1 00:00:00,099 --> 00:00:14,390 *Music* 2 00:00:14,390 --> 00:00:17,390 Herald: Because Iran pops up in the news 3 00:00:17,390 --> 00:00:21,200 frequently and mostly when it pops up, it's often about censorship and 4 00:00:21,200 --> 00:00:26,820 surveillance and our speaker here Mahsa Alimardani she's actually an expert on 5 00:00:26,820 --> 00:00:30,980 this topic. She's a specialist, she currently works at the Oxford Internet 6 00:00:30,980 --> 00:00:37,249 Institute, where she researches politics of Iran and of the Iranian internet but 7 00:00:37,249 --> 00:00:43,489 she also works for the NGO Article 19 and in her talk - which we hope we'll have 8 00:00:43,489 --> 00:00:50,290 the slides up very soon - in her talk she's doing a rundown of the current state 9 00:00:50,290 --> 00:00:55,530 of censorship and surveillance in Iran. So thank you for waiting until now, please 10 00:00:55,530 --> 00:00:57,629 give a warm round of applause to 11 00:00:57,629 --> 00:00:59,529 Mahsa Alimardani 12 00:00:59,529 --> 00:01:07,819 *Applause* 13 00:01:07,819 --> 00:01:10,040 Mahsa Alimardani: Well, thank you for coming and 14 00:01:10,040 --> 00:01:16,070 being so patient to hear me talk today I have to admit I did not anticipate doing 15 00:01:16,070 --> 00:01:20,989 this without my computer in front of me but I guess it's a good exercise in 16 00:01:20,989 --> 00:01:25,200 becoming less reliant on my devices. But I do still have my phone in my hand with the 17 00:01:25,200 --> 00:01:30,810 slide so I think that'll be useful; so, the name of the talk is "Tightening the 18 00:01:30,810 --> 00:01:36,719 Net" and so as the introduction went I'm going to be talking a little bit about how 19 00:01:36,719 --> 00:01:43,060 information controls work on the Iranian intranet. You're probably listening to my 20 00:01:43,060 --> 00:01:49,939 voice wondering why someone with an Iranian name sounds kind of American. I'm 21 00:01:49,939 --> 00:01:54,950 - I grew up in Canada and I spent most of my life going back and forth between the 22 00:01:54,950 --> 00:02:01,130 various countries I lived in abroad and back to Iran, so that's why I sound this 23 00:02:01,130 --> 00:02:08,010 way. It's a Canadian accent. And so I, I had slides to accompany what I was going 24 00:02:08,010 --> 00:02:15,000 to say next and it had a frightening Iranian vampire, that I was going to get 25 00:02:15,000 --> 00:02:21,330 into later on, but it seems that I can you know replace the frightening Iranian 26 00:02:21,330 --> 00:02:30,440 vampire for now. So the reason why I am here. Who am I?Well I wear a lot of 27 00:02:30,440 --> 00:02:34,280 different hats, the introduction said that I am, 28 00:02:34,280 --> 00:02:36,440 oh, that's not my slide, 29 00:02:36,440 --> 00:02:39,010 there's a frightening woman in front of me. 30 00:02:39,010 --> 00:02:44,690 *Laughter* 31 00:02:44,690 --> 00:02:50,490 So I, I'm doing my PhD at the Oxford Internet 32 00:02:50,490 --> 00:02:54,980 Institute and there I'm studying how social media evolves in Iran's information 33 00:02:54,980 --> 00:03:00,370 control space to see how political participation shapes, especially during 34 00:03:00,370 --> 00:03:06,260 elections and things like that. I also spend the majority of my time at a london- 35 00:03:06,260 --> 00:03:14,470 based NGO called Article 19 and there I work with an Iran team that tracks how 36 00:03:14,470 --> 00:03:19,450 freedom of expression and access to information takes shape in Iran, and uh, I 37 00:03:19,450 --> 00:03:32,180 think my slides are on their way up here? No? Is it there? It will come? That's 38 00:03:32,180 --> 00:03:34,940 promising. So at Article 19. 39 00:03:34,940 --> 00:03:42,150 *Applause* 40 00:03:42,150 --> 00:03:44,300 Yay, my slides are here, that's so 41 00:03:44,300 --> 00:03:50,680 exciting. Oh can I actually? then I it goes 42 00:03:50,680 --> 00:03:53,120 ... can I actually control it? 43 00:03:53,120 --> 00:03:54,330 Herald: You have to signal. 44 00:03:54,330 --> 00:03:56,340 MA: Oh, I have to signal, okay. We 45 00:03:56,340 --> 00:04:00,650 can go to the next slide. 46 00:04:00,650 --> 00:04:03,890 *Laughter* 47 00:04:03,890 --> 00:04:09,460 No, nope, oh this is fun, okay, so this was the part 48 00:04:09,460 --> 00:04:14,040 that would appear when I'm explaining who I am. What are you? It's the scene 49 00:04:14,040 --> 00:04:18,170 from the movie, but, I've been referencing, it's called "A girl walkes 50 00:04:18,170 --> 00:04:23,350 home alone at night" I think you should all watch it. So, we can go to the next 51 00:04:23,350 --> 00:04:30,580 slide. So, um, there was a troll on Twitter yesterday when I posted about my 52 00:04:30,580 --> 00:04:34,780 talk, who were saying that I'm kind of doing war-mongering or something like 53 00:04:34,780 --> 00:04:39,670 that, so I just want to leave a disclaimer: I do work on human rights, I 54 00:04:39,670 --> 00:04:43,950 am talking about some of the repressive things that happens in Iran, but this is 55 00:04:43,950 --> 00:04:54,390 not a talk to scare you away from Iran. In fact, if - you can go back - in fact, if 56 00:04:54,390 --> 00:04:58,350 it, if I weren't here and if I weren't doing this particular type of work I would 57 00:04:58,350 --> 00:05:04,240 probably be in Iran with my family for the holidays, so I urge you, if you have no 58 00:05:04,240 --> 00:05:10,890 security concerns, please go. It's a amazing country lots to see. But, one 59 00:05:10,890 --> 00:05:15,870 thing you will find is that the internet experience is a little bit different than 60 00:05:15,870 --> 00:05:22,270 what you would experience here in Leipzig, which kind of brings me round to the topic 61 00:05:22,270 --> 00:05:28,710 of my talk. So, the Iranian internet is sometimes known as "Filter-Net", this is a 62 00:05:28,710 --> 00:05:34,390 term that a lot of us who do kind of digital advocacy for Iran know and often 63 00:05:34,390 --> 00:05:42,331 use. I think the term was coined around 2009 or 2010 by a Iranian journalist, who 64 00:05:42,331 --> 00:05:48,240 focuses on technology named Mima Akbar, for, you can follow the hashtag on Twitter 65 00:05:48,240 --> 00:05:51,840 and you could see lots of different things related to Internet censorship and 66 00:05:51,840 --> 00:06:00,770 surveillance in Iran. And so - next slide - there's also the series, that I helped 67 00:06:00,770 --> 00:06:06,139 run with a number of colleagues at Article 19, which is called "Tightening the Net" 68 00:06:06,139 --> 00:06:09,840 the name of this talk and if you want to get into the nitty gritty details of what 69 00:06:09,840 --> 00:06:16,169 happens in terms of internet policy, in terms of how users are put at risk in Iran 70 00:06:16,169 --> 00:06:21,669 this is a series you can follow and it started initially with the national 71 00:06:21,669 --> 00:06:26,810 internet project, which is sort of sometimes known as the "Halal-Net". 