0 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:30,000 Dear viewer, these subtitles were generated by a machine via the service Trint and therefore are (very) buggy. If you are capable, please help us to create good quality subtitles: https://c3subtitles.de/talk/701 Thanks! 1 00:00:13,640 --> 00:00:15,469 We all know that when you have physical 2 00:00:15,470 --> 00:00:17,569 access to a machine, that game 3 00:00:17,570 --> 00:00:19,639 over, but 4 00:00:19,640 --> 00:00:21,949 how much game over are we talking? 5 00:00:21,950 --> 00:00:24,049 Actually, let's find out 6 00:00:24,050 --> 00:00:26,269 how completely defenseless Intel 7 00:00:26,270 --> 00:00:29,389 chipsets are when faced with 8 00:00:29,390 --> 00:00:30,429 USB. 9 00:00:33,110 --> 00:00:35,179 Here's the maximum Noriaki with tapping 10 00:00:35,180 --> 00:00:36,559 into the core. Let's give them a big 11 00:00:36,560 --> 00:00:37,560 round of applause. 12 00:00:46,960 --> 00:00:49,119 OK, my name is 13 00:00:49,120 --> 00:00:50,109 Moxham, Gretchen. 14 00:00:50,110 --> 00:00:52,389 I'm a security 15 00:00:52,390 --> 00:00:53,390 researcher. 16 00:00:54,310 --> 00:00:57,219 It was a positive technology company. 17 00:00:57,220 --> 00:00:59,319 Unfortunately, my author 18 00:00:59,320 --> 00:01:01,089 couldn't be here. 19 00:01:01,090 --> 00:01:02,979 His contribution to the work huge. 20 00:01:02,980 --> 00:01:05,589 And please consider that we did 21 00:01:05,590 --> 00:01:07,509 his work together. 22 00:01:07,510 --> 00:01:09,579 So, uh, 23 00:01:09,580 --> 00:01:11,199 I would like to go over the topic of 24 00:01:11,200 --> 00:01:13,389 hardware, Georgeann, and, uh, 25 00:01:13,390 --> 00:01:15,519 tell about, uh, 26 00:01:15,520 --> 00:01:17,949 one of the modern Intel Sebu design 27 00:01:17,950 --> 00:01:19,899 features that can be used for this 28 00:01:19,900 --> 00:01:20,900 purpose. 29 00:01:22,830 --> 00:01:25,709 It's direct connect interface. 30 00:01:25,710 --> 00:01:26,710 OK. 31 00:01:27,370 --> 00:01:29,519 Uh, as you can see from 32 00:01:29,520 --> 00:01:31,529 the slide, we are going to, uh, to 33 00:01:31,530 --> 00:01:32,530 review, uh, 34 00:01:33,720 --> 00:01:36,119 uh, debugging interface 35 00:01:36,120 --> 00:01:38,849 as a basis of, uh, such 36 00:01:38,850 --> 00:01:41,669 Trudgen on the model until C.P.U, 37 00:01:41,670 --> 00:01:43,139 we are going to review. 38 00:01:43,140 --> 00:01:45,869 Uh, I do connect interface. 39 00:01:45,870 --> 00:01:48,059 It's, uh, Geotech, 40 00:01:48,060 --> 00:01:50,859 uh, like interface 41 00:01:50,860 --> 00:01:53,639 and, uh, activation. 42 00:01:53,640 --> 00:01:56,279 And, uh, then I'm going to talk about 43 00:01:56,280 --> 00:01:58,499 several types, uh, that 44 00:01:58,500 --> 00:02:00,749 can, uh, can you help to detect 45 00:02:00,750 --> 00:02:01,750 such attack. 46 00:02:02,790 --> 00:02:04,500 And so, 47 00:02:05,700 --> 00:02:08,129 uh, I could have a Trojan 48 00:02:08,130 --> 00:02:10,409 is a malicious alternation of hardware 49 00:02:10,410 --> 00:02:13,619 that could under specific, um, 50 00:02:13,620 --> 00:02:14,699 specific condition, 51 00:02:15,720 --> 00:02:18,239 uh, result in functional changes on, uh, 52 00:02:18,240 --> 00:02:19,049 to the system. 53 00:02:19,050 --> 00:02:21,749 It can be inserted at, uh, at the time 54 00:02:21,750 --> 00:02:24,569 of manufacture or shipment, uh, 55 00:02:24,570 --> 00:02:26,789 and storage or use. 56 00:02:27,930 --> 00:02:30,119 You can find information 57 00:02:30,120 --> 00:02:32,639 on this type and, uh, general 58 00:02:32,640 --> 00:02:34,019 technique of detection. 59 00:02:34,020 --> 00:02:36,119 Instapaper wanted, uh, 60 00:02:36,120 --> 00:02:37,800 commented on this on the slide. 61 00:02:39,000 --> 00:02:41,159 Uh, I think there is no need 62 00:02:41,160 --> 00:02:43,439 to emphasize the timelines 63 00:02:43,440 --> 00:02:45,929 of this system. 64 00:02:45,930 --> 00:02:47,669 Attack vector. 65 00:02:47,670 --> 00:02:49,799 And, uh, 66 00:02:49,800 --> 00:02:52,049 in the in the C catalog, 67 00:02:52,050 --> 00:02:53,969 which recently became available to 68 00:02:53,970 --> 00:02:56,249 public, uh, contains 69 00:02:56,250 --> 00:02:58,379 information on, uh, 70 00:02:58,380 --> 00:03:01,379 dedicated device for Dell servers 71 00:03:01,380 --> 00:03:03,779 that in, uh, in fact, uh, classic 72 00:03:03,780 --> 00:03:04,780 hardware, Trojan. 73 00:03:05,670 --> 00:03:08,159 And, uh, 74 00:03:10,280 --> 00:03:12,729 uh, what I've just said, logical 75 00:03:12,730 --> 00:03:14,939 Larisa's the following question, how much 76 00:03:14,940 --> 00:03:17,309 would it cost to implement such, 77 00:03:17,310 --> 00:03:19,779 uh, a Trojan on modern systems 78 00:03:19,780 --> 00:03:22,269 that the cost of the development and, 79 00:03:22,270 --> 00:03:24,539 uh, embedding such, 80 00:03:24,540 --> 00:03:26,779 uh, Trojans and Osos technique 81 00:03:26,780 --> 00:03:29,009 available to people organization 82 00:03:29,010 --> 00:03:31,439 who are not state security services. 83 00:03:32,880 --> 00:03:35,369 All reports will show that, 84 00:03:35,370 --> 00:03:36,149 unfortunately. 