0 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:30,000 Dear viewer, these subtitles were generated by a machine via the service Trint and therefore are (very) buggy. If you are capable, please help us to create good quality subtitles: https://c3subtitles.de/talk/625 Thanks! 1 00:00:14,130 --> 00:00:16,679 So to start off with a compelling 2 00:00:16,680 --> 00:00:18,629 talk, we got a hell of a speaker over 3 00:00:18,630 --> 00:00:19,999 here, Sean 4 00:00:21,480 --> 00:00:24,179 built a critical infrastructure in 2009 5 00:00:24,180 --> 00:00:26,909 for the drone program in Afghanistan. 6 00:00:26,910 --> 00:00:29,249 And in 2015, he began 7 00:00:29,250 --> 00:00:31,439 speaking about his work. 8 00:00:31,440 --> 00:00:33,779 And today he will tell us about 9 00:00:33,780 --> 00:00:35,669 the moral challenges and the need of 10 00:00:35,670 --> 00:00:37,889 accountability that we need in this 11 00:00:37,890 --> 00:00:39,719 technology that basically 12 00:00:42,600 --> 00:00:44,759 keeps apart the act of killing 13 00:00:44,760 --> 00:00:47,099 from the person that does it and 14 00:00:47,100 --> 00:00:49,529 possibly do not piss off all the agents 15 00:00:49,530 --> 00:00:50,669 around here. 16 00:00:50,670 --> 00:00:52,349 But good luck. 17 00:01:01,880 --> 00:01:04,089 Well, everybody, it's 18 00:01:04,090 --> 00:01:05,449 just an honor to be here. 19 00:01:07,010 --> 00:01:09,229 I was only told recently 20 00:01:09,230 --> 00:01:11,839 how big of a room this was going to be, 21 00:01:11,840 --> 00:01:14,000 but I think I'll manage. 22 00:01:15,380 --> 00:01:17,629 So my my talk is 23 00:01:17,630 --> 00:01:19,489 called the global assassination grid. 24 00:01:19,490 --> 00:01:20,839 And I'm sure all of you kind of get the 25 00:01:20,840 --> 00:01:21,840 play on words there 26 00:01:23,030 --> 00:01:25,609 with the global information grid 27 00:01:25,610 --> 00:01:29,149 and the NSA program. 28 00:01:29,150 --> 00:01:31,309 So I'm sure I'm going to have 29 00:01:31,310 --> 00:01:32,479 a good show of hands. 30 00:01:32,480 --> 00:01:33,739 But how many people here have heard of 31 00:01:33,740 --> 00:01:34,740 Edward Snowden? 32 00:01:37,140 --> 00:01:39,060 OK, much better than my other talks, 33 00:01:40,740 --> 00:01:42,869 so what Edward 34 00:01:42,870 --> 00:01:44,700 Snowden revealed was a 35 00:01:46,170 --> 00:01:48,599 global surveillance system that 36 00:01:48,600 --> 00:01:51,179 is pretty much spying 37 00:01:51,180 --> 00:01:54,389 on everybody all the time 38 00:01:54,390 --> 00:01:56,459 in terms of 39 00:01:56,460 --> 00:01:57,900 at least metadata. 40 00:01:59,430 --> 00:02:01,769 One of the things that catalyzed him 41 00:02:01,770 --> 00:02:04,289 was, was the 42 00:02:04,290 --> 00:02:06,329 drone program and actually being able to 43 00:02:06,330 --> 00:02:07,799 watch drone strikes on the 44 00:02:09,180 --> 00:02:11,279 on the computer from one of the 45 00:02:11,280 --> 00:02:12,419 offices. 46 00:02:12,420 --> 00:02:14,099 That's one of the things that catalyzed 47 00:02:14,100 --> 00:02:15,100 me as well. 48 00:02:15,960 --> 00:02:18,059 So what I'll be talking about today is 49 00:02:18,060 --> 00:02:21,029 the the side of that 50 00:02:21,030 --> 00:02:22,979 global surveillance system that is used 51 00:02:22,980 --> 00:02:25,589 to assassinate people in countries 52 00:02:25,590 --> 00:02:27,719 that we haven't formally declared war 53 00:02:27,720 --> 00:02:28,720 on. 54 00:02:32,210 --> 00:02:33,210 So 55 00:02:34,340 --> 00:02:36,649 kind of to add to what he said, what I 56 00:02:36,650 --> 00:02:39,349 what I did in the Air Force is I 57 00:02:39,350 --> 00:02:40,369 built a 58 00:02:41,600 --> 00:02:44,419 system along with 70 59 00:02:44,420 --> 00:02:46,820 other people that 60 00:02:48,140 --> 00:02:50,329 creates battlefield 61 00:02:50,330 --> 00:02:52,280 command and control over 62 00:02:53,900 --> 00:02:55,549 Afghanistan. 63 00:02:55,550 --> 00:02:58,009 So two hundred and forty thousand 64 00:02:58,010 --> 00:02:59,959 square miles of it. 65 00:02:59,960 --> 00:03:02,689 And we're intercepting communications 66 00:03:02,690 --> 00:03:04,789 from not just 67 00:03:04,790 --> 00:03:07,009 drones, but also other fighter 68 00:03:07,010 --> 00:03:09,709 aircraft attends transportation 69 00:03:09,710 --> 00:03:10,639 aircraft. 70 00:03:10,640 --> 00:03:12,859 And we're creating 71 00:03:12,860 --> 00:03:14,929 a kind of 72 00:03:14,930 --> 00:03:17,059 a universal signal 73 00:03:17,060 --> 00:03:19,789 so that it can be 74 00:03:19,790 --> 00:03:22,159 transmitted long haul and sent back to 75 00:03:22,160 --> 00:03:24,860 places like Aidid and Ramstein. 76 00:03:26,300 --> 00:03:27,769 So that's a little bit of what I'll be 77 00:03:27,770 --> 00:03:30,139 talking about today and also 78 00:03:30,140 --> 00:03:32,719 be talking about how warfare has 79 00:03:32,720 --> 00:03:34,669 changed into 80 00:03:35,930 --> 00:03:37,430 a distributed 81 00:03:38,570 --> 00:03:39,570 system. 82 00:03:40,520 --> 00:03:41,779 This is Germany, so 83 00:03:43,080 --> 00:03:45,469 I will be speaking about 84 00:03:47,060 --> 00:03:49,459 how our arrests and the Milgram 85 00:03:49,460 --> 00:03:51,199 experiments. 86 00:03:51,200 --> 00:03:53,959 I'm sure some of you are aware of those 87 00:03:53,960 --> 00:03:56,149 Milgram experiments were 88 00:03:56,150 --> 00:03:58,219 done to test 89 00:04:00,590 --> 00:04:03,229 as a test and the trials of 90 00:04:03,230 --> 00:04:06,139 Alfred Eichmann, the Nazi war criminal 91 00:04:06,140 --> 00:04:08,209 who was 92 00:04:08,210 --> 00:04:10,369 a bureaucrat. And it was to find 93 00:04:10,370 --> 00:04:12,619 out if a bureaucrat could essentially 94 00:04:12,620 --> 00:04:14,029 order the killing of all these people 95 00:04:14,030 --> 00:04:15,679 without feeling the human connection. 96 00:04:17,180 --> 00:04:19,369 The distribution 97 00:04:19,370 --> 00:04:20,838 and the diffusion of responsibility is 98 00:04:20,839 --> 00:04:22,939 something that's happened in the military 99 00:04:22,940 --> 00:04:25,339 for a long time since 100 00:04:25,340 --> 00:04:27,469 the trebuchet, it takes five people to 101 00:04:27,470 --> 00:04:29,929 load up a trebuchet and 102 00:04:29,930 --> 00:04:32,299 get it to fire on somebody. 103 00:04:32,300 --> 00:04:34,609 So the question of who 104 00:04:34,610 --> 00:04:37,099 is ultimately responsible for that and 105 00:04:37,100 --> 00:04:39,379 like that kill decision is distributed 106 00:04:39,380 --> 00:04:40,850 among those five people. 107 00:04:41,870 --> 00:04:43,849 It's gotten a lot more technical and 108 00:04:43,850 --> 00:04:45,949 there's a lot more, you 109 00:04:45,950 --> 00:04:48,409 know, going on now. 110 00:04:48,410 --> 00:04:49,410 But 111 00:04:51,170 --> 00:04:52,519 one of the things that I wanted to do, 112 00:04:52,520 --> 00:04:53,870 and I start off 113 00:04:55,160 --> 00:04:57,319 a lot of my talks with a clip 114 00:04:57,320 --> 00:04:59,269 from this documentary called National 115 00:04:59,270 --> 00:05:01,490 Bird, and that's where 116 00:05:03,110 --> 00:05:05,149 three other whistleblowers 117 00:05:06,950 --> 00:05:09,049 besides myself have decided to speak 118 00:05:09,050 --> 00:05:10,699 out. And 119 00:05:11,930 --> 00:05:12,949 it's a pretty. 120 00:05:15,370 --> 00:05:17,469 Good representation 121 00:05:17,470 --> 00:05:20,199 of what people on the ground 122 00:05:20,200 --> 00:05:21,909 are experiencing, as well as 123 00:05:21,910 --> 00:05:23,649 whistleblowers within the system. 124 00:05:27,190 --> 00:05:29,499 So it 125 00:05:29,500 --> 00:05:31,039 kind of a bit of a treat. 126 00:05:31,040 --> 00:05:32,169 The director is here. 127 00:05:32,170 --> 00:05:33,339 I didn't know that she was going to be in 128 00:05:33,340 --> 00:05:35,439 Hamburg. So I've kind 129 00:05:35,440 --> 00:05:37,869 of like asked 130 00:05:37,870 --> 00:05:40,149 her impromptu to come and speak here. 131 00:05:40,150 --> 00:05:41,559 And I didn't tell her how big the 132 00:05:41,560 --> 00:05:42,489 audience was either. 133 00:05:42,490 --> 00:05:44,109 So I'm 134 00:05:45,250 --> 00:05:46,959 I yeah. 135 00:05:46,960 --> 00:05:49,029 So I apologize to her, 136 00:05:49,030 --> 00:05:50,030 but. 137 00:05:52,790 --> 00:05:54,919 I'll just play this literally just kind 138 00:05:54,920 --> 00:05:57,049 of hover, and you 139 00:05:57,050 --> 00:05:58,549 wait until he walks out to the field to 140 00:05:58,550 --> 00:05:59,899 meet with some friends for something 141 00:06:02,180 --> 00:06:03,180 like. 142 00:06:05,320 --> 00:06:07,389 Drop a Hellfire missile on, maybe we 143 00:06:07,390 --> 00:06:08,949 call our objective, maybe we told a guy 144 00:06:08,950 --> 00:06:10,299 who we thought was our objective. 145 00:06:10,300 --> 00:06:12,489 You don't know when 146 00:06:12,490 --> 00:06:14,109 I first got into the military analyst 147 00:06:14,110 --> 00:06:15,459 thinking it was a force for good in the 148 00:06:15,460 --> 00:06:17,019 world, I thought I was going to be on the 149 00:06:17,020 --> 00:06:17,929 right side of history. 150 00:06:17,930 --> 00:06:20,599 And today I don't believe I was. 151 00:06:20,600 --> 00:06:22,699 I still have a top secret clearance, so 152 00:06:22,700 --> 00:06:24,319 I have to be extraordinarily cautious 153 00:06:24,320 --> 00:06:26,420 about what I can and can't say on camera. 154 00:06:27,890 --> 00:06:30,019 My job was to watch 155 00:06:30,020 --> 00:06:32,389 what's happening in the video, the drones 156 00:06:32,390 --> 00:06:34,729 and identify everything adolescent 157 00:06:34,730 --> 00:06:35,899 near the rear of the SUV. 158 00:06:35,900 --> 00:06:37,759 That's deceptive and get the opinion that 159 00:06:37,760 --> 00:06:38,759 you're at ten thousand feet. 160 00:06:38,760 --> 00:06:40,729 You see this photograph. You know what's 161 00:06:40,730 --> 00:06:42,229 going on. You don't know what's going on. 162 00:06:42,230 --> 00:06:44,120 You know what you see in two dimensions. 163 00:06:46,030 --> 00:06:47,799 You see someone die? 164 00:06:47,800 --> 00:06:49,419 Yes, you said it was OK to kill them. 165 00:06:49,420 --> 00:06:50,439 It's too easy. 166 00:06:50,440 --> 00:06:52,719 They just embolden commanders, 167 00:06:52,720 --> 00:06:54,939 let the party begin because there is no 168 00:06:54,940 --> 00:06:55,940 threat. 