72 00:06:26,810 --> 00:06:31,500 And then, we looked at software and cyber tactics in Iran for the next edition and 73 00:06:31,500 --> 00:06:37,360 now every quarter we come out with a rundown of what's going on, online in 74 00:06:37,360 --> 00:06:42,090 Iran, with a series of advocacy recommendations for various branches of 75 00:06:42,090 --> 00:06:47,080 the Iranian government. So, if you want to get more information beyond the 76 00:06:47,080 --> 00:06:56,850 generalities of this talk to check that out. Next slide. So, understanding the 77 00:06:56,850 --> 00:07:03,260 #filternet. In order to understand - next slide - so whenever I do this, it means 78 00:07:03,260 --> 00:07:09,180 next slide. So, understanding what happens online you 79 00:07:09,180 --> 00:07:14,810 have to kind of understand that in Iran there is an infrastructure of control, 80 00:07:14,810 --> 00:07:23,220 that kind of shapes how this works and I can show this to you. Here, which is kind 81 00:07:23,220 --> 00:07:32,190 of a map of what's going on in Iran and you can see that in Iran the head of state 82 00:07:32,190 --> 00:07:38,140 is in fact not elected, it's the supreme leader. He's kind of a religious 83 00:07:38,140 --> 00:07:42,360 authority, but also he has ultimate veto- power over everything that happens in the 84 00:07:42,360 --> 00:07:47,530 country and you can see him up at the top. I'm not signaling to change, I'm just pointing. 85 00:07:47,530 --> 00:07:52,250 It's, he's up at the top there and everything sort of like falls under 86 00:07:52,250 --> 00:07:58,770 his umbrella. And, what's interesting to know that, every four years there, are 87 00:07:58,770 --> 00:08:03,430 there is a democratic element to the government in Iran and there is a 88 00:08:03,430 --> 00:08:09,010 president that gets elected and within the president's cabinet you have the Ministry 89 00:08:09,010 --> 00:08:16,490 of ICT information communications and technology and within the Ministry of ICT 90 00:08:16,490 --> 00:08:22,350 you see a lot of what happens in terms of control inside of Iran. So the Ministry of 91 00:08:22,350 --> 00:08:28,180 ICT runs the telecommunications company of Iran and they maintain and authorize all 92 00:08:28,180 --> 00:08:34,259 the ISP and so in some ways this has been really good, because the current 93 00:08:34,259 --> 00:08:40,130 administration, that was elected back in 2013 and it was reelected in 2017 is a 94 00:08:40,130 --> 00:08:45,369 moderate administration and so it's done a lot to improve internet conditions in 95 00:08:45,369 --> 00:08:49,669 Iran. Internet speeds have improved by huge 96 00:08:49,669 --> 00:08:54,660 amounts. So, sometimes the Iranian internet was named, known as "condnet" 97 00:08:54,660 --> 00:09:00,139 which, kind of is like "slow internet", but that's really improved since this 98 00:09:00,139 --> 00:09:05,550 government has come into power and it's the government of President Rouhani and 99 00:09:05,550 --> 00:09:10,200 other things, like Internet access has come to villages, that often didn't have 100 00:09:10,200 --> 00:09:14,699 this kind of access. So in terms of ICT for development there's been a lot of 101 00:09:14,699 --> 00:09:20,009 progress over the past few years because of the work of this government in that 102 00:09:20,009 --> 00:09:26,389 ministry, but in terms of how surveillance occurs. So all Internet traffic is routed 103 00:09:26,389 --> 00:09:32,519 through the telecommunications company of Iran including private and government ISPs 104 00:09:32,519 --> 00:09:39,279 and the TCI - as you can see right below the Ministry of ICT - is responsible for 105 00:09:39,279 --> 00:09:45,680 blocking webpages and blacklists and keywords and in terms of surveillance the 106 00:09:45,680 --> 00:09:51,660 TCI also uses proxy servers for surveillance by logging all unencrypted 107 00:09:51,660 --> 00:09:55,540 web traffic which is why it's really important for there to be HTTPS over 108 00:09:55,540 --> 00:10:02,019 websites in Iran. What was particularly concerning is that 109 00:10:02,019 --> 00:10:05,339 underneath the control of the Supreme Leader there's a body called the 110 00:10:05,339 --> 00:10:12,439 Revolutionary Guards and so, every time there's a protest movement in Iran or 111 00:10:12,439 --> 00:10:18,050 there's any sort of opposition's of the status quo the Revolutionary Guards help 112 00:10:18,050 --> 00:10:24,110 the regime kind of, you know, quell protesters, arrest them, gather 113 00:10:24,110 --> 00:10:37,269 intelligence and so the IRGC, excuse me. In 2009 the IRGC a consortium owned by 114 00:10:37,269 --> 00:10:43,320 this kind of paramilitary organization bought about 51% of the telecommunications 115 00:10:43,320 --> 00:10:47,569 company of Iran, because the government was trying to privatize it, but in essence 116 00:10:47,569 --> 00:10:53,269 its ownership falls, fell under this kind of repressive body within the 117 00:10:53,269 --> 00:11:00,040 establishment. So, beyond strengthening the the Revolutionary Guards, with you 118 00:11:00,040 --> 00:11:05,619 know, financial, through financial means they had direct access to the data of 119 00:11:05,619 --> 00:11:11,350 ordinary citizens which is super concerning. We can go to the next slide now. 120 00:11:11,350 --> 00:11:15,920 This was the news back in 2009 when they 121 00:11:15,920 --> 00:11:22,370 got 51% of the shares of the telecommunications company of Iran. Next 122 00:11:22,370 --> 00:11:32,319 slide. So, just to go over a brief history of controls, because along with the 123 00:11:32,319 --> 00:11:38,290 infrastructure of control, there's kind of a legal mechanism for how this kind of 124 00:11:38,290 --> 00:11:45,490 established itself. So, back in 2001, filtering really started in Iran because 125 00:11:45,490 --> 00:11:52,139 there is a crackdown on newspapers and a lot of people started migrating online. 126 00:11:52,139 --> 00:11:58,279 The scripts for writing Persian online was developing so, there was this huge 127 00:11:58,279 --> 00:12:02,300 migration and it was only around 2001 that the government started targeting and doing 128 00:12:02,300 --> 00:12:07,839 censorship of these, you know, more reformist or progressive journalists and 129 00:12:07,839 --> 00:12:14,269 activists, who were writing and kind of going against the ethos of the regime. 130 00:12:14,269 --> 00:12:20,440 You can go back, you went ahead too. Oh, so were you doing it? Oh sorry. 