85 00:03:36,150 --> 00:03:37,019 Yes. 86 00:03:37,020 --> 00:03:38,509 And, uh, 87 00:03:40,140 --> 00:03:42,239 uh, implementing such Trojan 88 00:03:42,240 --> 00:03:44,569 may be impossible for anywhere who 89 00:03:44,570 --> 00:03:46,709 who is willing to explore the 90 00:03:46,710 --> 00:03:49,229 possibilities provided Geotech 91 00:03:49,230 --> 00:03:50,340 on the modern Sipi use 92 00:03:51,600 --> 00:03:53,189 and uh. 93 00:03:53,190 --> 00:03:55,039 Oh, sorry, sorry, sorry. 94 00:03:57,300 --> 00:04:00,269 It's it's INSEE. 95 00:04:00,270 --> 00:04:02,849 Uh, let's step aside, uh, 96 00:04:02,850 --> 00:04:05,129 a bit of usage, tech debugging 97 00:04:05,130 --> 00:04:07,409 technique, uh, a little closer and 98 00:04:07,410 --> 00:04:09,619 try to find it into LCP, 99 00:04:09,620 --> 00:04:11,849 use geotech standards for joint, 100 00:04:11,850 --> 00:04:14,579 uh, for Joint Action Group. 101 00:04:14,580 --> 00:04:17,129 Uh, and you can find as 102 00:04:17,130 --> 00:04:19,409 detailed, uh, 103 00:04:19,410 --> 00:04:21,898 its description in 104 00:04:21,899 --> 00:04:24,299 Tripoli, uh, with the details 105 00:04:24,300 --> 00:04:26,399 available and the standards itself, 106 00:04:26,400 --> 00:04:28,829 how you can see a reference 107 00:04:28,830 --> 00:04:30,299 on the slide. 108 00:04:30,300 --> 00:04:32,999 There is also video from, 109 00:04:33,000 --> 00:04:35,099 uh, Triple C conference available on 110 00:04:35,100 --> 00:04:37,979 YouTube, where the design is described 111 00:04:37,980 --> 00:04:40,109 in close detail 112 00:04:40,110 --> 00:04:42,779 and, uh, 113 00:04:42,780 --> 00:04:43,889 but, um, 114 00:04:45,180 --> 00:04:47,619 sometimes manufacture, uh, 115 00:04:47,620 --> 00:04:50,009 um, uh, 116 00:04:50,010 --> 00:04:52,469 but generally, uh, 117 00:04:52,470 --> 00:04:54,629 geotag is good, not only 118 00:04:54,630 --> 00:04:56,819 as a basis of Trudgen, 119 00:04:56,820 --> 00:04:59,369 it can also be used for forensic. 120 00:04:59,370 --> 00:05:01,469 For example, if you don't trust the 121 00:05:01,470 --> 00:05:03,659 BIOS, uh, and would 122 00:05:03,660 --> 00:05:05,129 like to read fine. 123 00:05:05,130 --> 00:05:07,889 Uh, from wires knowledge from 124 00:05:07,890 --> 00:05:10,169 Flesche without a programmer 125 00:05:10,170 --> 00:05:12,779 or to detect a rootkit 126 00:05:12,780 --> 00:05:14,939 and, uh, detection. 127 00:05:14,940 --> 00:05:17,279 But, um, can also 128 00:05:17,280 --> 00:05:19,379 be helpful in research 129 00:05:19,380 --> 00:05:22,709 for analyzing undocumented, 130 00:05:22,710 --> 00:05:25,609 uh, architecture technique, 131 00:05:25,610 --> 00:05:28,529 uh, also mudguard or 132 00:05:28,530 --> 00:05:30,689 system management. 133 00:05:30,690 --> 00:05:33,059 Uh, and it also 134 00:05:33,060 --> 00:05:35,789 may simplify, uh, simplify debugging 135 00:05:35,790 --> 00:05:37,949 of, uh, hypervisor 136 00:05:37,950 --> 00:05:40,739 and to drivers or, 137 00:05:40,740 --> 00:05:43,019 uh, power consumption or 138 00:05:43,020 --> 00:05:45,269 uh, you fi, 139 00:05:45,270 --> 00:05:48,089 uh, models and uh, 140 00:05:49,830 --> 00:05:52,469 some way, uh, 141 00:05:52,470 --> 00:05:54,249 often manufacture extend the standard 142 00:05:54,250 --> 00:05:57,239 stack by adding their own functionalities 143 00:05:57,240 --> 00:05:59,969 uh and uh, install 144 00:05:59,970 --> 00:06:02,909 uh do to uh, 145 00:06:02,910 --> 00:06:05,309 detect in uh 146 00:06:05,310 --> 00:06:07,769 into processor is described 147 00:06:07,770 --> 00:06:10,049 as a poorly uh uh, some 148 00:06:10,050 --> 00:06:12,179 information can be found, uh, in 149 00:06:12,180 --> 00:06:14,309 the documentation I mentioned on the 150 00:06:14,310 --> 00:06:16,569 slide and 151 00:06:16,570 --> 00:06:19,319 um, uh, 152 00:06:19,320 --> 00:06:21,269 how you can uh how you can see. 153 00:06:22,490 --> 00:06:24,679 Until you have three types 154 00:06:24,680 --> 00:06:27,259 of, uh, interface for 155 00:06:27,260 --> 00:06:29,539 Detec, it's, 156 00:06:29,540 --> 00:06:31,699 uh, direct connection through 157 00:06:31,700 --> 00:06:33,769 Entel in Target, Propp extended 158 00:06:33,770 --> 00:06:36,259 the port nitpicks ZIPPI 159 00:06:36,260 --> 00:06:39,259 and, uh, 160 00:06:39,260 --> 00:06:42,169 into its new technology, 161 00:06:42,170 --> 00:06:44,389 into Direct Connect interface. 162 00:06:44,390 --> 00:06:46,609 It's special transport, uh, 163 00:06:46,610 --> 00:06:49,219 designed to enable 164 00:06:49,220 --> 00:06:51,379 closer Cheesus debark through 165 00:06:51,380 --> 00:06:53,659 any ORFEUS misreports 166 00:06:53,660 --> 00:06:55,939 you can use geotag like, 167 00:06:55,940 --> 00:06:59,959 uh, interface, uh, 168 00:06:59,960 --> 00:07:02,299 through through use free. 169 00:07:02,300 --> 00:07:04,759 And, uh, there are two type 170 00:07:04,760 --> 00:07:06,379 of design. Wasn't there for use in the 171 00:07:06,380 --> 00:07:09,109 platform be requesting Dessaix. 