169 00:06:56,620 --> 00:06:58,839 I mean, this could grow to get so 170 00:06:58,840 --> 00:06:59,840 out of control. 171 00:07:01,200 --> 00:07:03,449 Somebody downstairs was knocking 172 00:07:03,450 --> 00:07:05,729 at the door and immediately both people 173 00:07:05,730 --> 00:07:07,829 at the door shoved FBI badges in 174 00:07:07,830 --> 00:07:08,830 my face. 175 00:07:10,590 --> 00:07:12,659 The Espionage Act is one 176 00:07:12,660 --> 00:07:14,849 of the most serious charges you can level 177 00:07:14,850 --> 00:07:17,099 against an American that I'm probably 178 00:07:17,100 --> 00:07:18,509 going to get indicted and I'm probably 179 00:07:18,510 --> 00:07:19,510 going to get charged. 180 00:07:21,010 --> 00:07:23,169 I lost part of my humanity working 181 00:07:23,170 --> 00:07:24,849 in the drone program. 182 00:07:24,850 --> 00:07:26,849 How much worse? If you ask them how much 183 00:07:26,850 --> 00:07:27,850 the. 184 00:07:29,110 --> 00:07:30,939 It's a secret program. 185 00:07:30,940 --> 00:07:32,799 I can't just go telling the public what 186 00:07:32,800 --> 00:07:34,869 it is, what I can tell 187 00:07:34,870 --> 00:07:37,509 you is that to me, it's frightening. 188 00:07:45,500 --> 00:07:47,660 And I'd like to. 189 00:07:54,900 --> 00:07:56,699 Now, I'd like to give the floor to Sonia 190 00:07:56,700 --> 00:07:58,619 Kennebec. She's the director of National 191 00:07:58,620 --> 00:07:59,760 Bird. Tell me what you see. 192 00:08:01,410 --> 00:08:03,299 Is this better not intentional? 193 00:08:14,340 --> 00:08:15,869 I don't use a MacBook often. 194 00:08:17,910 --> 00:08:18,910 Thank you. 195 00:08:24,850 --> 00:08:26,979 Wow, this is quite a 196 00:08:26,980 --> 00:08:29,109 surprise, Sean, thank you very much 197 00:08:29,110 --> 00:08:31,479 for inviting me to this 198 00:08:31,480 --> 00:08:33,699 is really a surprise. 199 00:08:33,700 --> 00:08:36,189 So the reason 200 00:08:36,190 --> 00:08:38,319 Sean has asked me to 201 00:08:38,320 --> 00:08:40,178 complement is talk a little bit, because 202 00:08:40,179 --> 00:08:42,428 I have been working with 203 00:08:42,429 --> 00:08:44,019 whistleblower and especially national 204 00:08:44,020 --> 00:08:45,430 security whistleblowers 205 00:08:47,320 --> 00:08:48,699 for quite a while. 206 00:08:48,700 --> 00:08:51,099 And during the production 207 00:08:51,100 --> 00:08:53,499 of the film National Bird, 208 00:08:53,500 --> 00:08:55,719 you know, we talked a little bit and in 209 00:08:55,720 --> 00:08:57,909 the trailer and talked about 210 00:08:57,910 --> 00:08:58,910 it in the trailer. 211 00:08:59,920 --> 00:09:02,169 The film started out my research 212 00:09:02,170 --> 00:09:04,239 turned out to be research about the 213 00:09:04,240 --> 00:09:06,369 drone program, but it 214 00:09:06,370 --> 00:09:08,199 actually turned into a film about the 215 00:09:08,200 --> 00:09:10,419 cost of whistleblowing as well, 216 00:09:10,420 --> 00:09:12,129 because during the production of the 217 00:09:12,130 --> 00:09:14,199 film, two 218 00:09:14,200 --> 00:09:15,849 of the whistleblowers I had been working 219 00:09:15,850 --> 00:09:17,919 with, all three of them had 220 00:09:17,920 --> 00:09:19,959 top secret clearances and worked within 221 00:09:19,960 --> 00:09:22,299 the drone program, just like Sean. 222 00:09:22,300 --> 00:09:24,849 And so 223 00:09:24,850 --> 00:09:26,170 the Office 224 00:09:27,430 --> 00:09:29,469 of Special Investigations of the Air 225 00:09:29,470 --> 00:09:31,480 Force came after 226 00:09:32,500 --> 00:09:34,629 I tried to silence and intimidate one 227 00:09:34,630 --> 00:09:36,789 of the whistleblowers in my film who had 228 00:09:36,790 --> 00:09:38,209 been speaking out. 229 00:09:38,210 --> 00:09:39,279 Her name is Heather. 230 00:09:39,280 --> 00:09:41,199 They contacted her family during the 231 00:09:41,200 --> 00:09:43,329 production. I had been filming with her 232 00:09:43,330 --> 00:09:45,429 for over a year at that point. 233 00:09:45,430 --> 00:09:48,759 But a few months prior to the visit 234 00:09:48,760 --> 00:09:51,099 by the Air Force, she had published 235 00:09:51,100 --> 00:09:53,319 an op ed and on Guardian 236 00:09:53,320 --> 00:09:56,259 dot com and 237 00:09:56,260 --> 00:09:57,969 and the Office of Special Investigations 238 00:09:57,970 --> 00:09:59,589 of the Air Force came to her family and 239 00:09:59,590 --> 00:10:01,749 said, you know, she is 240 00:10:01,750 --> 00:10:03,729 on some terrorism. 241 00:10:03,730 --> 00:10:07,149 Some known terrorist organization 242 00:10:07,150 --> 00:10:08,739 is looking for her. 243 00:10:08,740 --> 00:10:11,319 And and and she should 244 00:10:11,320 --> 00:10:13,419 lower her social media profile and 245 00:10:13,420 --> 00:10:15,639 not write op ed and, you know, just 246 00:10:15,640 --> 00:10:18,339 really try to scare her, which 247 00:10:18,340 --> 00:10:19,329 they did. 248 00:10:19,330 --> 00:10:21,429 And fortunately, at that point, 249 00:10:21,430 --> 00:10:23,589 she already had representation 250 00:10:23,590 --> 00:10:25,899 by whistleblower attorney Jesselyn 251 00:10:25,900 --> 00:10:27,909 Radack, who is also one of Edward 252 00:10:27,910 --> 00:10:30,399 Snowden's main legal counsels. 253 00:10:30,400 --> 00:10:33,039 And so Jesselyn Radack 254 00:10:33,040 --> 00:10:34,629 contacted the Office for Special 255 00:10:34,630 --> 00:10:37,089 Investigations of the Air Force, ask for 256 00:10:37,090 --> 00:10:38,740 more information. It turned out 257 00:10:39,910 --> 00:10:42,009 there wasn't an immediate threat, and 258 00:10:42,010 --> 00:10:43,869 it was it seemed to be a ruse because 259 00:10:43,870 --> 00:10:45,519 they said to her, you know, there's not a 260 00:10:45,520 --> 00:10:47,679 problem, but they generally advise her 261 00:10:47,680 --> 00:10:49,749 not to, you know, not 262 00:10:49,750 --> 00:10:51,969 to be public, you know, not to really 263 00:10:51,970 --> 00:10:53,829 write anything on Facebook. 264 00:10:53,830 --> 00:10:56,079 And then a few weeks after 265 00:10:56,080 --> 00:10:59,199 that, another of my protagonists, 266 00:10:59,200 --> 00:11:01,569 Daniel, was raided 267 00:11:01,570 --> 00:11:03,669 by 30 to 50 armed 268 00:11:03,670 --> 00:11:04,960 FBI agents 269 00:11:06,130 --> 00:11:08,379 and he was told it was an 270 00:11:08,380 --> 00:11:09,380 investigation 271 00:11:10,900 --> 00:11:12,459 for espionage. 272 00:11:12,460 --> 00:11:15,579 So he is being investigated for espionage 273 00:11:15,580 --> 00:11:17,860 and, you know. 274 00:11:19,190 --> 00:11:21,499 He also is now being represented 275 00:11:21,500 --> 00:11:23,299 by Jesselyn Radack, who represents all 276 00:11:23,300 --> 00:11:25,399 three whistleblowers in my film, 277 00:11:25,400 --> 00:11:26,779 but that is a very 278 00:11:27,800 --> 00:11:29,509 serious threat. 279 00:11:29,510 --> 00:11:31,579 And what's 280 00:11:31,580 --> 00:11:33,349 the reason I'm telling these stories is 281 00:11:33,350 --> 00:11:35,479 because I think, you know, 282 00:11:35,480 --> 00:11:37,699 most of you here probably know because 283 00:11:37,700 --> 00:11:39,019 you all are very informed. 284 00:11:39,020 --> 00:11:41,299 But, you know, many people in the general 285 00:11:41,300 --> 00:11:43,879 public are not aware of 286 00:11:43,880 --> 00:11:46,159 how difficult it has become 287 00:11:46,160 --> 00:11:48,799 to do national security reporting 288 00:11:48,800 --> 00:11:50,329 and also, you know, to be a 289 00:11:50,330 --> 00:11:52,309 whistleblower, how much courage it takes 290 00:11:52,310 --> 00:11:55,039 and how much of a risk 291 00:11:55,040 --> 00:11:56,929 you also are taking. 292 00:11:56,930 --> 00:11:59,119 And, you know, under the 293 00:11:59,120 --> 00:12:01,459 Obama administration, more whistleblowers 294 00:12:01,460 --> 00:12:03,829 have been prosecuted under the Espionage 295 00:12:03,830 --> 00:12:05,330 Act and all previous 296 00:12:06,770 --> 00:12:08,749 Obama has prosecuted more whistleblowers 297 00:12:08,750 --> 00:12:10,459 under the Espionage Act than all previous 298 00:12:10,460 --> 00:12:13,309 administrations combined since 299 00:12:13,310 --> 00:12:15,259 the Espionage Act was put into power in 300 00:12:15,260 --> 00:12:16,939 1917. 301 00:12:16,940 --> 00:12:19,069 And, you know, 302 00:12:19,070 --> 00:12:21,289 I became a journalist because I 303 00:12:21,290 --> 00:12:23,719 wanted to keep, you know, politicians 304 00:12:23,720 --> 00:12:25,639 accountable. I think, you know, that's 305 00:12:25,640 --> 00:12:27,829 why it's it's so dangerous for our 306 00:12:27,830 --> 00:12:30,619 society nowadays that, 307 00:12:30,620 --> 00:12:32,329 you know, journalists are a threat 308 00:12:32,330 --> 00:12:34,819 because journalists and filmmakers 309 00:12:34,820 --> 00:12:36,589 keep our governments accountable. 310 00:12:36,590 --> 00:12:39,019 And we rely on whistleblowers 311 00:12:39,020 --> 00:12:41,269 to often rely on whistleblowers 312 00:12:41,270 --> 00:12:43,099 to bring the information out. 313 00:12:43,100 --> 00:12:45,349 So I think we have to work on both 314 00:12:45,350 --> 00:12:47,720 whistleblower protection and 315 00:12:48,950 --> 00:12:51,259 the protection of, you know, in the US 316 00:12:51,260 --> 00:12:53,149 First Amendment, rights and freedom of 317 00:12:53,150 --> 00:12:54,769 speech, freedom of the press. 318 00:12:54,770 --> 00:12:56,659 So I hired a First Amendment lawyer 319 00:12:56,660 --> 00:12:58,669 during the development of my film. 320 00:12:58,670 --> 00:13:00,979 I worked with Jesselyn Radack, and 321 00:13:00,980 --> 00:13:03,379 I rely on 322 00:13:03,380 --> 00:13:05,469 people like all of you and 323 00:13:05,470 --> 00:13:08,029 this technology community 324 00:13:08,030 --> 00:13:10,009 to support us with 325 00:13:11,180 --> 00:13:13,519 technology to protect ourselves. 326 00:13:13,520 --> 00:13:15,979 You know, I'm very thankful for tools 327 00:13:15,980 --> 00:13:16,980 like 328 00:13:18,290 --> 00:13:21,229 Tales Signal. 329 00:13:21,230 --> 00:13:23,839 I think you know your community and 330 00:13:23,840 --> 00:13:26,179 I really hope that, you know, that's my 331 00:13:26,180 --> 00:13:28,339 my ass to you as a journalist, 332 00:13:28,340 --> 00:13:29,329 as a filmmaker. 