131 00:12:20,440 --> 00:12:22,420 *Laughter* 132 00:12:22,420 --> 00:12:29,819 Totally did not make that connection. So that was in 2001 and they wanted to 133 00:12:29,819 --> 00:12:36,089 codify how the system works, in terms of the filtering committee that enables this 134 00:12:36,089 --> 00:12:43,459 and so in 2006 there was a draft law known as the computer crimes law and actually 135 00:12:43,459 --> 00:12:47,300 Article 19, the law team and that Iran team - I wasn't part 136 00:12:47,300 --> 00:12:51,980 of it because this was before my time at the organization - they actually are the 137 00:12:51,980 --> 00:13:00,529 only source of translating and analyzing this law and so, it came into a draft form 138 00:13:00,529 --> 00:13:06,949 in 2006 and then by 2009 they really wanted to mobilize it and make sure it 139 00:13:06,949 --> 00:13:14,589 went into law. And 2009 was when the green movement happened and so the government 140 00:13:14,589 --> 00:13:18,750 was kind of trying to rein in control over what kind of discourse was going on 141 00:13:18,750 --> 00:13:24,430 online, because they they effectively shut down the internet for a small period of 142 00:13:24,430 --> 00:13:30,279 time during that protest movement and so right after this happened they picked up 143 00:13:30,279 --> 00:13:35,329 speed on this and made sure it passed and by 2010 this became law. 144 00:13:35,329 --> 00:13:43,170 You can take a look at this document in more precise form, different things like 145 00:13:43,170 --> 00:13:47,839 article 10, which makes things like encryption illegal came out of this 146 00:13:47,839 --> 00:13:53,639 document, different things like the filtering committee that decides through 147 00:13:53,639 --> 00:13:58,740 multi agency network of different ministries and different experts in the 148 00:13:58,740 --> 00:14:00,630 government what content needs to be filtered. 149 00:14:00,630 --> 00:14:02,979 Do you want me to do this and you can. 150 00:14:02,979 --> 00:14:04,549 *Laughs* 151 00:14:04,549 --> 00:14:08,649 Sorry I feel bad I've made you, yeah. 152 00:14:08,649 --> 00:14:10,579 *Laughter* 153 00:14:10,579 --> 00:14:11,579 Here she is. 154 00:14:11,579 --> 00:14:16,789 *Applause* 155 00:14:16,789 --> 00:14:21,779 Okay, okay, yeah, I'm sorry, I didn't realize and she was crouching here 156 00:14:21,779 --> 00:14:31,779 the entire time and that's not cool. So, so the next thing I have is a video 157 00:14:31,779 --> 00:14:37,970 which I feel like it's gonna get really difficult. So, the law came into effect in 158 00:14:37,970 --> 00:14:44,819 2010 and different bodies came into formation as well, things like the 159 00:14:44,819 --> 00:14:50,840 Revolutionary Guard set up their own cyber division known as Gharargah in 2009, right 160 00:14:50,840 --> 00:14:58,170 after the protest movement. Iran's police forces also established 161 00:14:58,170 --> 00:15:04,509 their own pulley of cyber force named Fatah in 2011 and because the 162 00:15:04,509 --> 00:15:09,189 establishment was realizing that the internet was so, basically crucial to the 163 00:15:09,189 --> 00:15:13,361 functioning of the nation, national security was being compromised, things 164 00:15:13,361 --> 00:15:18,460 like cyber attacks against the country's infrastructure was happening, the supreme 165 00:15:18,460 --> 00:15:22,240 leader basically wanted everything centralized to him, and so he created the 166 00:15:22,240 --> 00:15:26,989 "Supreme Council of Cyberspace" which, its name translated into English, is very 167 00:15:26,989 --> 00:15:32,690 scifi and fun to say sometimes and that happened in 2012. 168 00:15:32,690 --> 00:15:38,149 And so, this is all kind of like boring and I guess lots of dates and lots of 169 00:15:38,149 --> 00:15:41,970 things, but it's really important to how things happen day to day in Iranian's 170 00:15:41,970 --> 00:15:48,329 lives and how they experience the internet and so... Back in a few years ago, a 171 00:15:48,329 --> 00:15:53,899 colleague and I, okay, at the University of Amsterdam, decided to go through the 172 00:15:53,899 --> 00:15:59,739 censorship redirect page. So everytime you want to visit a page that's censored it's 173 00:15:59,739 --> 00:16:04,989 called peyvandha.ir - you can probably look this up, if you want - and so we 174 00:16:04,989 --> 00:16:09,300 using the wayback machine we, like, traced it over the years and how it evolved and 175 00:16:09,300 --> 00:16:13,259 how it kind of reflects on this changing internet policy. 176 00:16:13,259 --> 00:16:17,920 So I'm gonna take a crack at playing this, I'm probably gonna really mess this up, 177 00:16:17,920 --> 00:16:26,859 actually, but... uhm... so this is the video... Can I do it without...? 178 00:16:26,859 --> 00:16:28,040 AH: Let's try it... I can 179 00:16:28,040 --> 00:16:33,730 MA: Yes. Yeah! 180 00:16:33,730 --> 00:16:38,089 Video: arose with the establishment of Iran cybercrime laws following the 2009 181 00:16:38,089 --> 00:16:42,459 Green movement. The different versions of peyvandha.ir, which contain literature 182 00:16:42,459 --> 00:16:46,689 related to these laws and regulations, evolve as norms of what constitutes as 183 00:16:46,689 --> 00:16:50,290 filtered content becomes more entrenched with Iran. From the inception of the very 184 00:16:50,290 --> 00:16:55,269 first version of the page, whereby users are told: "In the name of god, according 185 00:16:55,269 --> 00:16:59,920 to the Computer Crimes Act, access to this website requested, is not possible." The 186 00:16:59,920 --> 00:17:04,640 messages users are viewing as censorship page, is toned down in the next version, 187 00:17:04,640 --> 00:17:08,240 whereby users are only told, that the links they are viewing are some of the 188 00:17:08,240 --> 00:17:14,419 registered links. Within version 2, we also see the peyvandha.ir website creating 189 00:17:14,419 --> 00:17:19,569 pages related to Internet policy. the 3rd version of peyvandha.ir continues with the 190 00:17:19,569 --> 00:17:24,270 theme of religious references, with a poem featured that states: "If you listen to 191 00:17:24,270 --> 00:17:30,010 the words of the poet Saadi, he says, he consents to require the consent of him". 192 00:17:30,010 --> 00:17:33,970 Immediately to the right of this, users see the text: "In the name of god and the 193 00:17:33,970 --> 00:17:38,970 merciful", as if to subtly tell users that the censorship they are experiencing, is 194 00:17:38,970 --> 00:17:42,820 by the will of god. These religious references are continued 195 00:17:42,820 --> 00:17:47,490 in version 4, whereby the main feature of the page is a changing image that makes 196 00:17:47,490 --> 00:17:52,049 references to national holidays and events, maintaining the theme of allusions 197 00:17:52,049 --> 00:17:58,059 to Shia Islam and national Imams. This image, for instance, depicts a mosque, 198 00:17:58,059 --> 00:18:02,950 marking the festival of Imam Reza, asking users to click on a link to submit ideas 199 00:18:02,950 --> 00:18:06,780 for the festival. Version 5 of peyvandha.ir brings attention 200 00:18:06,780 --> 00:18:10,610 to the islamic nature of censorship. The links featured here are perhaps the most 201 00:18:10,610 --> 00:18:15,320 related to state propaganda in comparisons to the other versions. While the previous 202 00:18:15,320 --> 00:18:19,740 version did not display any links, all previous versions of peyvandha.ir featured 203 00:18:19,740 --> 00:18:24,049 the popular Persian language blogging platform, BlogFa. However, this version 204 00:18:24,049 --> 00:18:28,100 omits the website. The omission of the main image in version 5 makes it hard to 205 00:18:28,100 --> 00:18:32,391 establish a firm connection between the previous and following versions. This 206 