172 00:07:09,110 --> 00:07:11,989 And uh, this is because then Gachet 173 00:07:11,990 --> 00:07:12,990 and 174 00:07:14,420 --> 00:07:16,549 now, uh, 175 00:07:16,550 --> 00:07:18,679 let's take a closer look at each 176 00:07:18,680 --> 00:07:19,680 of them. 177 00:07:22,970 --> 00:07:25,739 Intralytix DEPI, it's, 178 00:07:25,740 --> 00:07:28,009 uh, requires a special board 179 00:07:28,010 --> 00:07:29,149 and, uh, 180 00:07:30,230 --> 00:07:31,250 special socket, 181 00:07:32,480 --> 00:07:34,849 but, uh, it connects 182 00:07:34,850 --> 00:07:37,369 directly to the CPU. 183 00:07:37,370 --> 00:07:39,659 Uh, and, uh, 184 00:07:39,660 --> 00:07:41,989 uh, uh, it, uh, 185 00:07:41,990 --> 00:07:44,089 it is a capability with 186 00:07:44,090 --> 00:07:45,769 our intel system studier. 187 00:07:45,770 --> 00:07:47,929 You can download, uh, 188 00:07:47,930 --> 00:07:50,059 channel version from one of your 189 00:07:50,060 --> 00:07:53,449 websites and, uh, 190 00:07:53,450 --> 00:07:55,579 his, uh, his, 191 00:07:55,580 --> 00:07:58,219 uh, protocol protected by India 192 00:07:58,220 --> 00:08:01,009 and, uh, and 193 00:08:01,010 --> 00:08:03,259 makes a lot of noise and, uh, gets 194 00:08:03,260 --> 00:08:04,260 hot 195 00:08:06,680 --> 00:08:07,859 really. 196 00:08:07,860 --> 00:08:08,860 Uh, 197 00:08:10,370 --> 00:08:12,889 I check it, uh, starting 198 00:08:12,890 --> 00:08:15,109 with Skylake into, uh, 199 00:08:15,110 --> 00:08:17,599 introduced, uh, durcan 200 00:08:17,600 --> 00:08:18,919 that interface technology. 201 00:08:18,920 --> 00:08:21,679 And, uh, you can find Torres's, 202 00:08:21,680 --> 00:08:23,599 uh, specifically description of it in 203 00:08:23,600 --> 00:08:25,729 the, uh, documentation, the 204 00:08:25,730 --> 00:08:28,009 diagram show to type, 205 00:08:28,010 --> 00:08:30,449 uh, two types of connection 206 00:08:30,450 --> 00:08:32,928 using a special device and 207 00:08:32,929 --> 00:08:35,879 uh, um uh and 208 00:08:35,880 --> 00:08:37,999 uh, 209 00:08:38,000 --> 00:08:39,440 simple use USB 210 00:08:40,940 --> 00:08:42,109 cable. 211 00:08:42,110 --> 00:08:44,239 Uh, um, 212 00:08:44,240 --> 00:08:46,699 hey, uh, I would like to know that, 213 00:08:46,700 --> 00:08:49,519 uh, the target system is not, uh, 214 00:08:49,520 --> 00:08:51,769 is this case does the, uh, 215 00:08:51,770 --> 00:08:53,779 does not require any software or 216 00:08:53,780 --> 00:08:56,749 hardware, um, uh, against, 217 00:08:56,750 --> 00:08:58,909 uh, you 218 00:08:58,910 --> 00:09:01,049 need only, uh, 219 00:09:01,050 --> 00:09:03,679 uh, cable or 220 00:09:03,680 --> 00:09:04,680 special device. 221 00:09:06,320 --> 00:09:07,549 Uh, OK. 222 00:09:07,550 --> 00:09:10,819 And, uh, this technology, uh, 223 00:09:10,820 --> 00:09:13,129 unfortunately, uh is 224 00:09:13,130 --> 00:09:15,259 uh is works out of 225 00:09:15,260 --> 00:09:17,719 works or otherwise you 226 00:09:17,720 --> 00:09:20,569 uh you Sirius's chipsets 227 00:09:20,570 --> 00:09:22,340 and uh um 228 00:09:23,420 --> 00:09:25,549 well let's take a closer look at each 229 00:09:25,550 --> 00:09:26,550 of connection type. 230 00:09:27,780 --> 00:09:29,869 OK, this is because they 231 00:09:29,870 --> 00:09:32,409 say, uh 232 00:09:32,410 --> 00:09:34,639 uh, it's uh it's 233 00:09:34,640 --> 00:09:36,709 connection, uh, 234 00:09:36,710 --> 00:09:39,649 required special special device, 235 00:09:39,650 --> 00:09:42,079 uh, Entel Silicon View Technology, 236 00:09:42,080 --> 00:09:44,779 Clausewitz's Cheesus adapter, also 237 00:09:44,780 --> 00:09:47,609 known as a sweetie 238 00:09:47,610 --> 00:09:48,709 s.E.C. 239 00:09:48,710 --> 00:09:50,989 Or this has been provides access 240 00:09:50,990 --> 00:09:53,359 to the fix feature, 241 00:09:53,360 --> 00:09:55,429 uh, and, uh, 242 00:09:55,430 --> 00:09:58,139 like Geotech and or uncontrol 243 00:09:58,140 --> 00:10:00,349 through Eusebius reports on 244 00:10:00,350 --> 00:10:03,489 Entel, uh, 245 00:10:03,490 --> 00:10:05,749 and Direct Connect interface 246 00:10:05,750 --> 00:10:08,029 enabled silicone and platforms. 247 00:10:08,030 --> 00:10:10,129 It works through Eusebius for links, 248 00:10:10,130 --> 00:10:12,499 but implements a private protocol 249 00:10:12,500 --> 00:10:14,659 and makes it possible to manipulate 250 00:10:14,660 --> 00:10:18,619 the target system, uh, 251 00:10:18,620 --> 00:10:19,790 in deep sleep mode. 252 00:10:21,810 --> 00:10:23,909 Unfortunately, um, 253 00:10:23,910 --> 00:10:26,519 as of months ago, 254 00:10:26,520 --> 00:10:28,859 uh, both DEPI and Sweetie 255 00:10:28,860 --> 00:10:30,989 Adeptness, uh, might 256 00:10:30,990 --> 00:10:33,119 be, uh, able 257 00:10:33,120 --> 00:10:35,579 only after signing. 258 00:10:35,580 --> 00:10:37,949 Indeed, it wasn't all 259 00:10:37,950 --> 00:10:39,270 but is not a problem 260 00:10:41,400 --> 00:10:43,830 because we have special 261 00:10:45,030 --> 00:10:46,030 special device. 262 00:10:50,370 --> 00:10:52,469 Uh, Eusebius, requesting the 263 00:10:52,470 --> 00:10:54,779 CI is A commonly use B 264 00:10:54,780 --> 00:10:57,209 uh uh, through the buckyball, 265 00:10:57,210 --> 00:10:59,909 which work, uh, as an 266 00:10:59,910 --> 00:11:01,679 G device. 267 00:11:01,680 --> 00:11:03,869 That means that special device 268 00:11:03,870 --> 00:11:05,529 appears on the court system, an 269 00:11:05,530 --> 00:11:06,530 activation. 270 00:11:07,290 --> 00:11:08,290 It's really through. 271 00:11:10,470 --> 00:11:12,669 It's it's device, it's 272 00:11:12,670 --> 00:11:13,710 it's, uh, 273 00:11:14,910 --> 00:11:16,019 it's motherboard. 