333 00:13:29,330 --> 00:13:31,669 Please go out and educate us, 334 00:13:31,670 --> 00:13:33,739 educate us journalists, the general 335 00:13:33,740 --> 00:13:36,859 public, on how to use encryption, 336 00:13:36,860 --> 00:13:38,059 what the threats are. 337 00:13:38,060 --> 00:13:40,729 You know, how we can protect ourselves 338 00:13:40,730 --> 00:13:42,169 because it is really essential. 339 00:13:42,170 --> 00:13:44,389 It's not going to go away 340 00:13:44,390 --> 00:13:45,859 in the future. But we all probably 341 00:13:45,860 --> 00:13:47,569 predict it's going to get a lot worse, 342 00:13:47,570 --> 00:13:49,699 especially in the United States 343 00:13:49,700 --> 00:13:51,709 with a Trump administration having all of 344 00:13:51,710 --> 00:13:53,809 these tools, all of these, you know, 345 00:13:53,810 --> 00:13:55,789 data collection, data storage at the 346 00:13:55,790 --> 00:13:56,959 fingertips. 347 00:13:56,960 --> 00:13:59,449 And and I 348 00:13:59,450 --> 00:14:01,549 really want to ask 349 00:14:01,550 --> 00:14:03,649 people to look at organizations 350 00:14:03,650 --> 00:14:06,559 like the Courage Foundation in Berlin. 351 00:14:06,560 --> 00:14:08,629 You know, Jesselyn Radack 352 00:14:08,630 --> 00:14:11,149 organization Whisper in the US 353 00:14:11,150 --> 00:14:13,309 that gives legal support 354 00:14:13,310 --> 00:14:16,369 and and help to to whistleblowers 355 00:14:16,370 --> 00:14:17,959 because, you know, whistleblower 356 00:14:17,960 --> 00:14:20,029 protection is is very important. 357 00:14:20,030 --> 00:14:22,519 But still, you know, there is a risk 358 00:14:22,520 --> 00:14:24,769 and and it takes a lot of courage. 359 00:14:24,770 --> 00:14:27,139 So, you know, I I think, 360 00:14:27,140 --> 00:14:29,329 you know, we should all really 361 00:14:29,330 --> 00:14:31,489 give a hand to Sean 362 00:14:31,490 --> 00:14:33,619 Westmorland to have the courage 363 00:14:33,620 --> 00:14:35,989 to speak out to you today and, 364 00:14:35,990 --> 00:14:37,579 you know, raise awareness for all these 365 00:14:37,580 --> 00:14:39,319 issues and speak truth to power. 366 00:14:39,320 --> 00:14:40,320 So thank you. 367 00:14:53,190 --> 00:14:54,190 So I'm going to be, 368 00:14:55,820 --> 00:14:58,049 I guess, pretty real with you 369 00:14:58,050 --> 00:15:00,389 in the beginning of this talk. 370 00:15:00,390 --> 00:15:02,529 I mean, 371 00:15:02,530 --> 00:15:04,949 what really catalyzed me the moment 372 00:15:04,950 --> 00:15:07,200 that I realized that. 373 00:15:08,280 --> 00:15:10,229 What we were doing was wrong and that I 374 00:15:10,230 --> 00:15:11,230 needed to 375 00:15:13,410 --> 00:15:15,479 at least change the trajectory of 376 00:15:15,480 --> 00:15:18,869 my life was when I was in Afghanistan 377 00:15:18,870 --> 00:15:22,289 and my 378 00:15:22,290 --> 00:15:23,429 NCOIC, 379 00:15:24,750 --> 00:15:27,330 which is the NCO in charge, he 380 00:15:29,520 --> 00:15:32,549 we had built out this entire system. 381 00:15:32,550 --> 00:15:34,559 We had done this many times before and 382 00:15:34,560 --> 00:15:36,089 training and whatnot. 383 00:15:36,090 --> 00:15:38,489 And during the training, 384 00:15:38,490 --> 00:15:39,960 it was always emphasized 385 00:15:41,190 --> 00:15:43,829 that we're going to be saving lives, 386 00:15:43,830 --> 00:15:45,389 we're going to be saving US troops, 387 00:15:45,390 --> 00:15:47,699 coalition troops, and 388 00:15:47,700 --> 00:15:49,799 that we aren't 389 00:15:49,800 --> 00:15:52,199 you know, the other side wasn't really 390 00:15:52,200 --> 00:15:54,330 paid much attention to. 391 00:15:58,590 --> 00:16:00,659 And, of 392 00:16:00,660 --> 00:16:02,759 course, going to Afghanistan, all 393 00:16:02,760 --> 00:16:04,229 of that training becomes real. 394 00:16:05,370 --> 00:16:07,799 And something 395 00:16:07,800 --> 00:16:09,059 like a technical job 396 00:16:10,380 --> 00:16:12,449 that you're you're 397 00:16:12,450 --> 00:16:14,999 doing to support 398 00:16:15,000 --> 00:16:16,110 combat troops. 399 00:16:17,910 --> 00:16:20,039 It's as viewed as support, 400 00:16:20,040 --> 00:16:21,779 but when you when you really think about 401 00:16:21,780 --> 00:16:23,999 it, these three support 402 00:16:24,000 --> 00:16:26,429 roles are often critical 403 00:16:26,430 --> 00:16:28,529 for the 404 00:16:28,530 --> 00:16:30,659 combat personnel to 405 00:16:30,660 --> 00:16:31,660 do their job. 406 00:16:32,910 --> 00:16:35,039 There's no other way around it, 407 00:16:35,040 --> 00:16:36,330 particularly with drones. 408 00:16:38,070 --> 00:16:40,289 The the difference between 409 00:16:40,290 --> 00:16:43,139 drones and conventional aircraft is that 410 00:16:43,140 --> 00:16:45,359 with a A10, 411 00:16:45,360 --> 00:16:47,729 it's ultimately the pilots 412 00:16:47,730 --> 00:16:49,739 who is sitting in the cockpit, who is 413 00:16:49,740 --> 00:16:51,719 making the final kill decision. 414 00:16:51,720 --> 00:16:53,309 He's the one on the scene. 415 00:16:53,310 --> 00:16:55,589 And, you know, he's looking 416 00:16:55,590 --> 00:16:56,730 at the ground. He's there 417 00:16:57,780 --> 00:16:59,729 with a drone. 418 00:16:59,730 --> 00:17:02,039 You have dozens of 419 00:17:02,040 --> 00:17:04,229 personnel, dozens of analysts, all 420 00:17:04,230 --> 00:17:06,929 making decisions, all looking at 421 00:17:06,930 --> 00:17:09,719 reality through sort of straws, 422 00:17:09,720 --> 00:17:11,429 so to speak. 423 00:17:11,430 --> 00:17:12,430 Each. 424 00:17:13,900 --> 00:17:16,209 Each compartmentalization, 425 00:17:16,210 --> 00:17:18,459 each career fields, 426 00:17:18,460 --> 00:17:21,639 an imagery analyst, is 427 00:17:21,640 --> 00:17:24,009 looking at the ground and picking targets 428 00:17:24,010 --> 00:17:26,289 based off of things that they see from 429 00:17:26,290 --> 00:17:28,599 the air, a signals analyst 430 00:17:28,600 --> 00:17:30,789 is looking at the metadata, 431 00:17:30,790 --> 00:17:32,769 looking at keywords that have been used 432 00:17:32,770 --> 00:17:36,069 in conversations with cell phones. 433 00:17:36,070 --> 00:17:38,439 You have translators who are 434 00:17:38,440 --> 00:17:40,599 looking or who are listening in on 435 00:17:40,600 --> 00:17:42,969 phone calls. You have geospatial analysts 436 00:17:42,970 --> 00:17:44,439 that are telling you which buildings are 437 00:17:44,440 --> 00:17:45,759 which. 438 00:17:45,760 --> 00:17:48,189 You have the 439 00:17:48,190 --> 00:17:50,079 mission intelligence coordinator that's 440 00:17:50,080 --> 00:17:51,669 aggregating all the information together 441 00:17:51,670 --> 00:17:53,739 to present a report to 442 00:17:53,740 --> 00:17:56,139 the commanders in 443 00:17:56,140 --> 00:17:58,689 Creech and the 444 00:17:58,690 --> 00:17:59,919 pilots. 445 00:17:59,920 --> 00:18:02,859 You have the pilot that makes the final 446 00:18:02,860 --> 00:18:05,079 kill decision with the trigger. 447 00:18:05,080 --> 00:18:07,749 And the the signals 448 00:18:07,750 --> 00:18:08,890 are they are sorry that 449 00:18:10,870 --> 00:18:13,089 the sensor operator who is guiding 450 00:18:13,090 --> 00:18:14,090 and the missile, 451 00:18:15,370 --> 00:18:16,929 many of you in Germany probably know who 452 00:18:16,930 --> 00:18:17,980 Brandon Bryant is. 453 00:18:19,120 --> 00:18:22,329 He has been speaking out for 454 00:18:22,330 --> 00:18:23,529 probably about three years. 455 00:18:23,530 --> 00:18:26,439 He's gone quiet relatively recently 456 00:18:26,440 --> 00:18:28,060 due to personal issues. 457 00:18:29,740 --> 00:18:30,740 And 458 00:18:32,410 --> 00:18:35,709 what he did was he he guided 459 00:18:35,710 --> 00:18:38,289 the missile into the target, 460 00:18:38,290 --> 00:18:39,550 which is 461 00:18:40,930 --> 00:18:43,509 takes about 12 to 462 00:18:43,510 --> 00:18:45,609 15 seconds, depending on what the 463 00:18:45,610 --> 00:18:47,139 altitude is. 464 00:18:47,140 --> 00:18:49,329 And the pilot 465 00:18:49,330 --> 00:18:50,330 is the one that 466 00:18:51,430 --> 00:18:52,389 pulls the trigger. 467 00:18:52,390 --> 00:18:53,390 So. 468 00:18:54,710 --> 00:18:56,479 Within this entire system, the 469 00:18:56,480 --> 00:18:57,919 responsibility for the ultimate kill 470 00:18:57,920 --> 00:18:59,900 decision is dispersed among 471 00:19:01,760 --> 00:19:02,900 different individuals. 472 00:19:04,160 --> 00:19:06,949 So this creates like 473 00:19:06,950 --> 00:19:09,769 several barriers that 474 00:19:09,770 --> 00:19:11,809 I'll be talking about, the cognitive 475 00:19:11,810 --> 00:19:13,429 barriers, of course, the structural 476 00:19:13,430 --> 00:19:16,129 barriers, the equipment itself 477 00:19:16,130 --> 00:19:17,269 and the 478 00:19:20,840 --> 00:19:22,129 the. 479 00:19:22,130 --> 00:19:23,269 Yeah, so 480 00:19:25,370 --> 00:19:27,559 I'll just I'll just get started on that. 481 00:19:29,030 --> 00:19:30,709 First off, and I know you guys are going 482 00:19:30,710 --> 00:19:33,779 to hate the slide, but it's 483 00:19:33,780 --> 00:19:36,769 I pulled it off of Wikipedia just 484 00:19:36,770 --> 00:19:38,900 for to save my own ass. 485 00:19:40,400 --> 00:19:42,469 The Twenty Fourth Intelligence Squadron 486 00:19:42,470 --> 00:19:44,569 is the culprit here that 487 00:19:44,570 --> 00:19:46,849 everybody in Germany is 488 00:19:46,850 --> 00:19:48,709 concerned about. That's the DGSE. 489 00:19:48,710 --> 00:19:50,209 Those are the people making the 490 00:19:51,470 --> 00:19:54,470 analysis of the information. 491 00:19:55,730 --> 00:19:57,859 So they provide the 492 00:19:57,860 --> 00:20:00,349 direct and conduct multi source Istar 493 00:20:00,350 --> 00:20:02,869 tasking, processing, 494 00:20:02,870 --> 00:20:05,239 exploitation and dissemination of 495 00:20:05,240 --> 00:20:07,309 operations in support of 496 00:20:07,310 --> 00:20:09,619 you safety, Tulkarm, AFRICOM, US, 497 00:20:09,620 --> 00:20:10,640 CENTCOM and NATO. 498 00:20:12,590 --> 00:20:15,019 The one of interest here is 499 00:20:15,020 --> 00:20:17,359 US CENTCOM and that's in charge 500 00:20:17,360 --> 00:20:19,489 of Afghanistan 501 00:20:19,490 --> 00:20:21,949 and the Middle Eastern region. 