00:18:32,391 --> 00:18:35,960 finding is in line with the notion that archives of web pages are not always 207 00:18:35,960 --> 00:18:39,940 successful in capturing all of the content. However, further research shows 208 00:18:39,940 --> 00:18:45,180 that this version still made use of images regarding Shia Islam. The after the Green 209 00:18:45,180 --> 00:18:50,299 movement, internet controls in Iran from 2009 and 2012 report, by the OpenNet 210 00:18:50,299 --> 00:18:54,960 initiative has captured and saved the version of peyvandha.ir, as it was on a 211 00:18:54,960 --> 00:19:01,850 25th of October 2012. This image features quranic writings. The last 2 iterations of 212 00:19:01,850 --> 00:19:06,690 the website in version 6 and 7 are very similar in design. The sudden change in 213 00:19:06,690 --> 00:19:11,691 design was explained by an anonymous source to make filtering more pleasant. Or 214 00:19:11,691 --> 00:19:16,370 rather to appear as a subtle part of the Iranian internet experience rather than 215 00:19:16,370 --> 00:19:21,179 one presented with indoctrinating aspects of the government. The significant change 216 00:19:21,179 --> 00:19:25,760 that comes in version 7, however, is the prominent feature of the Internet policy 217 00:19:25,760 --> 00:19:31,850 links. Concluding, we can say that this historiography of the peyvandha.ir website 218 00:19:31,850 --> 00:19:35,220 demonstrates a timeline of the beginning of the heightened internet controls from 219 00:19:35,220 --> 00:19:41,000 the inception of the page in 2010 to the present day. The changes in the page 220 00:19:41,000 --> 00:19:45,289 essentially demonstrate the evolution of the ways the Iranian state represents its 221 00:19:45,289 --> 00:19:50,519 censorship policies. The notions of religious motifs decrease over time, 222 00:19:50,519 --> 00:19:54,490 whereas the focus on internet policy becomes more present by the last iteration 223 00:19:54,490 --> 00:19:57,870 of the page. 224 00:19:57,870 --> 00:20:00,870 MA: And that was that. And as I struggle 225 00:20:00,870 --> 00:20:06,820 to go back to my presentation... Oh, I did it... without any glitches... how 226 00:20:06,820 --> 00:20:10,990 exciting... and so, over the years there have been different programs that the 227 00:20:10,990 --> 00:20:16,040 government has kind of put into place beyond the censorship that they do. Things 228 00:20:16,040 --> 00:20:20,460 that I have been following through my own work have been "the spider program", which 229 00:20:20,460 --> 00:20:26,320 comes from the Revolutionary Guards Garrideb division, the cyber... kind of 230 00:20:26,320 --> 00:20:29,820 Iranian cyber division of the Revolutionary Guards and intelligent 231 00:20:29,820 --> 00:20:37,080 filtering, the National Information Network, and the different ways that the 232 00:20:37,080 --> 00:20:41,549 Iranian government has been trying to attack journalist, activists, and human 233 00:20:41,549 --> 00:20:47,509 rights defenders in terms of... that the attacking these kind of vulnerable 234 00:20:47,509 --> 00:20:52,370 individuals that pose a threat. There's a lot of different projects article 19 235 00:20:52,370 --> 00:20:56,799 had an Iranian cyber army report about this, and there's been really great work 236 00:20:56,799 --> 00:21:03,230 to track this being done by the campaign for human rights in Iran by their 237 00:21:03,230 --> 00:21:08,299 researcher Amir Rashidi and by two other researchers who've been tracking this with 238 00:21:08,299 --> 00:21:14,390 the Iran threats project - Colin Anderson and Claudio Ranieri - so there's tons of 239 00:21:14,390 --> 00:21:20,850 great research being done in terms of identifying these attackers. The 240 00:21:20,850 --> 00:21:24,950 intelligent filtering project that the Iranian government has been doing is 241 00:21:24,950 --> 00:21:31,279 something that I looked into with another colleague - Frederic Jacobs - in 2015 and 242 00:21:31,279 --> 00:21:35,100 basically at that time we were noticing that the Iranian government was making 243 00:21:35,100 --> 00:21:41,190 these really grand statements. That's the Ministry of ICT about how they had 244 00:21:41,190 --> 00:21:46,889 sophisticated means to censor individual pages on different social media. And 245 00:21:46,889 --> 00:21:52,860 basically this has been a old policy that they've wanted to do, so sites like 246 00:21:52,860 --> 00:21:58,710 Facebook and Twitter were censored after the protest movement in 2009. Actually in 247 00:21:58,710 --> 00:22:04,409 the lead-up to the protest movement they were censored. And so for a long time 248 00:22:04,409 --> 00:22:08,390 various members of the government have said they want to unblock these platforms 249 00:22:08,390 --> 00:22:12,600 and find the means to just censor individual pages, or problematic content 250 00:22:12,600 --> 00:22:15,669 and leave these websites open. However, that's really 251 00:22:15,669 --> 00:22:20,360 hard to do, unless the government has a relationship with these companies. If they 252 00:22:20,360 --> 00:22:25,081 have a relationship with Facebook or Twitter. And so back in 2015, they made a 253 00:22:25,081 --> 00:22:28,179 grand announcement that they had finally nailed it, and they were doing this on 254 00:22:28,179 --> 00:22:34,440 Instagram. And Instagram is one of the more popular social media platforms and so 255 00:22:34,440 --> 00:22:38,600 what we noticed was that the censorship - intelligence censorship, which is just 256 00:22:38,600 --> 00:22:44,159 individual pages or individual pictures or accounts being censored - it was only 257 00:22:44,159 --> 00:22:50,610 being done on the mobile app, and the reason was that Instagram hadn't yet 258 00:22:50,610 --> 00:22:56,580 rolled out HTTPS on the mobile application. It had enabled it on the the 259 00:22:56,580 --> 00:23:02,309 browser version of the website, and so the running governments great, grand unveiling 260 00:23:02,309 --> 00:23:08,319 of intelligent censorship was in reality just Instagram not doing this. 261 00:23:08,319 --> 00:23:12,999 And so we found what kind of content they were targeting, which was really 262 00:23:12,999 --> 00:23:18,649 interesting, kind of cultural research in terms of how censorship was working. 263 00:23:18,649 --> 00:23:24,840 And then my colleague got in touch with Instagram, and they soon rolled out the 264 00:23:24,840 --> 00:23:30,850 HTTPS on the mobile app and then intelligent censorship came unraveling as 265 00:23:30,850 --> 00:23:35,970 the motherboard writer Lorenzo "Iran smart Instagram censorship isn't that smart." 266 00:23:35,970 --> 00:23:42,379 And so that's just one example of these grand policies that actually don't really 267 00:23:42,379 --> 00:23:47,241 add up to very much in terms of intelligent filtering. The researcher 268 00:23:47,241 --> 00:23:53,320 Colin Anderson recently found this database of Europe URLs that different 269 00:23:53,320 --> 00:24:01,309 ISPs were giving to this company called Sahab Pardaz. I can't talk too much about 270 00:24:01,309 --> 00:24:06,090 this, but this was kind of a public notice he put out to ask anyone interested in 271 00:24:06,090 --> 00:24:10,530 this data set, to see if this is actually another phase of intelligent filtering. 