274 00:11:20,100 --> 00:11:22,739 And comments are sent 275 00:11:22,740 --> 00:11:24,839 to this device through a commonly used 276 00:11:24,840 --> 00:11:27,389 interface, the device itself 277 00:11:27,390 --> 00:11:29,819 is integrated into platform cantorial 278 00:11:29,820 --> 00:11:32,129 hip hop and, uh, 279 00:11:32,130 --> 00:11:33,819 it transforms the command into each 280 00:11:33,820 --> 00:11:34,820 attack. 281 00:11:35,520 --> 00:11:37,860 And it's geotag for pulse. 282 00:11:40,080 --> 00:11:42,119 And small demo. 283 00:11:45,190 --> 00:11:46,920 So one moment. 284 00:11:51,520 --> 00:11:54,099 We are selecting a configuration 285 00:11:55,570 --> 00:11:57,659 wait for connection to Target, both 286 00:11:57,660 --> 00:11:58,660 for. 287 00:12:00,480 --> 00:12:01,480 And. 288 00:12:04,300 --> 00:12:05,300 Stopped. 289 00:12:06,150 --> 00:12:07,150 Execution. 290 00:12:08,990 --> 00:12:10,009 On the altar at. 291 00:12:15,410 --> 00:12:16,460 From this device. 292 00:12:25,140 --> 00:12:26,220 Current construction. 293 00:12:34,990 --> 00:12:36,010 Special master. 294 00:12:43,190 --> 00:12:44,190 And. 295 00:12:46,410 --> 00:12:47,410 I'm sorry, 296 00:12:49,150 --> 00:12:50,150 okay. 297 00:12:55,720 --> 00:12:56,869 One step. 298 00:12:56,870 --> 00:12:57,870 OK. 299 00:13:01,690 --> 00:13:02,690 It's worth. 300 00:13:09,560 --> 00:13:11,330 OK, demised. 301 00:13:20,960 --> 00:13:23,240 How to activate this magic function? 302 00:13:24,570 --> 00:13:25,669 Uh, 303 00:13:26,790 --> 00:13:29,389 there are several ways to do that 304 00:13:29,390 --> 00:13:31,459 through a unified human 305 00:13:31,460 --> 00:13:34,249 interface infrastructure besiege strupp 306 00:13:34,250 --> 00:13:36,469 and special hiden 307 00:13:36,470 --> 00:13:37,470 to B device. 308 00:13:38,510 --> 00:13:40,940 Now, let's review each of them in detail. 309 00:13:42,680 --> 00:13:44,749 Activation where you fi human 310 00:13:44,750 --> 00:13:46,489 interface, infrastructure, you fight 311 00:13:46,490 --> 00:13:48,049 human interface. Infrastructure is a 312 00:13:48,050 --> 00:13:50,359 special interface, 313 00:13:50,360 --> 00:13:53,179 is a special interface 314 00:13:53,180 --> 00:13:55,070 that allow creating a user 315 00:13:56,960 --> 00:13:59,179 user forum in Newfie, 316 00:13:59,180 --> 00:14:01,609 as well as persistent and manipulating 317 00:14:01,610 --> 00:14:02,610 user input. 318 00:14:03,770 --> 00:14:05,869 If we look at how 319 00:14:05,870 --> 00:14:07,969 and what the Newfie bios, uh, 320 00:14:07,970 --> 00:14:10,189 designed, if we can find a lot 321 00:14:10,190 --> 00:14:12,469 of hiding options that are not 322 00:14:12,470 --> 00:14:15,559 available to the user but process 323 00:14:15,560 --> 00:14:17,959 protest by bios, 324 00:14:17,960 --> 00:14:19,440 there is in fact the 325 00:14:20,750 --> 00:14:22,999 basis of our first 326 00:14:23,000 --> 00:14:24,000 technique. 327 00:14:25,010 --> 00:14:26,010 Are you fire? 328 00:14:27,020 --> 00:14:28,640 Human rights infrastructure 329 00:14:29,930 --> 00:14:32,209 identifies default values for all 330 00:14:32,210 --> 00:14:34,279 options, including the hidden, 331 00:14:34,280 --> 00:14:35,749 uh, hidden ones. 332 00:14:35,750 --> 00:14:37,819 And as soon as we find 333 00:14:37,820 --> 00:14:40,009 the option connected to 334 00:14:40,010 --> 00:14:42,679 the say, it can be activated 335 00:14:42,680 --> 00:14:44,149 to set default. 336 00:14:50,130 --> 00:14:51,979 Discernable special adoption. 337 00:14:53,100 --> 00:14:54,840 Uh, and, uh, 338 00:14:56,280 --> 00:14:59,869 uh, uh, 339 00:14:59,870 --> 00:15:02,639 Newfie, uh, in defiance, 340 00:15:02,640 --> 00:15:05,099 uh, default value for adoption. 341 00:15:05,100 --> 00:15:06,519 And, uh, 342 00:15:07,650 --> 00:15:09,729 we find the option connected with the 343 00:15:09,730 --> 00:15:11,849 say it can be activated to set 344 00:15:11,850 --> 00:15:13,949 defaults, then resetting 345 00:15:13,950 --> 00:15:16,649 the buyers to default using standard, 346 00:15:16,650 --> 00:15:17,700 uh, interface. 347 00:15:18,840 --> 00:15:20,969 And, uh, we obtain 348 00:15:20,970 --> 00:15:22,710 and we're going to say it's using 349 00:15:23,850 --> 00:15:25,200 uh, um, 350 00:15:26,670 --> 00:15:29,189 they did it in much is, uh, 351 00:15:29,190 --> 00:15:31,379 programed into Flesche 352 00:15:31,380 --> 00:15:33,569 by a programmer or through 353 00:15:33,570 --> 00:15:35,699 the standard US, uh, 354 00:15:35,700 --> 00:15:39,119 phone wire tool, if you have privileges. 355 00:15:39,120 --> 00:15:41,549 Uh, and, uh, you 356 00:15:41,550 --> 00:15:43,649 can, um, this little 357 00:15:43,650 --> 00:15:45,959 sentence can be edited by only 358 00:15:45,960 --> 00:15:48,359 a special only, uh, by its configuration 359 00:15:48,360 --> 00:15:51,029 problem or program on 360 00:15:51,030 --> 00:15:52,469 on the on the slide. 