502 00:20:21,950 --> 00:20:24,409 And that includes 503 00:20:24,410 --> 00:20:26,569 a distributed ground system and also 504 00:20:26,570 --> 00:20:28,729 a this this thing called Eagle Vision 505 00:20:28,730 --> 00:20:30,979 one, which is the civilian 506 00:20:30,980 --> 00:20:32,480 satellite counterpart. 507 00:20:34,960 --> 00:20:37,069 So one thing 508 00:20:37,070 --> 00:20:39,439 to understand is the drone itself 509 00:20:39,440 --> 00:20:41,059 is not the weapon system, it's just the 510 00:20:41,060 --> 00:20:42,349 platform. 511 00:20:42,350 --> 00:20:45,439 And it's a platform to deliver a payload, 512 00:20:45,440 --> 00:20:47,329 the Hellfire missile. 513 00:20:47,330 --> 00:20:49,549 And if you really 514 00:20:49,550 --> 00:20:51,199 want to understand drone warfare, you 515 00:20:51,200 --> 00:20:52,579 have to understand all of the 516 00:20:52,580 --> 00:20:54,499 infrastructure that's behind it and 517 00:20:54,500 --> 00:20:55,670 allows it to 518 00:20:56,840 --> 00:20:57,840 work. 519 00:20:58,880 --> 00:21:01,189 The DGSE is pretty 520 00:21:01,190 --> 00:21:03,529 much like the brain of the 521 00:21:03,530 --> 00:21:04,909 of the drone. That's where all the 522 00:21:04,910 --> 00:21:05,959 analysts are. 523 00:21:05,960 --> 00:21:08,149 And they're looking at all of this 524 00:21:08,150 --> 00:21:10,249 information and determining whether or 525 00:21:10,250 --> 00:21:12,319 not that, you 526 00:21:12,320 --> 00:21:14,479 know, that target is 527 00:21:14,480 --> 00:21:15,480 a target. 528 00:21:18,290 --> 00:21:20,569 There's also the nerve network, which 529 00:21:20,570 --> 00:21:21,570 is the 530 00:21:22,700 --> 00:21:25,129 it's the communications 531 00:21:25,130 --> 00:21:27,499 infrastructure, the relay's the the 532 00:21:27,500 --> 00:21:29,719 infrastructure that I worked on in 533 00:21:29,720 --> 00:21:30,649 Afghanistan. 534 00:21:30,650 --> 00:21:33,169 And Signorelli 535 00:21:33,170 --> 00:21:35,209 in Italy is another one. 536 00:21:35,210 --> 00:21:37,519 And you have various places 537 00:21:37,520 --> 00:21:38,520 around the US. 538 00:21:40,640 --> 00:21:41,640 And. 539 00:21:46,600 --> 00:21:48,759 So I went to so I went 540 00:21:48,760 --> 00:21:50,919 to the er 541 00:21:50,920 --> 00:21:53,289 the the German parliament, the Bundestag, 542 00:21:53,290 --> 00:21:55,959 a couple of months ago and 543 00:21:55,960 --> 00:21:58,899 I presented a petition 544 00:21:58,900 --> 00:22:00,999 to stop 545 00:22:01,000 --> 00:22:03,639 the the 546 00:22:03,640 --> 00:22:06,009 transmissions of 547 00:22:06,010 --> 00:22:08,289 communications through Ramstein. 548 00:22:08,290 --> 00:22:10,869 And I presented it as a violation 549 00:22:10,870 --> 00:22:13,059 of international law because we're 550 00:22:13,060 --> 00:22:15,279 in countries that nobody's 551 00:22:15,280 --> 00:22:16,839 formally declared war on. 552 00:22:16,840 --> 00:22:18,969 It hasn't been, you know, 553 00:22:18,970 --> 00:22:20,469 hasn't gone through the process of the 554 00:22:20,470 --> 00:22:21,879 United Nations. 555 00:22:21,880 --> 00:22:23,390 And I 556 00:22:24,670 --> 00:22:26,649 really I was trying to reach out to the 557 00:22:26,650 --> 00:22:28,809 German population because it 558 00:22:28,810 --> 00:22:30,369 seems to be something that's a bit more 559 00:22:30,370 --> 00:22:31,989 important to them than it is to the 560 00:22:31,990 --> 00:22:33,639 United States. So there's more of a 561 00:22:33,640 --> 00:22:35,619 chance that there might be some kind of 562 00:22:35,620 --> 00:22:37,509 resistance. And when you have a critical 563 00:22:37,510 --> 00:22:40,180 piece of the puzzle like Ramstein, 564 00:22:41,470 --> 00:22:43,089 you know, it's a lot easier to put 565 00:22:43,090 --> 00:22:45,519 pressure on that than it is to 566 00:22:45,520 --> 00:22:47,709 put pressure on hundreds of bases 567 00:22:47,710 --> 00:22:48,710 all over the United States. 568 00:22:50,980 --> 00:22:51,980 So. 569 00:22:53,670 --> 00:22:55,710 That was more of a. 570 00:23:00,300 --> 00:23:02,579 It was it was a political gesture, 571 00:23:02,580 --> 00:23:04,919 but it was meant 572 00:23:04,920 --> 00:23:07,079 to say, OK, we 573 00:23:07,080 --> 00:23:08,969 need to have some kind of accountability. 574 00:23:08,970 --> 00:23:11,849 If this stuff is running through the 575 00:23:11,850 --> 00:23:14,259 German, through German soil, 576 00:23:14,260 --> 00:23:16,559 then the German 577 00:23:18,300 --> 00:23:19,349 population. 578 00:23:20,910 --> 00:23:22,409 Well, the German government is 579 00:23:22,410 --> 00:23:24,119 essentially complicit in whatever we're 580 00:23:24,120 --> 00:23:25,120 doing. 581 00:23:25,710 --> 00:23:26,710 So 582 00:23:27,870 --> 00:23:29,130 I thought it would be. 583 00:23:33,620 --> 00:23:35,779 A good idea for the German population 584 00:23:35,780 --> 00:23:38,330 to basically 585 00:23:40,280 --> 00:23:42,649 try to challenge their try to challenge 586 00:23:42,650 --> 00:23:45,349 the the usage 587 00:23:45,350 --> 00:23:47,459 of the 588 00:23:47,460 --> 00:23:48,460 stuff. 589 00:23:57,140 --> 00:23:58,910 My biggest fear has come true. 590 00:23:59,930 --> 00:24:01,609 We've gone from a, 591 00:24:03,200 --> 00:24:05,689 you know, a liberal 592 00:24:05,690 --> 00:24:07,759 democracy to something else 593 00:24:07,760 --> 00:24:09,709 that we're not really sure what that is 594 00:24:09,710 --> 00:24:10,710 in the United States. 595 00:24:14,260 --> 00:24:16,989 So Donald Trump becomes president 596 00:24:16,990 --> 00:24:19,119 and he acts like all 597 00:24:19,120 --> 00:24:21,339 of these, you know, 598 00:24:21,340 --> 00:24:24,049 generals and puts them in his cabinet 599 00:24:24,050 --> 00:24:26,799 and it really looks like 600 00:24:26,800 --> 00:24:28,599 whatever foreign policy is going to be, 601 00:24:28,600 --> 00:24:30,909 it's going to be heavily militarized. 602 00:24:30,910 --> 00:24:33,489 And, you know, drones 603 00:24:33,490 --> 00:24:35,649 are a very easy weapon to 604 00:24:35,650 --> 00:24:37,899 use. There's 605 00:24:37,900 --> 00:24:40,419 very low political threshold 606 00:24:40,420 --> 00:24:42,489 to to. 607 00:24:44,090 --> 00:24:47,029 To use them, because there's no 608 00:24:47,030 --> 00:24:49,039 there's no people on the ground who could 609 00:24:49,040 --> 00:24:51,619 potentially die, and 610 00:24:51,620 --> 00:24:53,689 it's very easy to hide 611 00:24:53,690 --> 00:24:56,670 information from populations. 612 00:25:00,300 --> 00:25:01,300 So 613 00:25:04,100 --> 00:25:06,199 another piece of the what I what 614 00:25:06,200 --> 00:25:08,449 I worked on was I created this 615 00:25:08,450 --> 00:25:10,669 connection between the battlefield 616 00:25:10,670 --> 00:25:12,229 airborne communications node, which is 617 00:25:12,230 --> 00:25:14,239 now on a Global Hawk. 618 00:25:14,240 --> 00:25:16,369 And it's it's 619 00:25:16,370 --> 00:25:17,450 a bridging node. It's 620 00:25:18,530 --> 00:25:21,019 your and it's a universal 621 00:25:21,020 --> 00:25:23,629 translator of sorts, 622 00:25:23,630 --> 00:25:24,630 a relay. 623 00:25:25,520 --> 00:25:27,319 It wasn't a bombardier express, an 624 00:25:27,320 --> 00:25:28,759 unmarked private jet. 625 00:25:28,760 --> 00:25:31,009 And what it allowed for was 626 00:25:31,010 --> 00:25:33,109 for basically a 627 00:25:33,110 --> 00:25:34,939 special forces operative on a cell phone 628 00:25:34,940 --> 00:25:36,889 to talk to somebody in the pilot of an 629 00:25:36,890 --> 00:25:39,440 A10, or it allows 630 00:25:40,490 --> 00:25:42,140 drones and 631 00:25:43,730 --> 00:25:45,829 conventional aircrafts to share data 632 00:25:45,830 --> 00:25:47,750 and to 633 00:25:49,430 --> 00:25:51,710 send information 634 00:25:53,930 --> 00:25:56,419 back to us where we were transported 635 00:25:56,420 --> 00:25:58,989 long haul through, 636 00:25:58,990 --> 00:26:01,189 you know, ground based stationary 637 00:26:01,190 --> 00:26:02,839 satellites with higher bandwidth 638 00:26:02,840 --> 00:26:03,840 capacity. 639 00:26:05,180 --> 00:26:06,180 And 640 00:26:07,400 --> 00:26:09,529 the common misconception is 641 00:26:09,530 --> 00:26:11,629 that, you know, the drone 642 00:26:11,630 --> 00:26:13,429 links to the satellite and then it goes 643 00:26:13,430 --> 00:26:14,809 straight down to Ramstein. 644 00:26:14,810 --> 00:26:17,209 But there's a lot of redundant 645 00:26:17,210 --> 00:26:19,139 infrastructure involved. 646 00:26:19,140 --> 00:26:21,289 So the like say if there's a signal loss 647 00:26:21,290 --> 00:26:24,019 or if you needed to transfer 648 00:26:24,020 --> 00:26:25,160 like higher bandwidth 649 00:26:26,180 --> 00:26:28,429 images, you 650 00:26:28,430 --> 00:26:29,430 would use 651 00:26:30,500 --> 00:26:34,069 RF. So we called 652 00:26:34,070 --> 00:26:36,319 the beacon system the wi fi 653 00:26:36,320 --> 00:26:37,819 in the sky. 654 00:26:37,820 --> 00:26:40,369 And this is a precursor 655 00:26:40,370 --> 00:26:42,769 to network centric warfare 656 00:26:42,770 --> 00:26:44,689 like this is this is the beginning where 657 00:26:44,690 --> 00:26:47,839 you have high altitude relays 658 00:26:47,840 --> 00:26:50,329 flying over why you have, 659 00:26:50,330 --> 00:26:52,639 you know, hunter killer drones 660 00:26:52,640 --> 00:26:54,710 flying and ESR 661 00:26:55,820 --> 00:26:58,519 information surveillance reconnaissance 662 00:26:58,520 --> 00:27:00,619 working in tandem to pick targets 663 00:27:00,620 --> 00:27:02,090 and eliminate them. 664 00:27:05,360 --> 00:27:07,039 We're not the only country that's doing 665 00:27:07,040 --> 00:27:08,089 this. 666 00:27:08,090 --> 00:27:11,059 They're they're working 667 00:27:11,060 --> 00:27:12,229 on drones. 668 00:27:12,230 --> 00:27:14,449 And China and India, 669 00:27:14,450 --> 00:27:15,919 the British have them. 670 00:27:15,920 --> 00:27:18,589 The Israelis are really spearheading 671 00:27:18,590 --> 00:27:19,669 it. 672 00:27:19,670 --> 00:27:21,949 And even the Germans 673 00:27:21,950 --> 00:27:23,749 are starting to have them. 674 00:27:25,910 --> 00:27:28,759 And it's kind of 675 00:27:28,760 --> 00:27:29,900 unleashing a 676 00:27:31,130 --> 00:27:33,499 a Pandora's box of potential 677 00:27:33,500 --> 00:27:35,359 for future warfare. 