272 00:24:10,530 --> 00:24:17,240 However, the minister of ICT did respond to this and said that they are not 273 00:24:17,240 --> 00:24:23,370 actually compromising users' data, and he condemned the work of this company Sahab 274 00:24:23,370 --> 00:24:30,200 Pardaz, which doesn't quite add up, which I guess helps illustrate how confusing 275 00:24:30,200 --> 00:24:34,320 Internet policy is in Iran, like what are they actually doing, what are they 276 00:24:34,320 --> 00:24:40,219 actually saying, how does it align with the laws, and those kinds of regulations. 277 00:24:40,219 --> 00:24:47,379 In 2016... through the budget, it was announced that Iran was spending about 66 278 00:24:47,379 --> 00:24:52,010 million on the intelligent filtering project, however it's really unclear what 279 00:24:52,010 --> 00:24:55,610 that adds up to, like what are the deliverables on this work that they're 280 00:24:55,610 --> 00:25:02,639 doing? So again, it's kind of like this chaotic quagmire of what's actually 281 00:25:02,639 --> 00:25:07,629 happening or not in terms of their ability to silence 282 00:25:07,629 --> 00:25:16,750 different voices in Iran. They have been kind of targeting different users in 283 00:25:16,750 --> 00:25:25,769 different ways in 2015, 2016 the Garrideb spider program was rounding up series of 284 00:25:25,769 --> 00:25:29,440 models and people in the fashion industry in Iran that are quite prominently present 285 00:25:29,440 --> 00:25:36,259 on Instagram, and while some of the statements coming from Garrideb was saying 286 00:25:36,259 --> 00:25:39,610 that they had technical hacking abilities, what they were actually doing 287 00:25:39,610 --> 00:25:45,390 was arresting these models and forcing passwords and getting their accounts that 288 00:25:45,390 --> 00:25:50,450 way, but during that time I actually got an Instagram request from one of these 289 00:25:50,450 --> 00:25:56,779 seized accounts, Nikahang Clothing, which you can see over there, and you can see 290 00:25:56,779 --> 00:26:02,090 that Garrideb had taken it over, because there's a notice that's saying because of 291 00:26:02,090 --> 00:26:07,610 such-and-such law this account has been seized under the spider program, and so 292 00:26:07,610 --> 00:26:14,190 that was happening for a while under this. Again, more actual physical takeover than 293 00:26:14,190 --> 00:26:18,799 technical sophistication of that kind of work. Another thing that's quite 294 00:26:18,799 --> 00:26:22,950 concerning, that the campaign for human rights actually was the first to report 295 00:26:22,950 --> 00:26:30,539 on, was the Supreme Council of cyberspace requiring all telegram accounts to 296 00:26:30,539 --> 00:26:37,690 register with the government, and so Telegram is hugely popular inside of Iran, 297 00:26:37,690 --> 00:26:42,440 it's almost ubiquitous, and it's often used as a social media application, 298 00:26:42,440 --> 00:26:47,470 and so the public channels are run by administrators, and if you have more than 299 00:26:47,470 --> 00:26:52,309 5,000 followers, they basically needed you to register and get approval, and by 300 00:26:52,309 --> 00:26:57,460 registering they would add a bot to the account, and the bot could basically get 301 00:26:57,460 --> 00:27:01,620 information of the administrators and the followers, which was quite dangerous 302 00:27:01,620 --> 00:27:07,570 because last May, when in the lead-up to the presidential elections there was a 303 00:27:07,570 --> 00:27:13,059 roundup of Telegram administrators that a lot of digital activists believe was 304 00:27:13,059 --> 00:27:23,350 through this registration program of having all of this personal data. Excuse 305 00:27:23,350 --> 00:27:30,220 me. In terms of the national internet project, it's quite a contentious project 306 00:27:30,220 --> 00:27:36,059 in that a lot of people say that on one extreme it goes towards being like North 307 00:27:36,059 --> 00:27:41,030 Korea's intranet, kind of closed off from the rest of the world. I... through 308 00:27:41,030 --> 00:27:45,399 my own work I don't think this is what the Iranian government wants to do. They 309 00:27:45,399 --> 00:27:49,759 do want to localize certain things like banking and different forms of 310 00:27:49,759 --> 00:27:55,620 infrastructure against cyberattacks like Stuxnet, but in general what they want to 311 00:27:55,620 --> 00:28:00,919 do is keep data inside of the country, so they can have access and control in... 312 00:28:00,919 --> 00:28:04,260 part of this project has been to create imitation versions 313 00:28:04,260 --> 00:28:09,429 of foreign companies, so like I said they couldn't force Facebook or 314 00:28:09,429 --> 00:28:13,200 Twitter to censor things for them, because they don't have a relationship, but if 315 00:28:13,200 --> 00:28:17,809 they have local versions they can effectively do this, and so and they've 316 00:28:17,809 --> 00:28:22,860 come up with alternatives for things like Instagram, with Lenzor, which you can see 317 00:28:22,860 --> 00:28:31,559 has a very oddly similar user interface, but oftentimes users inside of Iran don't 318 00:28:31,559 --> 00:28:36,429 trust these imitation apps, so usage amongst for like Instagram it's always 319 00:28:36,429 --> 00:28:40,600 much higher than it is for the local alternatives. One researcher 320 00:28:40,600 --> 00:28:48,850 a few years ago saw that the way that a Telegram imitation app was implemented 321 00:28:48,850 --> 00:28:53,460 kind of traced how the data was going back to the government, so there's generally a 322 00:28:53,460 --> 00:29:00,549 sense of distrust for this kind of work. Throughout the year, since 2016 this 323 00:29:00,549 --> 00:29:05,699 attempt to localize user content has really increased. They put a ultimatum on 324 00:29:05,699 --> 00:29:10,000 platforms that have not been censored yet, like Telegram and Instagram, that they had 325 00:29:10,000 --> 00:29:14,999 a year to bring their servers inside of the country, or else it would be censored. 326 00:29:14,999 --> 00:29:21,960 This obviously didn't work, so in 2017, this past year, they've been doing 327 00:29:21,960 --> 00:29:27,590 different things that kind of have basically added up to net discrimination, 328 00:29:27,590 --> 00:29:32,010 like they've been going against net neutrality values by offering incentives 329 00:29:32,010 --> 00:29:38,320 for people to use local traffic, access local traffic, local platforms and 330 00:29:38,320 --> 00:29:43,270 websites over international ones, and they've been giving million-dollar 331 00:29:43,270 --> 00:29:48,830 incentives to developers to create apps, and for example if they got a million 332 00:29:48,830 --> 00:29:56,830 users, they would get a million American dollars for developing such a platform. 