361 00:15:52,470 --> 00:15:53,470 Is it 362 00:15:54,630 --> 00:15:56,149 it's free. 363 00:15:56,150 --> 00:15:58,609 You can you can download 364 00:15:58,610 --> 00:16:00,389 uh from the website 365 00:16:01,590 --> 00:16:03,059 and um 366 00:16:04,380 --> 00:16:08,009 uh but uh, 367 00:16:08,010 --> 00:16:10,679 if, uh, Woodgate is running, 368 00:16:10,680 --> 00:16:12,749 uh, this, uh, 369 00:16:12,750 --> 00:16:14,939 this technique, uh, 370 00:16:14,940 --> 00:16:17,009 don't work because, uh, 371 00:16:17,010 --> 00:16:19,229 the system will not vote, 372 00:16:19,230 --> 00:16:21,329 uh, since this to change, it 373 00:16:21,330 --> 00:16:23,999 changes a unified model. 374 00:16:24,000 --> 00:16:25,000 Uh, but 375 00:16:26,190 --> 00:16:27,190 you can. 376 00:16:28,990 --> 00:16:30,559 Activation where strupp. 377 00:16:31,740 --> 00:16:33,969 Uh, 378 00:16:33,970 --> 00:16:36,189 this decision 379 00:16:36,190 --> 00:16:37,999 can also be activated by configuration 380 00:16:38,000 --> 00:16:39,999 specific bit on the besieged 381 00:16:40,000 --> 00:16:42,099 configuration is a 382 00:16:42,100 --> 00:16:44,529 MONALI, uh, they 383 00:16:44,530 --> 00:16:46,609 are located in the 384 00:16:46,610 --> 00:16:48,849 descriptor region or by 385 00:16:48,850 --> 00:16:50,929 using flash of flash image tool. 386 00:16:50,930 --> 00:16:53,139 That is a special tool 387 00:16:53,140 --> 00:16:55,989 for, uh, 388 00:16:55,990 --> 00:16:59,859 for Crede, uh, 389 00:16:59,860 --> 00:17:02,109 from wire, uh, bills, because, 390 00:17:03,430 --> 00:17:05,559 uh, this technique works. 391 00:17:05,560 --> 00:17:08,309 Even if woodcutters activated, 392 00:17:08,310 --> 00:17:10,409 it's good and 393 00:17:10,410 --> 00:17:12,608 it's for and finally, 394 00:17:12,609 --> 00:17:14,769 you can try to activate 395 00:17:14,770 --> 00:17:16,838 it directly through Peteris be 396 00:17:16,839 --> 00:17:17,799 device. 397 00:17:17,800 --> 00:17:20,289 You can find a special index, 398 00:17:20,290 --> 00:17:22,689 uh, and register in documents 399 00:17:22,690 --> 00:17:24,489 for different PC generation. 400 00:17:25,609 --> 00:17:28,179 Uh, right. 401 00:17:28,180 --> 00:17:30,429 It's sixth generation 402 00:17:30,430 --> 00:17:32,799 and uh, left 403 00:17:32,800 --> 00:17:34,240 from seven generation 404 00:17:35,290 --> 00:17:37,210 and uh, um, 405 00:17:38,380 --> 00:17:40,779 uh, use those 406 00:17:40,780 --> 00:17:43,389 data for this activation on the fly 407 00:17:43,390 --> 00:17:45,829 if Beuse has not logged 408 00:17:45,830 --> 00:17:47,439 certain changes. 409 00:17:47,440 --> 00:17:48,440 Okay. Right. 410 00:17:49,130 --> 00:17:52,479 Uh, we know some motherboard 411 00:17:52,480 --> 00:17:54,160 where it's work 412 00:17:56,320 --> 00:17:58,419 and uh, so leads 413 00:17:58,420 --> 00:18:00,669 to the question, how can we protect 414 00:18:00,670 --> 00:18:03,669 ourselves from such Trojan's. 415 00:18:03,670 --> 00:18:05,649 And we propose activating Mudguard in 416 00:18:05,650 --> 00:18:07,389 order to make the modification the 417 00:18:07,390 --> 00:18:10,389 scripted, uh, in 418 00:18:10,390 --> 00:18:13,779 in the first uh 419 00:18:13,780 --> 00:18:16,059 and uh then you can check 420 00:18:16,060 --> 00:18:18,429 the discernable beat and debugging 421 00:18:18,430 --> 00:18:21,049 disable and register through, 422 00:18:21,050 --> 00:18:23,629 uh, special debug interface 423 00:18:23,630 --> 00:18:25,749 MSR in uh in 424 00:18:25,750 --> 00:18:27,879 this case, uh, the C may be 425 00:18:27,880 --> 00:18:30,159 enabled, but execution cannot 426 00:18:30,160 --> 00:18:31,269 be stopped. 427 00:18:31,270 --> 00:18:33,399 Uh, and uh, as 428 00:18:33,400 --> 00:18:35,829 a result, it's impossible to get access 429 00:18:35,830 --> 00:18:37,359 to memory and register 430 00:18:38,740 --> 00:18:39,740 and. 431 00:18:40,500 --> 00:18:43,559 You can, uh, 432 00:18:43,560 --> 00:18:45,649 see documentation 433 00:18:45,650 --> 00:18:48,269 the least significant bit, uh, 434 00:18:48,270 --> 00:18:50,399 this register makes it possible to 435 00:18:50,400 --> 00:18:52,919 restrict Sibiu debugging. 436 00:18:52,920 --> 00:18:54,989 So we need to set to 437 00:18:54,990 --> 00:18:57,179 zero and to log the register 438 00:18:57,180 --> 00:18:59,910 itself, recording, uh, 439 00:19:00,990 --> 00:19:02,749 which one into 440 00:19:04,200 --> 00:19:06,750 special fields and, uh. 441 00:19:08,610 --> 00:19:10,979 And, uh, can you help us to project 442 00:19:10,980 --> 00:19:13,109 to you your platform, 443 00:19:13,110 --> 00:19:15,539 your laptops and. 444 00:19:18,190 --> 00:19:20,230 But DSB, you can 445 00:19:21,550 --> 00:19:23,739 find or 446 00:19:23,740 --> 00:19:26,529 make special device, which, 447 00:19:26,530 --> 00:19:28,989 um, uh, 448 00:19:28,990 --> 00:19:31,269 which, uh, 449 00:19:31,270 --> 00:19:33,909 uh, uh, transmits commands 450 00:19:33,910 --> 00:19:36,129 from USB or wi fi 451 00:19:36,130 --> 00:19:38,199 and use it 452 00:19:38,200 --> 00:19:41,469 to, uh, 453 00:19:41,470 --> 00:19:43,929 implemented Back-Door in servers, 454 00:19:43,930 --> 00:19:46,629 in a laptop or, uh, 455 00:19:46,630 --> 00:19:49,449 servers or another, 456 00:19:49,450 --> 00:19:51,739 uh, another 457 00:19:51,740 --> 00:19:53,859 motherboard or 458 00:19:53,860 --> 00:19:55,779 computer and 459 00:19:57,340 --> 00:19:57,789 modules. 460 00:19:57,790 --> 00:19:58,809 I suppose. 