678 00:27:37,520 --> 00:27:39,589 The there's 679 00:27:39,590 --> 00:27:42,139 a subway systems, 680 00:27:42,140 --> 00:27:43,140 and 681 00:27:44,810 --> 00:27:47,359 in England, they've 682 00:27:47,360 --> 00:27:50,059 developed a drone called The Tyrannis, 683 00:27:50,060 --> 00:27:52,159 and they claim that it is 684 00:27:52,160 --> 00:27:53,240 able to 685 00:27:54,380 --> 00:27:55,380 pick a target 686 00:27:56,900 --> 00:27:59,089 pick and identify a target 687 00:27:59,090 --> 00:28:01,369 correctly and essentially take it 688 00:28:01,370 --> 00:28:02,930 all the way to the point where 689 00:28:04,250 --> 00:28:05,989 it can make the kill decision. 690 00:28:05,990 --> 00:28:07,459 And then they have a human operator come 691 00:28:07,460 --> 00:28:08,930 in and just to prove it. 692 00:28:11,480 --> 00:28:13,579 So it's doing this 693 00:28:13,580 --> 00:28:14,959 and it's putting it into a stealth 694 00:28:14,960 --> 00:28:16,519 aircraft. 695 00:28:16,520 --> 00:28:19,069 The only reason you would need a stealth 696 00:28:19,070 --> 00:28:21,559 aircraft with semi-autonomous 697 00:28:21,560 --> 00:28:24,439 capabilities is for inter-state warfare. 698 00:28:24,440 --> 00:28:25,789 You wouldn't need that in a place like 699 00:28:25,790 --> 00:28:27,109 Afghanistan. 700 00:28:27,110 --> 00:28:29,299 So all of this development 701 00:28:29,300 --> 00:28:31,609 and stealth autonomous aircraft 702 00:28:31,610 --> 00:28:32,900 is intended for 703 00:28:35,000 --> 00:28:36,140 developed nations 704 00:28:37,880 --> 00:28:40,039 like Russia or 705 00:28:40,040 --> 00:28:42,529 China or, you know, 706 00:28:42,530 --> 00:28:43,530 you name it. 707 00:28:44,780 --> 00:28:46,279 Those are things to be concerned about. 708 00:28:49,460 --> 00:28:50,959 So they are 709 00:28:52,520 --> 00:28:53,750 developing a 710 00:28:55,250 --> 00:28:57,380 higher bandwidth satellite infrastructure 711 00:28:58,820 --> 00:29:01,909 up there that can 712 00:29:01,910 --> 00:29:04,399 basically supply about 10 times more 713 00:29:04,400 --> 00:29:06,949 capacity than the existing 714 00:29:06,950 --> 00:29:08,749 infrastructure right now. 715 00:29:08,750 --> 00:29:12,079 And that means more drones, 716 00:29:12,080 --> 00:29:14,119 more and 717 00:29:15,560 --> 00:29:18,229 more imagery and 718 00:29:18,230 --> 00:29:19,230 yeah, 719 00:29:21,100 --> 00:29:23,359 a more pervasive 720 00:29:23,360 --> 00:29:24,360 war. 721 00:29:26,420 --> 00:29:27,420 So. 722 00:29:29,990 --> 00:29:32,689 I've identified 723 00:29:32,690 --> 00:29:34,790 several different issues with the 724 00:29:36,170 --> 00:29:38,689 with the infrastructure where 725 00:29:38,690 --> 00:29:41,390 we're using it to kill people, and 726 00:29:42,950 --> 00:29:45,349 so the compartmentalization of 727 00:29:45,350 --> 00:29:47,509 analysis and decision making I talk 728 00:29:47,510 --> 00:29:49,699 to you about before where 729 00:29:49,700 --> 00:29:52,189 you have all of these different roles 730 00:29:52,190 --> 00:29:55,429 that you're using and 731 00:29:55,430 --> 00:29:57,589 they they come 732 00:29:57,590 --> 00:30:00,259 together at the end to 733 00:30:00,260 --> 00:30:01,519 create a final report. 734 00:30:03,950 --> 00:30:05,629 Now, if you were to take 10 people in 735 00:30:05,630 --> 00:30:07,969 here and you were to give them 736 00:30:07,970 --> 00:30:11,419 different information and 737 00:30:11,420 --> 00:30:13,549 you're to tell them it's all 738 00:30:13,550 --> 00:30:15,289 information pertaining to one specific 739 00:30:15,290 --> 00:30:17,359 event, you 740 00:30:17,360 --> 00:30:19,129 were to tell them to create a picture of 741 00:30:19,130 --> 00:30:21,889 it and use 742 00:30:21,890 --> 00:30:24,049 that in determining whether or not 743 00:30:24,050 --> 00:30:25,099 a person lives or dies. 744 00:30:26,120 --> 00:30:28,279 You might find some 745 00:30:28,280 --> 00:30:29,299 holes in that 746 00:30:30,920 --> 00:30:33,889 one problem. And places like Afghanistan, 747 00:30:33,890 --> 00:30:36,229 Yemen and Somalia, as they're all pretty 748 00:30:36,230 --> 00:30:38,359 aware of the fact that we're listening on 749 00:30:38,360 --> 00:30:39,589 their cell phones and whatnot. 750 00:30:39,590 --> 00:30:42,539 So they're not using electronic means to 751 00:30:42,540 --> 00:30:43,819 to communicate. 752 00:30:43,820 --> 00:30:45,919 They're using people like couriers 753 00:30:45,920 --> 00:30:47,329 and stuff like that. 754 00:30:47,330 --> 00:30:49,639 And there's a man 755 00:30:49,640 --> 00:30:51,769 named Malik Jalal that I met with in 756 00:30:51,770 --> 00:30:53,929 the British parliament, 757 00:30:53,930 --> 00:30:56,149 and he was speaking to several 758 00:30:56,150 --> 00:30:58,879 parliamentarians and asking them 759 00:30:58,880 --> 00:31:00,890 that they could 760 00:31:02,330 --> 00:31:04,799 remove him from the 761 00:31:04,800 --> 00:31:06,859 the kill list, that they can 762 00:31:06,860 --> 00:31:08,929 ask the United States to 763 00:31:08,930 --> 00:31:11,059 remove them from him from the killers. 764 00:31:11,060 --> 00:31:12,060 I 765 00:31:13,610 --> 00:31:15,079 kind of added to that and said that he's 766 00:31:15,080 --> 00:31:16,159 not really on the kill list. 767 00:31:16,160 --> 00:31:18,679 He's been identified as a courier and 768 00:31:18,680 --> 00:31:20,899 they're using him because 769 00:31:20,900 --> 00:31:23,509 he is part of an organization 770 00:31:23,510 --> 00:31:25,009 called the Northern Waziristan Peace 771 00:31:25,010 --> 00:31:27,109 Coalition and is going around trying 772 00:31:27,110 --> 00:31:28,430 to radicalize 773 00:31:30,320 --> 00:31:33,139 young Taliban 774 00:31:33,140 --> 00:31:35,119 fighters, Pakistani Taliban fighters. 775 00:31:36,920 --> 00:31:39,079 You know, in most movements, I 776 00:31:39,080 --> 00:31:40,369 just came from Standing Rock. 777 00:31:40,370 --> 00:31:42,449 You have people who are grounded and 778 00:31:42,450 --> 00:31:44,569 then you have people who feel like 779 00:31:44,570 --> 00:31:46,489 they need to defend themselves or they 780 00:31:46,490 --> 00:31:48,679 need to avenge their families and 781 00:31:48,680 --> 00:31:50,119 whatnot. And that happens any time you 782 00:31:50,120 --> 00:31:51,379 make a mistake. 783 00:31:51,380 --> 00:31:53,749 Now, mistakes happen 784 00:31:53,750 --> 00:31:55,669 a lot more often than the Obama 785 00:31:55,670 --> 00:31:57,889 administration is admitting. 786 00:31:57,890 --> 00:31:59,179 They said that there was one hundred and 787 00:31:59,180 --> 00:32:01,669 sixty one civilians killed outside 788 00:32:01,670 --> 00:32:03,769 of declared war zones. 789 00:32:03,770 --> 00:32:06,709 NGOs are reporting thousands. 790 00:32:06,710 --> 00:32:08,359 It's probably somewhere in between, 791 00:32:10,460 --> 00:32:11,460 but. 792 00:32:14,060 --> 00:32:16,219 There isn't that external 793 00:32:16,220 --> 00:32:17,780 oversight of. 794 00:32:18,960 --> 00:32:20,789 What's happening in the drone program, 795 00:32:22,290 --> 00:32:23,290 there's 796 00:32:24,660 --> 00:32:26,739 structural issues with that 797 00:32:26,740 --> 00:32:28,799 to include the fact that you 798 00:32:28,800 --> 00:32:31,500 have some missions that are being 799 00:32:32,580 --> 00:32:34,709 orchestrated by the CIA. 800 00:32:34,710 --> 00:32:37,649 Some of them are orchestrated by the 801 00:32:37,650 --> 00:32:39,629 Joint Special Operations Command. 802 00:32:39,630 --> 00:32:40,709 One is military. 803 00:32:40,710 --> 00:32:42,389 One is intelligence. 804 00:32:42,390 --> 00:32:44,249 One is a civilian organization that's not 805 00:32:44,250 --> 00:32:45,879 technically supposed to kill anybody. 806 00:32:45,880 --> 00:32:48,209 So they are 807 00:32:48,210 --> 00:32:50,309 farmed out to the 808 00:32:50,310 --> 00:32:51,569 Air Force. 809 00:32:51,570 --> 00:32:53,819 That's the like 810 00:32:55,530 --> 00:32:57,749 the the secret, I guess 811 00:32:57,750 --> 00:33:00,150 the the open secret. 812 00:33:01,830 --> 00:33:04,409 Then you have contracting agencies 813 00:33:04,410 --> 00:33:06,569 that are helping and making targeting 814 00:33:06,570 --> 00:33:08,939 decisions. So at any given mission, 815 00:33:08,940 --> 00:33:11,309 you could have three 816 00:33:11,310 --> 00:33:13,499 organizational overlaps 817 00:33:13,500 --> 00:33:15,739 within that kill decision. 818 00:33:15,740 --> 00:33:18,119 So if you are 819 00:33:18,120 --> 00:33:20,399 to trace it back 820 00:33:20,400 --> 00:33:22,499 and figure out where the problems lie, 821 00:33:22,500 --> 00:33:24,299 you have to deal with three different 822 00:33:24,300 --> 00:33:27,389 structures, three different organizations 823 00:33:27,390 --> 00:33:29,519 to parse out 824 00:33:29,520 --> 00:33:30,660 what actually happened. 825 00:33:31,680 --> 00:33:34,619 And some of those organizations, well, 826 00:33:34,620 --> 00:33:36,929 they all have different security 827 00:33:36,930 --> 00:33:39,719 clearances. They all have different, 828 00:33:39,720 --> 00:33:42,539 you know, protections for 829 00:33:42,540 --> 00:33:43,920 whistleblowers and whatnot. 830 00:33:47,320 --> 00:33:48,320 So 831 00:33:49,390 --> 00:33:51,549 the other thing that comes into play 832 00:33:51,550 --> 00:33:53,589 is you have the developers who create 833 00:33:53,590 --> 00:33:55,689 algorithms in order to 834 00:33:55,690 --> 00:33:57,040 do narrow tasks. 835 00:33:58,390 --> 00:34:01,179 I think in 2004 836 00:34:01,180 --> 00:34:02,949 there was about three hundred thousand 837 00:34:02,950 --> 00:34:04,809 hours of footage 838 00:34:06,040 --> 00:34:07,269 like drone footage that was being 839 00:34:07,270 --> 00:34:08,289 produced. 