333 00:29:56,830 --> 00:30:04,710 Recently, we just translated and analyzed a new policy that's forming into a law by 334 00:30:04,710 --> 00:30:09,340 the Supreme Council of cyberspace policy, an action on organizing social media 335 00:30:09,340 --> 00:30:14,860 messaging applications, and this is just a set of rules for local apps and foreign 336 00:30:14,860 --> 00:30:18,070 apps that need to follow in order to operate inside 337 00:30:18,070 --> 00:30:27,850 of Iran. This is supposed to be a gif, but that didn't work. So, another point 338 00:30:27,850 --> 00:30:32,999 that's kind of come up over... especially over the past year, is how controls don't 339 00:30:32,999 --> 00:30:34,981 only come from the Iranian government, but they 340 00:30:34,981 --> 00:30:46,500 also come from abroad. So companies like Apple and Google, in order to comply and 341 00:30:46,500 --> 00:30:51,090 sometimes over-comply with US sanctions, they've been denying certain services to 342 00:30:51,090 --> 00:30:56,649 Iranians. So what has been happening... it has been... Iranian app developers have 343 00:30:56,649 --> 00:31:02,349 been seeing their apps being rejected from the Google Play Store, and the Apple... 344 00:31:02,349 --> 00:31:09,330 the App Store. Mainly because they were providing financial transactions over it, 345 00:31:09,330 --> 00:31:13,330 and even things that weren't directly doing financial payments were getting 346 00:31:13,330 --> 00:31:19,080 blocked, such as one particular app, which is kind of the Uber of Iran, called Snap, 347 00:31:19,080 --> 00:31:23,330 they were told to remove financial payments over the app or else they would 348 00:31:23,330 --> 00:31:27,900 be getting removed from the App Store. Once they did remove that, it seemed that 349 00:31:27,900 --> 00:31:32,080 they knew that there was some sort of financial transaction occurring offline 350 00:31:32,080 --> 00:31:36,980 and they still removed that app from the App Store, just to 351 00:31:36,980 --> 00:31:46,179 comply with sanctions. There's also a kind of threat to other companies, as the 352 00:31:46,179 --> 00:31:50,929 nuclear negotiations went through back in 2015, there's a lot of foreign companies 353 00:31:50,929 --> 00:31:56,500 going in. There's been a huge influx of the telecom sector, like Vodafone and 354 00:31:56,500 --> 00:32:00,699 Orange, and different companies like that going to Iran, and there's kind of a fear 355 00:32:00,699 --> 00:32:05,269 that social media giants like Twitter and Facebook might find incentive to also 356 00:32:05,269 --> 00:32:10,899 go, so it's always good to keep pressure to... for them to the remain transparent 357 00:32:10,899 --> 00:32:18,299 about their dealings with Iran. The new minister of ICT recently said that he had 358 00:32:18,299 --> 00:32:23,320 started negotiations with Twitter to unfilter Twitter in Iran, however Twitter 359 00:32:23,320 --> 00:32:31,029 has refused to officially reply, or say anything. So the thing that I spend most 360 00:32:31,029 --> 00:32:37,130 of my time working on in terms of social media discourse is Telegram, because 361 00:32:37,130 --> 00:32:42,299 Telegram is kind of an exciting new territory in understanding social media, 362 00:32:42,299 --> 00:32:47,220 especially in Iran, because internet penetration and Telegram usage are 363 00:32:47,220 --> 00:32:55,100 almost on par, so there's about 40 to 45 million Internet users inside of Iran, and 364 00:32:55,100 --> 00:32:59,870 according to the company Telegram, there's about 25 million daily users and about 365 00:32:59,870 --> 00:33:04,499 40 million monthly users. So what this means for how 366 00:33:04,499 --> 00:33:10,020 people communicate, how people are accessing information in Iran, is huge, 367 00:33:10,020 --> 00:33:14,520 because oftentimes everything from shopping to staying in touch with friends 368 00:33:14,520 --> 00:33:18,980 to getting updates on the weather and traffic and news, it comes from Telegram 369 00:33:18,980 --> 00:33:27,299 and the public channels. So understanding this, and how the government is responding 370 00:33:27,299 --> 00:33:31,740 to such an important application for communication, is also really important 371 00:33:31,740 --> 00:33:38,789 and as always it's become sort of a target for vulnerable at-risk users, for example 372 00:33:38,789 --> 00:33:44,780 a number of journalists a few years ago were having their accounts seized through 373 00:33:44,780 --> 00:33:51,150 SMS brute-force entry, I mean through SMS logins, they were 374 00:33:51,150 --> 00:33:59,659 able to get in, and so there's those kinds of concerns. Telegram has been kind of 375 00:33:59,659 --> 00:34:04,619 reactive to these security flaws. When the journalist had their accounts taken over 376 00:34:04,619 --> 00:34:10,600 through the SMS hacks, they did help reinstate them. A few weeks ago there was 377 00:34:10,600 --> 00:34:18,850 a flaw in a notification that users got in Iran on Telegram, that hackers were able 378 00:34:18,850 --> 00:34:23,170 to sort of take over - you can see in that picture over there - and Telegram kind of 379 00:34:23,170 --> 00:34:31,150 reacted really fast and fixed the flaw. But the issue that a lot of digital rights 380 00:34:31,150 --> 00:34:37,760 activists on Iran find is that Telegram is so important, and it's so crucial to how a 381 00:34:37,760 --> 00:34:42,960 lot of things operate inside of Iran, yet they're not really trying to prevent 382 00:34:42,960 --> 00:34:50,760 anything, they're being much more reactive. There's also been concerns about 383 00:34:50,760 --> 00:34:56,910 how they interact with the Iranian government as well, and... however, 384 00:34:56,910 --> 00:35:02,570 Telegram has kind of always made a... taking a stand to say that they are not 385 00:35:02,570 --> 00:35:11,940 cooperating with the Iranian government and... but they do say large things, 386 00:35:11,940 --> 00:35:16,790 boastful things, that they stand for freedom of speech, yet they have failed to 387 00:35:16,790 --> 00:35:23,090 really reach out to civil society and human rights activists for Iran and so 388 00:35:23,090 --> 00:35:28,690 there's a general kind of plea towards this platform that's so important, for 389 00:35:28,690 --> 00:35:34,330 them to be a bit more cooperative and prioritize these human rights concerns in 390 00:35:34,330 --> 00:35:42,860 Iran a little bit more. I was going to slightly get into more security 391 00:35:42,860 --> 00:35:49,670 aspects of things, but I'll quickly go over it. Obviously, there's security concerns 392 00:35:49,670 --> 00:35:55,150 with Telegram. It takes up some of the work that I do at article 19, working with 393 00:35:55,150 --> 00:36:00,940 civil society and protecting them in that way, so I'll just quickly go over it 394 00:36:00,940 --> 00:36:09,610 because I wanted to end on a particular note. This is like a very... a standard 395 00:36:09,610 --> 00:36:14,570 thing I'd like to say is you don't necessarily apply the same security 396 00:36:14,570 --> 00:36:19,230 concerns to Iran that you would here, so just these