461 00:19:58,810 --> 00:20:01,009 I also using debugging tools which they 462 00:20:01,010 --> 00:20:03,219 hope to uh use be 463 00:20:03,220 --> 00:20:06,059 available to numerous platforms 464 00:20:06,060 --> 00:20:08,289 there is to make it possible to control 465 00:20:08,290 --> 00:20:10,359 a system totally making the 466 00:20:10,360 --> 00:20:12,519 technology interactive, not 467 00:20:12,520 --> 00:20:14,739 only for debugging and research, but also 468 00:20:14,740 --> 00:20:17,019 for deploying hardware. 469 00:20:17,020 --> 00:20:19,689 Trojan and 470 00:20:19,690 --> 00:20:22,149 please check your 471 00:20:22,150 --> 00:20:23,380 Skylake laptops 472 00:20:24,610 --> 00:20:25,610 and. 473 00:20:26,690 --> 00:20:29,119 Thank you for your attention and, uh, 474 00:20:29,120 --> 00:20:30,529 maybe we, uh, 475 00:20:32,210 --> 00:20:34,639 we published a special tool on 476 00:20:34,640 --> 00:20:37,099 our own, get some of 477 00:20:37,100 --> 00:20:39,589 our company, uh, which 478 00:20:39,590 --> 00:20:42,079 can help you to check 479 00:20:42,080 --> 00:20:43,429 your motherboard. 480 00:20:43,430 --> 00:20:44,859 Thank you for your attention. 481 00:20:55,350 --> 00:20:58,469 It's possible, Maxine, so questions 482 00:20:58,470 --> 00:21:00,719 do we have any any questions from Axium 483 00:21:00,720 --> 00:21:02,789 about geotag over 484 00:21:02,790 --> 00:21:03,790 USPI? 485 00:21:04,890 --> 00:21:06,609 See one already here in the front? 486 00:21:08,430 --> 00:21:10,319 Thanks for a great talk. 487 00:21:10,320 --> 00:21:11,729 Um, two questions. 488 00:21:11,730 --> 00:21:14,099 First of all, um, could you share 489 00:21:14,100 --> 00:21:16,289 which motherboards, 490 00:21:16,290 --> 00:21:18,569 uh, allow enabling such 491 00:21:18,570 --> 00:21:20,249 debugging features? 492 00:21:20,250 --> 00:21:22,439 We know only one wonders because, 493 00:21:22,440 --> 00:21:24,719 uh, but, uh, we 494 00:21:24,720 --> 00:21:26,969 don't, um, search 495 00:21:26,970 --> 00:21:29,189 in other windows and we 496 00:21:29,190 --> 00:21:31,409 don't know, uh, 497 00:21:31,410 --> 00:21:32,410 how much it 498 00:21:33,890 --> 00:21:34,619 suspenders. 499 00:21:34,620 --> 00:21:36,689 OK, uh, 500 00:21:36,690 --> 00:21:37,739 why. 501 00:21:37,740 --> 00:21:39,959 Um, available 502 00:21:39,960 --> 00:21:42,150 to use as a function of functionality. 503 00:21:44,550 --> 00:21:46,649 Second question, um, 504 00:21:46,650 --> 00:21:49,319 is it possible to 505 00:21:49,320 --> 00:21:51,419 send debugging data not via 506 00:21:51,420 --> 00:21:53,639 USB but when 507 00:21:53,640 --> 00:21:55,380 network itself. 508 00:21:56,940 --> 00:21:58,479 Why not. 509 00:21:58,480 --> 00:22:00,839 You have my instrument engine 510 00:22:00,840 --> 00:22:01,840 processor. 511 00:22:04,020 --> 00:22:05,069 Scary things. 512 00:22:06,730 --> 00:22:09,089 OK, we have a question from the Internet. 513 00:22:12,180 --> 00:22:14,309 Hello. OK, um, the Internet wants 514 00:22:14,310 --> 00:22:16,259 to know if you have tried reverse 515 00:22:16,260 --> 00:22:18,479 engineering the protocol 516 00:22:18,480 --> 00:22:19,770 the USB box uses. 517 00:22:22,040 --> 00:22:23,040 Yeah, 518 00:22:25,260 --> 00:22:27,510 but it's, uh, 519 00:22:28,740 --> 00:22:29,880 uh, next serious. 520 00:22:31,590 --> 00:22:33,400 OK, here in the front. 521 00:22:34,890 --> 00:22:36,959 So have you contacted Intel and if. 522 00:22:36,960 --> 00:22:38,969 Yes, what they said, yes. 523 00:22:38,970 --> 00:22:41,159 They, uh, don't 524 00:22:41,160 --> 00:22:42,160 said anything 525 00:22:44,520 --> 00:22:45,599 in the back by the camera. 526 00:22:45,600 --> 00:22:48,029 So the the the debugging 527 00:22:48,030 --> 00:22:49,709 features can be disabled by the bios. 528 00:22:49,710 --> 00:22:50,639 Right. 529 00:22:50,640 --> 00:22:53,069 Sorry. What the debugging features 530 00:22:53,070 --> 00:22:54,899 can be disabled depending on your vendor 531 00:22:54,900 --> 00:22:56,039 by the bios. Right. 532 00:22:56,040 --> 00:22:58,739 Uh, Dessaix unfortunately 533 00:22:58,740 --> 00:22:59,789 sometimes no. 534 00:22:59,790 --> 00:23:01,150 Because uh 535 00:23:02,980 --> 00:23:04,799 uh you can um. 536 00:23:07,840 --> 00:23:10,299 Uh, because, uh, 537 00:23:10,300 --> 00:23:13,209 configuration of, uh, they say, 538 00:23:13,210 --> 00:23:16,319 uh, in a, uh, enable, uh, 539 00:23:16,320 --> 00:23:18,549 is enabling, uh, to 540 00:23:18,550 --> 00:23:21,189 besiege strip and if, uh, 541 00:23:21,190 --> 00:23:23,499 in besieged strip, uh, or on, 542 00:23:23,500 --> 00:23:25,599 uh, platform hub 543 00:23:25,600 --> 00:23:27,759 or is activated by us, 544 00:23:27,760 --> 00:23:30,009 uh, can't, uh, 545 00:23:30,010 --> 00:23:31,569 disable it. 546 00:23:31,570 --> 00:23:34,390 And if you, uh, if you have, uh, 547 00:23:35,440 --> 00:23:38,319 DEA, you always, 548 00:23:38,320 --> 00:23:42,339 uh, enable, uh, 549 00:23:42,340 --> 00:23:44,739 any features, uh, because 550 00:23:44,740 --> 00:23:47,319 you can, uh, you can stop 551 00:23:47,320 --> 00:23:49,389 on the asset vector. 552 00:23:49,390 --> 00:23:50,439 Sorry. 