840 00:34:08,290 --> 00:34:09,550 Now there's. 841 00:34:10,940 --> 00:34:13,369 Probably upwards 842 00:34:13,370 --> 00:34:14,370 of two million, 843 00:34:16,190 --> 00:34:17,689 there's not enough people, not enough 844 00:34:17,690 --> 00:34:19,459 operators to sift through all that. 845 00:34:19,460 --> 00:34:22,009 So you need algorithms to help you 846 00:34:22,010 --> 00:34:24,408 determine, you know, 847 00:34:24,409 --> 00:34:27,019 like if there is suspicious 848 00:34:27,020 --> 00:34:28,219 patterns of activity 849 00:34:29,480 --> 00:34:31,579 or if there are, 850 00:34:32,630 --> 00:34:33,630 you know. 851 00:34:34,120 --> 00:34:34,908 Yeah. 852 00:34:34,909 --> 00:34:35,909 So 853 00:34:37,040 --> 00:34:38,988 the question always lies is when you're 854 00:34:38,989 --> 00:34:40,908 using all of these different algorithms 855 00:34:40,909 --> 00:34:43,039 in tandem with people that may or 856 00:34:43,040 --> 00:34:44,839 may not understand what the algorithm 857 00:34:44,840 --> 00:34:46,429 itself actually does. 858 00:34:48,409 --> 00:34:50,629 Is it possible that say, 859 00:34:52,310 --> 00:34:54,709 you know, that the limitations 860 00:34:54,710 --> 00:34:56,779 of the algorithm 861 00:34:56,780 --> 00:34:59,030 aren't congruent with 862 00:35:00,110 --> 00:35:02,509 the reality you might be presented? 863 00:35:02,510 --> 00:35:04,790 Like let's say you want to 864 00:35:06,110 --> 00:35:07,849 target anybody who is wearing a purple 865 00:35:07,850 --> 00:35:09,919 hat and like that has a 866 00:35:09,920 --> 00:35:12,229 tendency to pace back 867 00:35:12,230 --> 00:35:13,230 and forth 868 00:35:14,660 --> 00:35:15,660 on a street, 869 00:35:16,940 --> 00:35:18,829 you know, in a regular situation. 870 00:35:18,830 --> 00:35:21,049 You might that that might 871 00:35:21,050 --> 00:35:22,129 be pretty limiting. 872 00:35:22,130 --> 00:35:23,929 There's not many people who do that. 873 00:35:23,930 --> 00:35:26,659 But like, let's say Mardi Gras happens. 874 00:35:26,660 --> 00:35:29,839 And, you know, you have 875 00:35:29,840 --> 00:35:32,059 this situation where you have a bunch 876 00:35:32,060 --> 00:35:33,230 of people wearing purple hats. 877 00:35:34,760 --> 00:35:36,949 That creates some confusion 878 00:35:36,950 --> 00:35:37,950 in that. 879 00:35:40,490 --> 00:35:43,189 So when you have all this technology 880 00:35:43,190 --> 00:35:45,439 working for you and this is a big problem 881 00:35:45,440 --> 00:35:47,599 with with what I find with with 882 00:35:47,600 --> 00:35:49,939 commanders, is they get all these fancy 883 00:35:49,940 --> 00:35:53,629 toys. They're not necessarily 884 00:35:53,630 --> 00:35:55,909 up to par on, 885 00:35:55,910 --> 00:35:58,519 you know, like technology 886 00:35:58,520 --> 00:35:59,759 themselves. 887 00:35:59,760 --> 00:36:00,760 A lot of them 888 00:36:02,090 --> 00:36:04,550 may need help with using their emails. 889 00:36:09,260 --> 00:36:11,359 And they're sitting here 890 00:36:11,360 --> 00:36:12,679 looking at all this technology and it 891 00:36:12,680 --> 00:36:14,419 creates this false sense of confidence 892 00:36:14,420 --> 00:36:16,909 like that you have 893 00:36:16,910 --> 00:36:19,009 like this this overarching understanding 894 00:36:19,010 --> 00:36:21,559 of everything that's going on, but 895 00:36:21,560 --> 00:36:23,029 in fact, you don't. 896 00:36:23,030 --> 00:36:25,009 And most people in this crowd probably 897 00:36:25,010 --> 00:36:26,719 understand that. 898 00:36:26,720 --> 00:36:28,909 So the other 899 00:36:28,910 --> 00:36:31,219 issue is military training. 900 00:36:31,220 --> 00:36:33,379 You know, you have these 901 00:36:33,380 --> 00:36:35,689 operators and pilots and everybody, 902 00:36:35,690 --> 00:36:37,099 they're going through military training. 903 00:36:37,100 --> 00:36:39,769 They're being broken down. 904 00:36:39,770 --> 00:36:41,929 They are sleep 905 00:36:41,930 --> 00:36:43,519 deprived, deprived of food. 906 00:36:43,520 --> 00:36:45,799 You get about five minutes to eat. 907 00:36:45,800 --> 00:36:48,499 You're constantly being indoctrinated 908 00:36:48,500 --> 00:36:50,629 with, you know, 909 00:36:50,630 --> 00:36:52,609 accepting the act of killing. 910 00:36:53,960 --> 00:36:56,179 And you're taught to fear 911 00:36:56,180 --> 00:36:57,739 your commanders more than you are the 912 00:36:57,740 --> 00:36:58,819 enemy. 913 00:36:58,820 --> 00:37:01,129 And those 914 00:37:01,130 --> 00:37:03,169 those people are being put in positions 915 00:37:03,170 --> 00:37:05,119 where they're not going to combat. 916 00:37:05,120 --> 00:37:07,019 They're getting put in a 917 00:37:08,330 --> 00:37:10,579 box somewhere in 918 00:37:10,580 --> 00:37:12,889 the middle of the Midwest 919 00:37:12,890 --> 00:37:15,530 and they're picking out targets 920 00:37:16,730 --> 00:37:18,619 and they're doing that with the same, 921 00:37:18,620 --> 00:37:21,949 like, zeal of a 922 00:37:21,950 --> 00:37:24,289 Marine or whatever that is, 923 00:37:24,290 --> 00:37:26,599 you know, going off into 924 00:37:26,600 --> 00:37:27,600 Afghanistan. 925 00:37:28,850 --> 00:37:30,379 There's there's a big problem with that, 926 00:37:30,380 --> 00:37:32,269 too, you know. 927 00:37:32,270 --> 00:37:34,489 And, you know, there's 928 00:37:34,490 --> 00:37:36,799 there's an issue with this kind of 929 00:37:38,270 --> 00:37:40,549 call it confirmation bias. 930 00:37:40,550 --> 00:37:42,859 But, you know, 931 00:37:42,860 --> 00:37:44,869 if you have an analyst and all he's doing 932 00:37:44,870 --> 00:37:47,399 is watching Fox News and his image of, 933 00:37:47,400 --> 00:37:49,579 you know, all, you know, Arab 934 00:37:49,580 --> 00:37:51,919 people are that, you know, they 935 00:37:51,920 --> 00:37:54,199 belong to this religion that is 936 00:37:54,200 --> 00:37:55,909 intrinsically violent. 937 00:37:55,910 --> 00:37:58,039 And, you 938 00:37:58,040 --> 00:38:00,259 know, it only takes a matter of time 939 00:38:00,260 --> 00:38:01,460 to radicalize them. 940 00:38:03,320 --> 00:38:05,359 You know, they're not going to really 941 00:38:05,360 --> 00:38:06,649 view the population on the ground with 942 00:38:06,650 --> 00:38:08,749 much humanity, which is something I 943 00:38:08,750 --> 00:38:10,879 believe is is pretty necessary 944 00:38:10,880 --> 00:38:12,979 when you have somebody 945 00:38:12,980 --> 00:38:15,319 that far away, blocked 946 00:38:15,320 --> 00:38:17,030 by, you know, 947 00:38:18,230 --> 00:38:21,049 not only dissidents, but also a screen 948 00:38:21,050 --> 00:38:24,139 that's pixels and 949 00:38:24,140 --> 00:38:26,269 an image that it may or may not 950 00:38:26,270 --> 00:38:27,270 be fuzzy. 951 00:38:29,450 --> 00:38:31,909 And a lot of cultural 952 00:38:31,910 --> 00:38:33,650 ignorance comes into that. 953 00:38:34,940 --> 00:38:37,339 You know, one instance that I talk 954 00:38:37,340 --> 00:38:39,859 about is the KURK ninety seven papers 955 00:38:39,860 --> 00:38:41,959 that were released by the 956 00:38:41,960 --> 00:38:43,549 L.A. Times. 957 00:38:43,550 --> 00:38:45,769 So General Stanley McChrystal 958 00:38:45,770 --> 00:38:47,300 decided to release these 959 00:38:48,350 --> 00:38:51,199 in part because it was 960 00:38:51,200 --> 00:38:53,719 very controversial and 961 00:38:53,720 --> 00:38:56,179 he was also involved in the operation 962 00:38:56,180 --> 00:38:57,180 where it was happening. 963 00:38:58,160 --> 00:39:00,889 They created a kill box because 964 00:39:00,890 --> 00:39:03,289 there was a operation 965 00:39:03,290 --> 00:39:05,719 that went down earlier that day 966 00:39:05,720 --> 00:39:07,969 and that. 967 00:39:10,070 --> 00:39:12,289 Particular operation ended in a 968 00:39:12,290 --> 00:39:14,539 strike that killed twenty three 969 00:39:14,540 --> 00:39:16,789 civilians and four children. 970 00:39:18,680 --> 00:39:20,809 So there are 30 people in the convoy and 971 00:39:20,810 --> 00:39:23,419 because of the way it looked 972 00:39:23,420 --> 00:39:25,669 and because of the 973 00:39:25,670 --> 00:39:28,069 lack of training that the 974 00:39:28,070 --> 00:39:30,229 analysts got and also 975 00:39:30,230 --> 00:39:32,569 the fact that it was a kill box, 976 00:39:32,570 --> 00:39:35,419 which doesn't 977 00:39:35,420 --> 00:39:37,519 require commander 978 00:39:37,520 --> 00:39:39,769 approval, you 979 00:39:39,770 --> 00:39:41,419 can administer the strike at a lower 980 00:39:41,420 --> 00:39:42,559 level. 981 00:39:42,560 --> 00:39:44,959 You had a bunch of inexperienced people 982 00:39:44,960 --> 00:39:47,809 administering this, the strike 983 00:39:47,810 --> 00:39:49,909 that killed all of these 984 00:39:49,910 --> 00:39:50,910 innocent people. 985 00:39:52,460 --> 00:39:54,619 And again, that may 986 00:39:54,620 --> 00:39:57,709 or may not be happening at a much larger 987 00:39:57,710 --> 00:39:59,929 level. It hasn't been reported 988 00:39:59,930 --> 00:40:00,930 to the public. 989 00:40:01,610 --> 00:40:03,409 But in this particular incident, 990 00:40:04,460 --> 00:40:06,529 I like to mention 991 00:40:06,530 --> 00:40:07,939 the Milgram experiments. 992 00:40:07,940 --> 00:40:10,099 And if you if you don't 993 00:40:10,100 --> 00:40:13,009 know, it was a there's a researcher. 994 00:40:13,010 --> 00:40:14,359 So so the experiment goes. 995 00:40:14,360 --> 00:40:17,329 There was a there was a researcher and 996 00:40:17,330 --> 00:40:19,429 his job was act as a position 997 00:40:19,430 --> 00:40:21,349 of authority while he's telling this 998 00:40:21,350 --> 00:40:23,719 volunteer to increase 999 00:40:26,050 --> 00:40:28,549 the intensity of 1000 00:40:28,550 --> 00:40:30,109 an electrical shock. 1001 00:40:30,110 --> 00:40:32,209 And he found that 60 percent of 1002 00:40:32,210 --> 00:40:34,489 the time a person was likely 1003 00:40:34,490 --> 00:40:36,619 to obey authority and actually administer 1004 00:40:36,620 --> 00:40:37,620 that shock. 1005 00:40:39,140 --> 00:40:41,599 They did the 1006 00:40:41,600 --> 00:40:44,029 well, the person 1007 00:40:44,030 --> 00:40:45,529 who is in the chair who was being shot 1008 00:40:45,530 --> 00:40:47,749 was a was an actor. 1009 00:40:47,750 --> 00:40:49,820 So that. 1010 00:40:52,570 --> 00:40:54,639 That experiment was done in front of 1011 00:40:54,640 --> 00:40:56,649 a window and behind a window. 1012 00:40:56,650 --> 00:40:59,229 And what they found was that 1013 00:40:59,230 --> 00:41:00,909 while it was in front of the window, when 1014 00:41:00,910 --> 00:41:01,929 they were sitting face to face, the 1015 00:41:01,930 --> 00:41:04,149 person was much less likely to actually 1016 00:41:04,150 --> 00:41:05,659 administer the lethal shot. 1017 00:41:05,660 --> 00:41:08,109 So even a barrier of a window 1018 00:41:08,110 --> 00:41:10,869 creates a barrier to a person's 1019 00:41:10,870 --> 00:41:13,360 ability to feel empathy. 