grand statements of 397 00:36:19,230 --> 00:36:24,690 "use Signal, use TOR" often don't work. Telegram is hugely popular, so I often say 398 00:36:24,690 --> 00:36:28,700 "why don't we work on making Telegram safer," because users are not going to 399 00:36:28,700 --> 00:36:33,740 migrate away from it unless Signal comes and creates a whole infrastructure 400 00:36:33,740 --> 00:36:38,380 and platform that's going to cater to those specific needs of being both social 401 00:36:38,380 --> 00:36:44,200 media and having the different usability features. That's really the last point 402 00:36:44,200 --> 00:36:53,370 I wanted to take away with. But I also just wanted to have one kind of message, which is 403 00:36:53,370 --> 00:36:59,130 I am super privileged to be standing here and talking about this topic that 404 00:36:59,130 --> 00:37:07,280 I am really passionate about and I am really grateful that I've had this opportunity, 405 00:37:07,280 --> 00:37:15,410 since over the years to work on these kind of digital rights concerns on Iran, and 406 00:37:15,410 --> 00:37:22,580 I've had certain personal hurdles in terms of, without cutting into the nitty-gritty 407 00:37:22,580 --> 00:37:28,070 of my personal life and the things I've had to go through, but there's been this 408 00:37:28,070 --> 00:37:34,830 general kind of mood in the past year, with the #MeToo movement and all these 409 00:37:34,830 --> 00:37:43,800 different stories of harassment and basically I've been really grateful to all 410 00:37:43,800 --> 00:37:48,030 the people who have supported me over the years to make sure that the hurdles I've 411 00:37:48,030 --> 00:37:54,840 had to encounter for the specific kind of unfortunate personal events that took 412 00:37:54,840 --> 00:38:00,581 place, that have affected my career... To really help support me and when I was 413 00:38:00,581 --> 00:38:05,310 coming to Leipzig I was super proud to be coming to the Chaos 414 00:38:05,310 --> 00:38:11,550 Computer Club's events and the stories I've been hearing about people who have 415 00:38:11,550 --> 00:38:18,540 been victims of harassment have really upset me and I think it would be... 416 00:38:18,540 --> 00:38:22,520 I would be remiss to not make a point of saying that I'm a little bit 417 00:38:22,520 --> 00:38:28,080 disappointed, that I've been reading these things, and 418 00:38:28,080 --> 00:38:39,120 *Applause* 419 00:38:39,120 --> 00:38:41,980 And while I really appreciate all of you 420 00:38:41,980 --> 00:38:47,840 and all the help you give me to set up my talk and I appreciate 421 00:38:47,840 --> 00:38:52,161 that I've been given this platform, but I really hope we can do better, because this 422 00:38:52,161 --> 00:38:58,110 is just not cool. It's not cool for people to not feel safe and I know how it feels 423 00:38:58,110 --> 00:39:04,450 personally and I hope Dina - I haven't seen her yet, I have chatted with her 424 00:39:04,450 --> 00:39:09,620 briefly, I hope she's having a great time at this Congress, because... and I'm 425 00:39:09,620 --> 00:39:14,170 really sorry to hear that some of... some people that I think are doing great work 426 00:39:14,170 --> 00:39:19,390 and should be in the space are not here this year, and I just hope we can do 427 00:39:19,390 --> 00:39:24,700 better in 2018. And that's about it. Thank you. 428 00:39:24,700 --> 00:39:45,130 *Applause* 429 00:39:45,130 --> 00:39:46,300 Herald: Thanks for your talk. Mahsa 430 00:39:46,300 --> 00:39:51,270 Alimardani, and for your patience with our technical problems. Thank you very much. 431 00:39:51,270 --> 00:39:56,360 Please line up at the microphones. There are four microphones here in the room. 432 00:39:56,360 --> 00:39:59,310 Please line up there. We have a couple more 433 00:39:59,310 --> 00:40:02,350 minutes for Q&A. You wanna hold a Q&A? Yes? 434 00:40:02,350 --> 00:40:04,450 MA: Sure. 435 00:40:04,450 --> 00:40:06,030 H: But first, maybe there are the signal 436 00:40:06,030 --> 00:40:10,290 angels in the back. Is he waving or not, are there any questions from the internet? 437 00:40:10,290 --> 00:40:13,730 Signal angel: No, nothing. H: Okay, thank you. There is someone 438 00:40:13,730 --> 00:40:15,770 standing at microphone 3. What's your question? 439 00:40:15,770 --> 00:40:21,541 Microphone 3: Hi. Thanks for your last statement, really. Thanks a lot. My 440 00:40:21,541 --> 00:40:27,820 question would be about Instagram and Telegram. I don't know if I missed that 441 00:40:27,820 --> 00:40:32,060 part, but does it mean that then the Iranian government has relationships with 442 00:40:32,060 --> 00:40:36,250 them? Because you mentioned that they help. I mean, they show these things, so 443 00:40:36,250 --> 00:40:41,720 you've been blocked and this is because of this. So why this happens? And why is it 444 00:40:41,720 --> 00:40:46,840 only these two particular platforms? I understood that Twitter and Facebook don't 445 00:40:46,840 --> 00:40:50,190 cooperate. If you could say more about that, thanks. 446 00:40:50,190 --> 00:40:54,360 MA: yeah, that's a really great question, and something that's been really 447 00:40:54,360 --> 00:40:58,380 interesting. So, I think, I mentioned that this new government the moderate Rouhani 448 00:40:58,380 --> 00:41:03,850 administration has kind of, at least in terms of how its positioned the words it 449 00:41:03,850 --> 00:41:09,640 says, has been a bit more open to internet freedoms and things like that. And so I think 450 00:41:09,640 --> 00:41:13,770 one of the achievements of that government is stopping the censorship of Instagram 451 00:41:13,770 --> 00:41:16,050 and Telegram. Because there's lots of hardline elements 452 00:41:16,050 --> 00:41:20,780 in the establishment that have wanted this to get censored. And it's kind of like 453 00:41:20,780 --> 00:41:24,540 come to deliberation to censor it over the years. There have been some rumors that 454 00:41:24,540 --> 00:41:32,411 Telegram has been working with... with the Iranian government. Although, I think that 455 00:41:32,411 --> 00:41:35,771 might be rumors, because the Ministry of ICT every so often says that they have a 456 00:41:35,771 --> 00:41:42,170 direct relationship and then Telegram comes and refutes it. So, yeah, that's up 457 00:41:42,170 --> 00:41:47,040 in the realm of rumours, however. But I think it's mainly the work of this 458 00:41:47,040 --> 00:41:51,490 moderate administration that's been able to prevent the censorship. If that answers 459 00:41:51,490 --> 00:41:53,030 your question. M3: So they are in connection 460 00:41:53,030 --> 00:41:58,210 with Instagram? MA: No, there are as far as I know they're 461 00:41:58,210 --> 00:42:02,100 not working with Instagram. Instagram is owned by Facebook, so Facebook is 462 00:42:02,100 --> 00:42:06,830 censored. But, I mean there could be many different reasons but these are all 463 00:42:06,830 --> 00:42:11,980 conjecture. Instagram is just kind of more for entertainment, so they have less of a 464 00:42:11,980 --> 00:42:18,780 reason to block it, but also the work of this moderate administration to kind of 465 00:42:18,780 --> 00:42:22,480 keep Instagram going. Although, for a short while during the elections they were 466 00:42:22,480 --> 00:42:27,230 blocking Instagram live, because it was being used for like protests and 467 00:42:27,230 --> 00:42:35,130 gatherings and things like that. H: Microphone number 1 please. 