553 00:23:50,440 --> 00:23:52,659 So, uh, so any idea how widespread this 554 00:23:52,660 --> 00:23:53,660 is? 555 00:23:54,730 --> 00:23:56,349 The question was, do you have any idea 556 00:23:56,350 --> 00:23:58,639 how widespread this problem is? 557 00:23:58,640 --> 00:24:00,519 I, I don't know. 558 00:24:00,520 --> 00:24:02,649 Maybe, um, I, uh, I 559 00:24:02,650 --> 00:24:04,180 think that, um, 560 00:24:05,980 --> 00:24:08,319 uh, Encho, uh, 561 00:24:08,320 --> 00:24:11,319 implemented special, uh, 562 00:24:11,320 --> 00:24:14,289 special technique which, uh, 563 00:24:14,290 --> 00:24:16,419 connection with cryptography. 564 00:24:16,420 --> 00:24:18,849 Uh, but I don't, 565 00:24:18,850 --> 00:24:21,129 uh, don't use it, use it now. 566 00:24:21,130 --> 00:24:23,379 And I 567 00:24:23,380 --> 00:24:26,019 think that, uh, maybe in next generation 568 00:24:26,020 --> 00:24:27,020 activated it. 569 00:24:28,810 --> 00:24:29,979 We have another question from the 570 00:24:29,980 --> 00:24:30,999 Internet. 571 00:24:31,000 --> 00:24:32,859 Uh, the Internet wants to know if it's 572 00:24:32,860 --> 00:24:35,199 possible to use this to, um, do 573 00:24:35,200 --> 00:24:37,509 something to bypass, uh, 574 00:24:37,510 --> 00:24:39,279 some kind of signature check or 575 00:24:39,280 --> 00:24:40,280 something. 576 00:24:42,440 --> 00:24:45,139 So if you can, like, modify what's 577 00:24:45,140 --> 00:24:46,400 being executed basically 578 00:24:47,990 --> 00:24:50,089 now, because 579 00:24:50,090 --> 00:24:53,299 Strupp is not a signatory 580 00:24:53,300 --> 00:24:56,779 and, uh, you can, uh, 581 00:24:56,780 --> 00:24:59,059 override it, uh, 582 00:24:59,060 --> 00:25:00,819 for, um, 583 00:25:01,840 --> 00:25:04,039 uh, for 584 00:25:04,040 --> 00:25:06,379 for buyers and, uh, Bogot 585 00:25:06,380 --> 00:25:07,519 on another technology. 586 00:25:07,520 --> 00:25:10,609 Don't don't see, uh, 587 00:25:10,610 --> 00:25:11,610 I don't see it. 588 00:25:13,130 --> 00:25:14,449 Is there a follow up question from the 589 00:25:14,450 --> 00:25:15,769 Internet. Uh, yeah, that's the different 590 00:25:15,770 --> 00:25:17,959 question. That is, um, uh people 591 00:25:17,960 --> 00:25:20,239 want to know if and 592 00:25:20,240 --> 00:25:22,129 where they can get your slides and read 593 00:25:22,130 --> 00:25:23,130 more about your research. 594 00:25:24,240 --> 00:25:25,759 Sorry. 595 00:25:25,760 --> 00:25:27,949 They want to know if and where they 596 00:25:27,950 --> 00:25:30,139 can get the slides and read more about 597 00:25:30,140 --> 00:25:32,630 your research in my email. 598 00:25:35,720 --> 00:25:38,089 OK, Britney, I, 599 00:25:38,090 --> 00:25:39,090 I asked about 600 00:25:40,700 --> 00:25:41,700 I tell about it. 601 00:25:42,650 --> 00:25:44,689 OK, in the back. 602 00:25:44,690 --> 00:25:46,039 Yeah. Thanks for the talk. 603 00:25:46,040 --> 00:25:48,319 And did you do any research on platforms 604 00:25:48,320 --> 00:25:50,899 prior to Skylake, let's say Hatswell 605 00:25:50,900 --> 00:25:52,279 or something like that. 606 00:25:52,280 --> 00:25:53,899 Has a Haswell. 607 00:25:53,900 --> 00:25:56,299 Um, Hurtsville, 608 00:25:56,300 --> 00:25:58,629 uh, has, uh, 609 00:25:58,630 --> 00:25:59,599 the same technique. 610 00:25:59,600 --> 00:26:01,789 But unfortunately, uh, 611 00:26:01,790 --> 00:26:04,859 they say it's, uh, 612 00:26:04,860 --> 00:26:08,179 the technique in Huntsville, 613 00:26:08,180 --> 00:26:09,709 it's software technique. 614 00:26:09,710 --> 00:26:11,869 And sometimes, uh, and, 615 00:26:11,870 --> 00:26:14,809 uh, I, uh, I didn't see, 616 00:26:14,810 --> 00:26:17,549 uh, um, special special 617 00:26:17,550 --> 00:26:20,149 fin wire, which can, uh, 618 00:26:20,150 --> 00:26:23,059 use this, uh, uh, 619 00:26:23,060 --> 00:26:25,279 this, uh, detect like 620 00:26:25,280 --> 00:26:26,280 interface. 621 00:26:27,110 --> 00:26:28,979 It's, uh, it's technology. 622 00:26:28,980 --> 00:26:31,309 Uh, SVT adapter 623 00:26:31,310 --> 00:26:33,829 works from Hussle, 624 00:26:33,830 --> 00:26:36,049 but, uh, only 625 00:26:36,050 --> 00:26:38,179 after, uh, signing 626 00:26:38,180 --> 00:26:39,180 Indie's. 627 00:26:41,150 --> 00:26:43,159 So a Haswell doesn't work with a simple 628 00:26:43,160 --> 00:26:44,089 USB device. 629 00:26:44,090 --> 00:26:45,619 No, no, no. 630 00:26:45,620 --> 00:26:47,809 Only like on this 631 00:26:47,810 --> 00:26:49,909 x ray 632 00:26:49,910 --> 00:26:52,129 in the f shirt. 633 00:26:52,130 --> 00:26:54,289 Are you familiar with, uh, antivirus 634 00:26:54,290 --> 00:26:56,509 products that also use the Intel Dybbuk 635 00:26:56,510 --> 00:26:58,609 states like Checkpoint Sandblast, for 636 00:26:58,610 --> 00:27:00,889 example? And how is this similar 637 00:27:00,890 --> 00:27:03,889 or does it interfere with the hardware? 638 00:27:03,890 --> 00:27:06,769 It's difficult because it's very, uh, 639 00:27:06,770 --> 00:27:08,899 not stable works. 640 00:27:08,900 --> 00:27:11,539 So so does does that technique interfere, 641 00:27:11,540 --> 00:27:13,609 like with the checkpoint sandblast 642 00:27:13,610 --> 00:27:16,739 detect this or, uh, the checkpoint? 643 00:27:16,740 --> 00:27:19,269 Uh, it's 644 00:27:19,270 --> 00:27:21,949 mainly because, um, 645 00:27:21,950 --> 00:27:24,199 this technique have some 646 00:27:24,200 --> 00:27:24,769 troubles. 