1020 00:41:15,450 --> 00:41:16,450 And 1021 00:41:17,820 --> 00:41:20,669 there is another experiment that was done 1022 00:41:20,670 --> 00:41:23,069 where they were testing a person's 1023 00:41:23,070 --> 00:41:25,319 visual acuity, a pilot's visual acuity 1024 00:41:25,320 --> 00:41:27,779 while he was in a pilot in a cockpit 1025 00:41:27,780 --> 00:41:30,329 versus a 1026 00:41:31,470 --> 00:41:33,599 looking at a screen and identifying 1027 00:41:33,600 --> 00:41:35,729 targets. They found that when they were 1028 00:41:35,730 --> 00:41:37,889 looking at a screen, there 1029 00:41:37,890 --> 00:41:40,049 was much more false positives that 1030 00:41:40,050 --> 00:41:42,779 were identified 1031 00:41:42,780 --> 00:41:44,069 with those targets. 1032 00:41:44,070 --> 00:41:45,070 So, 1033 00:41:47,190 --> 00:41:49,379 you know, a person's visual acuity is 1034 00:41:49,380 --> 00:41:52,529 much better than a pixilated screen. 1035 00:41:52,530 --> 00:41:54,689 And that extra 1036 00:41:54,690 --> 00:41:56,879 barrier, uh, kind of, 1037 00:41:59,100 --> 00:42:00,389 yeah. 1038 00:42:00,390 --> 00:42:02,729 It prevents the person from feeling 1039 00:42:02,730 --> 00:42:04,860 the the the 1040 00:42:05,970 --> 00:42:07,109 the reality of the fact that they're 1041 00:42:07,110 --> 00:42:08,110 killing somebody. 1042 00:42:10,440 --> 00:42:12,899 So another element 1043 00:42:12,900 --> 00:42:15,149 of all of this is the acronyms 1044 00:42:15,150 --> 00:42:17,549 that we use, military 1045 00:42:17,550 --> 00:42:20,429 age male as somebody who is 1046 00:42:20,430 --> 00:42:23,339 16 or above and they're male 1047 00:42:23,340 --> 00:42:25,949 and it has gone down to 1048 00:42:25,950 --> 00:42:28,019 about the age of 12. 1049 00:42:28,020 --> 00:42:30,630 This is no longer a social, 1050 00:42:32,160 --> 00:42:34,379 you know, indicator of a person 1051 00:42:34,380 --> 00:42:36,959 having, you know, like 1052 00:42:36,960 --> 00:42:39,419 militant tendencies. 1053 00:42:39,420 --> 00:42:40,420 That was changed, 1054 00:42:42,300 --> 00:42:44,879 but it's still 1055 00:42:44,880 --> 00:42:46,139 one of them. 1056 00:42:46,140 --> 00:42:48,239 And what we've done 1057 00:42:48,240 --> 00:42:49,349 with drones, 1058 00:42:50,550 --> 00:42:52,799 you know, there's there's multiple 1059 00:42:52,800 --> 00:42:55,739 ways to mitigate civilian casualties. 1060 00:42:55,740 --> 00:42:57,899 You can do it in actuality 1061 00:42:57,900 --> 00:43:00,029 or you could do it 1062 00:43:00,030 --> 00:43:01,030 on paper 1063 00:43:02,160 --> 00:43:04,709 through obfuscating the 1064 00:43:04,710 --> 00:43:07,260 the language and say 1065 00:43:08,850 --> 00:43:10,980 calling somebody an associated threat 1066 00:43:12,720 --> 00:43:14,789 in the military. We've we've associated 1067 00:43:14,790 --> 00:43:15,989 proximity with guilt. 1068 00:43:17,040 --> 00:43:19,799 And, you know, that's 1069 00:43:19,800 --> 00:43:22,079 that's a huge problem when you're using 1070 00:43:22,080 --> 00:43:24,569 weapons payloads that 1071 00:43:24,570 --> 00:43:25,650 could have a 1072 00:43:26,910 --> 00:43:29,189 30 meter kill 1073 00:43:29,190 --> 00:43:30,449 radius or 1074 00:43:31,540 --> 00:43:33,600 a 500 foot kill radius. 1075 00:43:35,550 --> 00:43:37,769 You know, it's these bombs 1076 00:43:37,770 --> 00:43:39,179 are indiscriminate. So the narrative 1077 00:43:39,180 --> 00:43:41,159 saying that these things are very precise 1078 00:43:41,160 --> 00:43:42,160 is 1079 00:43:43,560 --> 00:43:45,719 pretty easily identified as false because 1080 00:43:45,720 --> 00:43:47,699 bombs are not discriminate. 1081 00:43:49,860 --> 00:43:51,509 And if you're using it to assassinate 1082 00:43:51,510 --> 00:43:53,879 people, it's much less discriminant 1083 00:43:53,880 --> 00:43:56,969 than, say, using a sniper rifle 1084 00:43:56,970 --> 00:43:57,669 in the US. 1085 00:43:57,670 --> 00:43:59,069 We've had a, 1086 00:44:00,180 --> 00:44:02,819 you know, an opposition 1087 00:44:02,820 --> 00:44:03,820 to 1088 00:44:05,490 --> 00:44:06,540 assassination. 1089 00:44:07,650 --> 00:44:09,869 But what we're doing with drones is 1090 00:44:09,870 --> 00:44:11,819 we're we're technically assassinating 1091 00:44:11,820 --> 00:44:12,820 people. 1092 00:44:13,740 --> 00:44:16,139 That creates 1093 00:44:16,140 --> 00:44:18,629 a international norm. 1094 00:44:18,630 --> 00:44:20,699 And essentially any country 1095 00:44:20,700 --> 00:44:22,439 that would want to do the same thing 1096 00:44:22,440 --> 00:44:23,440 would be able to. 1097 00:44:24,840 --> 00:44:27,029 So if, say, Pakistan wanted 1098 00:44:27,030 --> 00:44:28,859 to use the same argument to attack us, 1099 00:44:28,860 --> 00:44:31,019 they would be in their right 1100 00:44:31,020 --> 00:44:32,020 to do that. 1101 00:44:34,740 --> 00:44:36,060 That's something else to think about. 1102 00:44:38,300 --> 00:44:41,789 We also have words that 1103 00:44:41,790 --> 00:44:44,310 make light of the act of killing, like 1104 00:44:46,230 --> 00:44:48,359 when somebody has been struck 1105 00:44:48,360 --> 00:44:50,819 and they're trying to flee the scene 1106 00:44:50,820 --> 00:44:51,809 and they're injured. 1107 00:44:51,810 --> 00:44:52,890 We call them squirters. 1108 00:44:54,930 --> 00:44:56,130 When there's, 1109 00:44:57,570 --> 00:44:59,729 you know, when there's 1110 00:44:59,730 --> 00:45:01,799 an impact and 1111 00:45:01,800 --> 00:45:03,599 it hits the cell phone that we're 1112 00:45:03,600 --> 00:45:04,600 targeting, 1113 00:45:06,450 --> 00:45:08,820 we would call it a. 1114 00:45:17,560 --> 00:45:18,880 Yeah, so 1115 00:45:21,400 --> 00:45:23,919 there's a few things going on, 1116 00:45:23,920 --> 00:45:24,920 but. 1117 00:45:27,200 --> 00:45:28,429 Yeah, you know what I mean, it's 1118 00:45:30,520 --> 00:45:32,780 it's it's a little heavy, 1119 00:45:37,280 --> 00:45:40,099 so as far as the 1120 00:45:40,100 --> 00:45:42,050 the political side of it, of course, 1121 00:45:43,220 --> 00:45:45,739 you know, having 1122 00:45:45,740 --> 00:45:47,750 no soldiers dying 1123 00:45:48,860 --> 00:45:51,379 allows countries 1124 00:45:51,380 --> 00:45:54,679 to create narratives that 1125 00:45:54,680 --> 00:45:57,769 this is a ethical weapon. 1126 00:45:57,770 --> 00:45:59,839 We're saving lives of our troops, 1127 00:45:59,840 --> 00:46:01,579 but also saving the lives of people on 1128 00:46:01,580 --> 00:46:02,580 the ground. 1129 00:46:03,770 --> 00:46:06,259 You know, the fact that there are 1130 00:46:06,260 --> 00:46:08,359 civilian kills and the fact that 1131 00:46:08,360 --> 00:46:10,549 maybe we are hitting our 1132 00:46:10,550 --> 00:46:11,550 targets, 1133 00:46:13,010 --> 00:46:15,349 you know, the people 1134 00:46:15,350 --> 00:46:17,270 in those neighborhoods 1135 00:46:19,220 --> 00:46:21,289 may or may not know that the person we 1136 00:46:21,290 --> 00:46:23,269 were striking is an insurgent. 1137 00:46:23,270 --> 00:46:24,529 It's not something that you would 1138 00:46:24,530 --> 00:46:25,969 typically advertise 1139 00:46:26,990 --> 00:46:29,329 if you're part of an al Qaeda network. 1140 00:46:30,500 --> 00:46:32,689 So if it were to kill him 1141 00:46:32,690 --> 00:46:34,819 and his family and 1142 00:46:34,820 --> 00:46:37,399 the children, that's all 1143 00:46:37,400 --> 00:46:39,169 those people would see. 1144 00:46:39,170 --> 00:46:41,179 They're not getting the Western narrative 1145 00:46:41,180 --> 00:46:43,699 of what you 1146 00:46:43,700 --> 00:46:45,229 know, who those people were, what they 1147 00:46:45,230 --> 00:46:46,309 did. 1148 00:46:46,310 --> 00:46:47,900 Most of that isn't explained, 1149 00:46:49,400 --> 00:46:51,499 although over there they're much 1150 00:46:51,500 --> 00:46:53,329 more aware of the 1151 00:46:54,470 --> 00:46:56,329 the fact that we're killing people on a 1152 00:46:56,330 --> 00:46:58,429 consistent basis with drones than 1153 00:46:58,430 --> 00:46:59,430 than we are here. 1154 00:47:02,450 --> 00:47:04,849 And it kind of presents 1155 00:47:04,850 --> 00:47:05,749 another issue. 1156 00:47:05,750 --> 00:47:07,939 The, uh, the question 1157 00:47:07,940 --> 00:47:08,940 of 1158 00:47:10,370 --> 00:47:12,379 are these ethical tools or are they 1159 00:47:12,380 --> 00:47:14,570 perceived as cowardice tools? 1160 00:47:16,010 --> 00:47:18,019 You know, it's. 1161 00:47:20,240 --> 00:47:22,439 I think it's a pretty human feeling that, 1162 00:47:22,440 --> 00:47:24,229 you know, if somebody has a problem with 1163 00:47:24,230 --> 00:47:26,359 you, you want them to face you like, 1164 00:47:26,360 --> 00:47:28,579 you know, say to your face to to come 1165 00:47:28,580 --> 00:47:30,739 up to you and, like, at least have 1166 00:47:30,740 --> 00:47:31,969 the ability to talk. 1167 00:47:31,970 --> 00:47:34,669 And, you know, 1168 00:47:34,670 --> 00:47:36,170 you could potentially even 1169 00:47:38,060 --> 00:47:40,279 decollete the situation if 1170 00:47:40,280 --> 00:47:41,479 you had somebody on the ground. 1171 00:47:42,920 --> 00:47:45,259 The drone is the ultimate 1172 00:47:45,260 --> 00:47:47,150 sign of, you know. 1173 00:47:48,400 --> 00:47:50,769 Fuck you, you deserve to die like 1174 00:47:50,770 --> 00:47:52,839 there's no ands upset about 1175 00:47:52,840 --> 00:47:53,920 it, you know about it. 1176 00:48:01,060 --> 00:48:03,279 So my 1177 00:48:03,280 --> 00:48:04,420 concerns for the future, 1178 00:48:06,220 --> 00:48:07,220 so 1179 00:48:08,890 --> 00:48:10,179 I don't know how many people here are 1180 00:48:10,180 --> 00:48:12,519 aware of the hacking incident 1181 00:48:12,520 --> 00:48:15,489 with the Archey 170 1182 00:48:15,490 --> 00:48:17,559 Sentinel drone over 1183 00:48:17,560 --> 00:48:19,689 Iran where they brought 1184 00:48:19,690 --> 00:48:22,569 down, you know, this 1185 00:48:22,570 --> 00:48:23,570 this 1186 00:48:24,790 --> 00:48:26,500 highly sophisticated drone, 1187 00:48:28,150 --> 00:48:30,429 and they did it 1188 00:48:30,430 --> 00:48:33,189 by overpowering 1189 00:48:33,190 --> 00:48:34,190 the signal. 