468 00:42:35,130 --> 00:42:37,750 Microphone 1: Mahsa I just wanted to thank you for you for your talk, and also 469 00:42:37,750 --> 00:42:40,920 appearing persevering through all the adversity. Not only of nation state 470 00:42:40,920 --> 00:42:43,270 actors but of also people inside the community that might. 471 00:42:43,270 --> 00:42:45,230 H: Come a little bit closer to the microphone please. 472 00:42:45,230 --> 00:42:47,830 M3: Sure. I just wanted to say thank you for persevering through all the 473 00:42:47,830 --> 00:42:51,700 adversity that has come your way, and for being here today to give this talk. It's 474 00:42:51,700 --> 00:42:58,550 important and vital and your voice is valued. The question about Iran in a 475 00:42:58,550 --> 00:43:03,640 geopolitical landscape as its exerting itself more in Yemen, Lebanon, perhaps 476 00:43:03,640 --> 00:43:07,320 other places. Do you see that the technology that's being pioneered by the 477 00:43:07,320 --> 00:43:13,250 state apparatuses, the state bodies inside of, inside of Tehran and Iran, will have a 478 00:43:13,250 --> 00:43:19,410 trickle-down effect into other countries, that may replicate the oppressive 479 00:43:19,410 --> 00:43:24,980 structures in which that Iran has placed? Do you see it being a model, as Iran 480 00:43:24,980 --> 00:43:28,850 geopolitically exerts this muscle? Well, do you see that some of these the 481 00:43:28,850 --> 00:43:33,080 technical sophistication and other things will be picked up by other actors in the 482 00:43:33,080 --> 00:43:36,800 region? A: Yeah, that's a good question. I think 483 00:43:36,800 --> 00:43:41,100 Iran would like to have the technical sophistication that would be replicated 484 00:43:41,100 --> 00:43:47,460 elsewhere. And I guess in some ways the capabilities are some that you're on cyber 485 00:43:47,460 --> 00:43:52,690 Iran cyber army which is kind of very hard to associate directly with the government, 486 00:43:52,690 --> 00:43:56,990 because sometimes the affiliations are very loose. They have certain 487 00:43:56,990 --> 00:44:01,520 capabilities, but in terms of the technology, I think, for censorship and 488 00:44:01,520 --> 00:44:06,580 surveillance, I think Iran more models itself on the technology coming out of 489 00:44:06,580 --> 00:44:11,520 China and Russia. Because they have had more effective and more sophisticated 490 00:44:11,520 --> 00:44:15,430 platforms and means of doing it. So, I think it's a little bit the other way 491 00:44:15,430 --> 00:44:20,210 around. H: Microphone number 1 please. 492 00:44:20,210 --> 00:44:26,330 Microphone 1: Thank you for your talk. You, if I'm not wrong, you mentioned some 493 00:44:26,330 --> 00:44:35,650 government supporters being arrested. Is this correct? Do you see any kind of clash 494 00:44:35,650 --> 00:44:41,740 between the Revolutionary Guard or the religious power and the government? 495 00:44:41,740 --> 00:44:46,900 MA: Yeah, absolutely. I mean after the nuclear negotiations the foreign minister 496 00:44:46,900 --> 00:44:52,060 Javad Zarif, who is like kind a little bit westernized, he speaks perfect 497 00:44:52,060 --> 00:44:57,950 English. And he had, he has a huge fan base in Iran because he established the 498 00:44:57,950 --> 00:45:02,380 nuclear deal. He had like almost physical confrontations in Parliament with the 499 00:45:02,380 --> 00:45:08,470 hardline elements. So, yeah there definitely is that, and the reason why 500 00:45:08,470 --> 00:45:12,521 some of the Telegram administrators, who are actually supporters of Rouhani, were 501 00:45:12,521 --> 00:45:16,990 arrested is because of this kind of clash between hardline elements like the 502 00:45:16,990 --> 00:45:22,310 Revolutionary Guards and the more moderate administration. So, there is this kind of, 503 00:45:22,310 --> 00:45:24,970 yeah, differentiation and nuance that happens. 504 00:45:24,970 --> 00:45:30,140 H: I guess we're moving to the last question at microphone number 3 please. 505 00:45:30,140 --> 00:45:33,100 M3: Oh hey. I just want to ask a question. 506 00:45:33,100 --> 00:45:36,291 What can we... First of all thank you for your great talk, it was very 507 00:45:36,291 --> 00:45:42,170 well researched and great information and for your very brave proclamation. What can 508 00:45:42,170 --> 00:45:46,510 we in the room do, other than fund your work? Can we put pressure on the companies 509 00:45:46,510 --> 00:45:52,440 that, you know, work inside of Iran? Can we put pressure on the governments of the 510 00:45:52,440 --> 00:45:57,940 nations we're citizens in? What's the next step for people who are listening and want 511 00:45:57,940 --> 00:46:01,990 to do something? Thank you. MA: Yeah, I mean especially if you're not 512 00:46:01,990 --> 00:46:06,430 American, I think, *laughs*, Iranian government would be more open to hearing 513 00:46:06,430 --> 00:46:10,360 kind of the non-western perspective. But I think the reason why I think it's so 514 00:46:10,360 --> 00:46:14,640 important to be here in Europe, is because Europe is actively engaging in dialogue 515 00:46:14,640 --> 00:46:18,830 with Iran. So, if there's way to put pressure through the different companies 516 00:46:18,830 --> 00:46:23,610 that are going into Iran, like I mentioned there's you know the British Vodafone and 517 00:46:23,610 --> 00:46:28,061 like Frances Orange that are going in. If they can make certain demands for, you 518 00:46:28,061 --> 00:46:33,680 know, human rights standards and things like that. That would be, that would also 519 00:46:33,680 --> 00:46:38,380 be really great. I mean campaigning and putting pressure different ways through 520 00:46:38,380 --> 00:46:45,300 social media is always helpful. The main thing that I think we could perhaps have 521 00:46:45,300 --> 00:46:50,650 effect on is, hopefully a company like Telegram is listening and they can make 522 00:46:50,650 --> 00:46:56,630 the security and privacy of Iranians one of them one of their bigger priorities. So 523 00:46:56,630 --> 00:47:03,170 that's really the place that I think can have the most change, because we can have 524 00:47:03,170 --> 00:47:08,460 more, we can have easier dialogue with like Facebook, Telegram and all these 525 00:47:08,460 --> 00:47:13,060 different platforms to ensure that privacy and security is upheld. 526 00:47:13,060 --> 00:47:18,140 H: Mahsa Alimardani, thank you very much for the talk. And please give her a warm 527 00:47:18,140 --> 00:47:19,819 round of applause. 528 00:47:19,819 --> 00:47:26,238 *Applause* 529 00:47:26,238 --> 00:47:31,649 *Music* 530 00:47:31,649 --> 00:47:48,000 subtitles created by c3subtitles.de in the year 2017. Join, and help us!