647 00:27:24,770 --> 00:27:27,409 For example, um, 648 00:27:27,410 --> 00:27:29,749 uh, 649 00:27:29,750 --> 00:27:32,239 they, uh, it, it use 650 00:27:32,240 --> 00:27:34,629 a hardware register, 651 00:27:34,630 --> 00:27:36,709 uh, and, uh, 652 00:27:36,710 --> 00:27:39,259 you can read, uh, 653 00:27:39,260 --> 00:27:41,369 um, address 654 00:27:41,370 --> 00:27:43,459 addresses and uh 655 00:27:43,460 --> 00:27:46,639 you can read, uh, modify, 656 00:27:46,640 --> 00:27:50,249 uh, of memory, which uh 657 00:27:50,250 --> 00:27:53,059 uh doing this uh svt 658 00:27:53,060 --> 00:27:55,309 or use b uh geotag 659 00:27:55,310 --> 00:27:57,619 like uh device. 660 00:27:57,620 --> 00:28:00,079 Uh and uh 661 00:28:00,080 --> 00:28:02,369 it's detect formulae uh 662 00:28:02,370 --> 00:28:04,699 uh for wires and 663 00:28:04,700 --> 00:28:07,069 uh maybe you can use 664 00:28:07,070 --> 00:28:08,380 it but uh. 665 00:28:09,550 --> 00:28:10,550 Uh. 666 00:28:11,500 --> 00:28:13,289 And not not good sometimes. 667 00:28:14,560 --> 00:28:16,449 You have time for about three more. 668 00:28:17,590 --> 00:28:18,590 Did you have a follow up? 669 00:28:19,600 --> 00:28:19,939 No. 670 00:28:19,940 --> 00:28:22,109 OK, then in the front, is 671 00:28:22,110 --> 00:28:24,219 is it tracing capabilities 672 00:28:24,220 --> 00:28:26,289 in a possible 673 00:28:26,290 --> 00:28:28,359 duel? Is it possible to trace code 674 00:28:28,360 --> 00:28:29,829 and maybe read Mamoru? 675 00:28:29,830 --> 00:28:31,059 Yes, well, of course. 676 00:28:32,630 --> 00:28:33,759 Yes, yes. Yes. 677 00:28:33,760 --> 00:28:35,859 OK, so you could you can read all 678 00:28:35,860 --> 00:28:38,230 the procedures and you can. 679 00:28:41,830 --> 00:28:42,719 You can. 680 00:28:42,720 --> 00:28:43,729 You can actually. 681 00:28:43,730 --> 00:28:45,609 Can you use this technique to at the 682 00:28:45,610 --> 00:28:48,279 moment where you can 683 00:28:48,280 --> 00:28:50,649 use hardware breakpoint for 684 00:28:50,650 --> 00:28:53,019 special register on the 685 00:28:53,020 --> 00:28:55,449 on the right in this 686 00:28:55,450 --> 00:28:57,939 breakpoints and uh 687 00:28:57,940 --> 00:29:00,699 I don't um able 688 00:29:00,700 --> 00:29:03,039 to look to WLOX, 689 00:29:03,040 --> 00:29:05,319 uh, as a memory 690 00:29:05,320 --> 00:29:06,939 which, uh, 691 00:29:08,080 --> 00:29:10,299 which use to 692 00:29:10,300 --> 00:29:11,859 system, for example. 693 00:29:11,860 --> 00:29:14,529 And it we're doing 694 00:29:14,530 --> 00:29:15,309 we're doing it. 695 00:29:15,310 --> 00:29:16,539 Yeah. 696 00:29:16,540 --> 00:29:17,579 OK, in the back right 697 00:29:18,910 --> 00:29:21,069 now, um, the protocol 698 00:29:21,070 --> 00:29:22,899 that is protected and. 699 00:29:22,900 --> 00:29:25,329 Yeah. Are you aware of any like open 700 00:29:25,330 --> 00:29:26,289 research on this. 701 00:29:26,290 --> 00:29:27,639 Yes, it's open research. 702 00:29:27,640 --> 00:29:29,949 OK, another thing, if you 703 00:29:29,950 --> 00:29:31,779 would like following the normal USPI 704 00:29:31,780 --> 00:29:33,339 protocol or do you really need some 705 00:29:33,340 --> 00:29:36,189 special electrical properties for 706 00:29:36,190 --> 00:29:38,619 a sweetie special adapter? 707 00:29:38,620 --> 00:29:41,059 It's proper protocol which, 708 00:29:41,060 --> 00:29:43,539 um, using, 709 00:29:43,540 --> 00:29:45,699 uh, as a signal orfeus be 710 00:29:45,700 --> 00:29:48,099 free, but it's it's not used three. 711 00:29:48,100 --> 00:29:50,289 And this cable, it's, 712 00:29:50,290 --> 00:29:52,359 uh, simple USB three 713 00:29:52,360 --> 00:29:53,379 protocol. 714 00:29:53,380 --> 00:29:56,589 And uh, yes, 715 00:29:56,590 --> 00:29:58,939 you can write program, which, 716 00:29:58,940 --> 00:30:01,359 uh, for example, 717 00:30:01,360 --> 00:30:03,639 uh, can trace your 718 00:30:03,640 --> 00:30:05,049 target target system. 719 00:30:05,050 --> 00:30:06,050 Yeah. 720 00:30:06,700 --> 00:30:09,099 OK. And last one in the back. 721 00:30:09,100 --> 00:30:11,799 Um, it's it like Chatur compatible 722 00:30:11,800 --> 00:30:13,569 in such a way that it has a scansion and 723 00:30:13,570 --> 00:30:16,179 stuff or is this some internal invention. 724 00:30:16,180 --> 00:30:17,180 D.C.I protocol 725 00:30:18,400 --> 00:30:20,989 does say, uh, I know, 726 00:30:20,990 --> 00:30:23,229 uh, I think that this 727 00:30:23,230 --> 00:30:25,419 is a special device which I 728 00:30:25,420 --> 00:30:28,059 retranslated, uh, the comments 729 00:30:28,060 --> 00:30:30,489 from USB, uh, 730 00:30:30,490 --> 00:30:32,859 to J�taka chain 731 00:30:32,860 --> 00:30:34,809 tech types. Yeah, right. 732 00:30:34,810 --> 00:30:37,059 So it's like, uh, toggling the 733 00:30:37,060 --> 00:30:38,109 signals. Yeah. 734 00:30:38,110 --> 00:30:39,859 Yeah, yes. So that's what happens. 735 00:30:39,860 --> 00:30:42,039 Wow. And is there any chance to 736 00:30:42,040 --> 00:30:44,149 put this support into open OCD? 737 00:30:44,150 --> 00:30:46,839 You are such open source software 738 00:30:46,840 --> 00:30:48,759 and maybe in the future. 739 00:30:48,760 --> 00:30:49,760 Thanks. 740 00:30:50,590 --> 00:30:52,719 OK, let's put our hands together for 741 00:30:52,720 --> 00:30:53,770 Maxine one more time.