1190 00:48:35,560 --> 00:48:38,739 So the signal itself is a vulnerability 1191 00:48:38,740 --> 00:48:41,109 and having signals 1192 00:48:41,110 --> 00:48:42,399 going back and forth are always going to 1193 00:48:42,400 --> 00:48:44,829 be a vulnerability. So there is 1194 00:48:44,830 --> 00:48:47,559 a incentive to make these autonomous 1195 00:48:47,560 --> 00:48:49,839 and to have them, 1196 00:48:49,840 --> 00:48:52,569 you know, make decisions 1197 00:48:52,570 --> 00:48:55,069 either within 1198 00:48:55,070 --> 00:48:57,249 the the structure itself 1199 00:48:57,250 --> 00:48:58,899 or through a mesh network. 1200 00:49:01,030 --> 00:49:02,469 Swarming is 1201 00:49:03,550 --> 00:49:05,289 it appears like that's going to be the 1202 00:49:05,290 --> 00:49:07,509 next step, particularly 1203 00:49:07,510 --> 00:49:09,760 of countries like China. 1204 00:49:11,410 --> 00:49:13,359 You know, they're they're pretty advanced 1205 00:49:13,360 --> 00:49:14,269 with that right now. 1206 00:49:14,270 --> 00:49:15,669 They've just developed 1207 00:49:17,440 --> 00:49:19,719 a sort of rubberband launcher. 1208 00:49:19,720 --> 00:49:22,269 They can launch a hundred 1209 00:49:22,270 --> 00:49:24,399 of these swarming drones that 1210 00:49:24,400 --> 00:49:26,530 are programed to behave like swallows 1211 00:49:28,330 --> 00:49:30,519 to surveil an 1212 00:49:30,520 --> 00:49:32,979 area. And if it had found a target 1213 00:49:32,980 --> 00:49:35,199 to to basically 1214 00:49:35,200 --> 00:49:36,550 run into it. So they're 1215 00:49:38,380 --> 00:49:40,239 launching cruise missiles, 1216 00:49:41,620 --> 00:49:43,659 so to speak, and. 1217 00:49:45,900 --> 00:49:48,059 That's that's going to be 1218 00:49:48,060 --> 00:49:50,429 another big thing, and 1219 00:49:51,990 --> 00:49:53,699 I don't know how many of you are aware of 1220 00:49:53,700 --> 00:49:55,769 the STEM nodes and the neural 1221 00:49:55,770 --> 00:49:57,539 networks that they're trying to develop 1222 00:49:57,540 --> 00:49:59,519 for prosthesis. 1223 00:49:59,520 --> 00:50:00,959 A lot of this technology that's coming 1224 00:50:00,960 --> 00:50:04,229 out has a dual purpose, like the military 1225 00:50:04,230 --> 00:50:05,189 side of it. 1226 00:50:05,190 --> 00:50:07,409 I mean, you can use 1227 00:50:07,410 --> 00:50:09,779 it to move a hand or you can use 1228 00:50:09,780 --> 00:50:12,120 the the imagery 1229 00:50:13,710 --> 00:50:16,769 of the brain activity 1230 00:50:16,770 --> 00:50:19,019 to figure out how 1231 00:50:19,020 --> 00:50:21,359 to allow pilots 1232 00:50:21,360 --> 00:50:24,149 to make decisions without 1233 00:50:24,150 --> 00:50:26,219 using, you know, any of 1234 00:50:26,220 --> 00:50:27,220 their appendages. 1235 00:50:29,890 --> 00:50:31,209 That's the next step we need to be 1236 00:50:31,210 --> 00:50:32,210 looking out for 1237 00:50:35,230 --> 00:50:37,509 me blackout's that goes without saying. 1238 00:50:37,510 --> 00:50:39,819 And then miniaturization is another 1239 00:50:39,820 --> 00:50:41,679 thing, particularly with surveillance 1240 00:50:41,680 --> 00:50:42,819 robots. 1241 00:50:42,820 --> 00:50:45,519 I know Blackmer just 1242 00:50:45,520 --> 00:50:47,979 talked about the 1243 00:50:47,980 --> 00:50:49,779 possibility of having a little bees that 1244 00:50:49,780 --> 00:50:51,279 will go around. 1245 00:50:51,280 --> 00:50:53,409 I mean, that's it's 1246 00:50:53,410 --> 00:50:55,779 still science fiction, but 1247 00:50:55,780 --> 00:50:56,780 it's not. 1248 00:50:57,820 --> 00:51:00,399 Science fiction, in the next 1249 00:51:00,400 --> 00:51:02,619 twenty five years or 1250 00:51:02,620 --> 00:51:03,620 less, 1251 00:51:05,590 --> 00:51:07,149 we will have autonomous 1252 00:51:08,560 --> 00:51:10,119 killer robots 1253 00:51:11,200 --> 00:51:12,550 within the next five years. 1254 00:51:16,030 --> 00:51:17,139 So I. 1255 00:51:18,380 --> 00:51:20,629 Just hope that you're all 1256 00:51:20,630 --> 00:51:21,769 on that and 1257 00:51:23,000 --> 00:51:24,199 that, you know, 1258 00:51:25,460 --> 00:51:27,529 whistleblowers and 1259 00:51:27,530 --> 00:51:29,659 hackers and, you 1260 00:51:29,660 --> 00:51:31,969 know, human rights people can all work 1261 00:51:31,970 --> 00:51:34,489 together on issues like this 1262 00:51:34,490 --> 00:51:36,770 and we can sort of go 1263 00:51:37,820 --> 00:51:39,890 and take it from a multi-dimensional 1264 00:51:41,390 --> 00:51:42,390 like. 1265 00:51:43,370 --> 00:51:44,370 Approach 1266 00:51:47,450 --> 00:51:49,999 as far as solutions. 1267 00:51:50,000 --> 00:51:52,249 Of course, I met somebody 1268 00:51:52,250 --> 00:51:54,199 in Berlin, I believe his name is Adam, 1269 00:51:54,200 --> 00:51:55,309 and he built a 1270 00:51:57,410 --> 00:51:59,759 very he created a clothing 1271 00:51:59,760 --> 00:52:00,950 that is 1272 00:52:03,440 --> 00:52:05,649 reflective of infrared. 1273 00:52:07,730 --> 00:52:10,219 So things like that or 1274 00:52:10,220 --> 00:52:12,799 these these microwave 1275 00:52:12,800 --> 00:52:14,659 guns that are coming out that can take 1276 00:52:14,660 --> 00:52:15,800 down drones, these 1277 00:52:16,970 --> 00:52:19,189 nets that can go 1278 00:52:19,190 --> 00:52:20,960 up and capture drones, 1279 00:52:22,610 --> 00:52:24,709 you know, that's those are all 1280 00:52:24,710 --> 00:52:26,899 iterations of, you 1281 00:52:26,900 --> 00:52:29,329 know, civilian based 1282 00:52:29,330 --> 00:52:31,849 approaches to possibly 1283 00:52:31,850 --> 00:52:34,100 taking down drones with malicious intent. 1284 00:52:36,170 --> 00:52:37,579 Like I said, I just came back from 1285 00:52:37,580 --> 00:52:39,319 standing right there. 1286 00:52:39,320 --> 00:52:42,199 North Dakota is the first state in 1287 00:52:42,200 --> 00:52:44,299 the United States to legalize weaponized 1288 00:52:44,300 --> 00:52:45,300 drones. 1289 00:52:46,640 --> 00:52:48,589 They did that in 2015. 1290 00:52:48,590 --> 00:52:50,030 And and 1291 00:52:52,340 --> 00:52:53,839 you know that that might be something 1292 00:52:53,840 --> 00:52:56,059 that's up and coming. 1293 00:52:56,060 --> 00:52:58,249 They're already like 1294 00:52:58,250 --> 00:53:00,829 using excessive force against us. 1295 00:53:00,830 --> 00:53:03,379 I have had pepper spray, 1296 00:53:03,380 --> 00:53:05,509 six gas, rubber bullets shot 1297 00:53:05,510 --> 00:53:06,510 at me. 1298 00:53:07,280 --> 00:53:09,829 And they're doing this in subzero 1299 00:53:09,830 --> 00:53:12,499 weather along with water cannons 1300 00:53:12,500 --> 00:53:14,269 and stuff. They just blew a girl's arm 1301 00:53:14,270 --> 00:53:15,270 off. 1302 00:53:15,980 --> 00:53:17,629 This happening in the United States. 1303 00:53:17,630 --> 00:53:19,759 And it's happening where, you 1304 00:53:19,760 --> 00:53:21,979 know, these these groups aren't just 1305 00:53:21,980 --> 00:53:22,969 indigenous people. 1306 00:53:22,970 --> 00:53:25,549 It's it's also, uh, 1307 00:53:25,550 --> 00:53:27,259 you know, activists of different 1308 00:53:27,260 --> 00:53:29,089 indigenous batar, different ethnic 1309 00:53:29,090 --> 00:53:30,090 backgrounds. 1310 00:53:31,490 --> 00:53:33,649 So they really they really 1311 00:53:33,650 --> 00:53:34,650 don't care. 1312 00:53:36,710 --> 00:53:38,809 And you 1313 00:53:38,810 --> 00:53:41,149 know what I what I really. 1314 00:53:41,150 --> 00:53:42,590 What really catalyzed. 1315 00:53:44,940 --> 00:53:46,469 And me, while I was there, is the 1316 00:53:46,470 --> 00:53:48,749 realization that there are certain 1317 00:53:48,750 --> 00:53:50,879 resources that are 1318 00:53:50,880 --> 00:53:52,979 essential for life that we need 1319 00:53:52,980 --> 00:53:55,079 to protect 1320 00:53:55,080 --> 00:53:56,880 and we need to. 1321 00:54:00,340 --> 00:54:02,649 Be willing to put 1322 00:54:02,650 --> 00:54:05,139 ourselves on the line and, 1323 00:54:05,140 --> 00:54:07,299 you know, put our minds to work 1324 00:54:07,300 --> 00:54:09,759 at how to effectively 1325 00:54:09,760 --> 00:54:11,859 protect these things, except 1326 00:54:11,860 --> 00:54:14,889 besides just presenting a 1327 00:54:14,890 --> 00:54:15,890 a barrier 1328 00:54:17,860 --> 00:54:18,969 to them. 1329 00:54:18,970 --> 00:54:19,970 And 1330 00:54:21,780 --> 00:54:23,529 something else I would be very interested 1331 00:54:23,530 --> 00:54:25,929 in speaking to some of us is like how 1332 00:54:25,930 --> 00:54:28,029 how we can help some of the 1333 00:54:28,030 --> 00:54:30,429 indigenous communities lead this effort 1334 00:54:30,430 --> 00:54:32,679 in the US right 1335 00:54:32,680 --> 00:54:33,680 now. 1336 00:54:36,800 --> 00:54:38,779 Transcendental solutions. 1337 00:54:38,780 --> 00:54:40,879 That's that's a term that I 1338 00:54:40,880 --> 00:54:43,549 like, you have negotiated 1339 00:54:43,550 --> 00:54:46,099 solutions that 1340 00:54:46,100 --> 00:54:48,289 are predicated on one person getting 1341 00:54:48,290 --> 00:54:50,299 the benefit over the other, where you 1342 00:54:50,300 --> 00:54:52,759 have solutions that are mediated 1343 00:54:52,760 --> 00:54:55,459 and can 1344 00:54:55,460 --> 00:54:57,799 lead to a new reality 1345 00:54:57,800 --> 00:54:59,449 where everybody is 1346 00:55:01,010 --> 00:55:01,919 best served. 1347 00:55:01,920 --> 00:55:04,009 And I'd 1348 00:55:04,010 --> 00:55:05,779 like everybody to try and focus on those 1349 00:55:05,780 --> 00:55:08,179 as well and. 1350 00:55:09,360 --> 00:55:12,929 Yeah, so if you have any questions, 1351 00:55:12,930 --> 00:55:14,969 be very happy to hear them. 1352 00:55:14,970 --> 00:55:16,940 Yeah, so I grab a microphone. 1353 00:55:34,960 --> 00:55:37,239 What I hope one 1354 00:55:37,240 --> 00:55:39,699 thing I don't get from the talk is 1355 00:55:39,700 --> 00:55:41,439 when will all these people be able to 1356 00:55:41,440 --> 00:55:43,030 download your documentary? 1357 00:55:44,050 --> 00:55:46,689 Oh, it's actually opening in theaters 1358 00:55:46,690 --> 00:55:48,819 in Germany, all over Germany 1359 00:55:48,820 --> 00:55:50,109 in May. 1360 00:55:50,110 --> 00:55:52,449 So it will be available 1361 00:55:52,450 --> 00:55:54,819 in the regular theater and 1362 00:55:54,820 --> 00:55:57,339 at some point also via download 1363 00:55:57,340 --> 00:55:57,849 and so on. 1364 00:55:57,850 --> 00:55:59,829 But it would be great if you come out 1365 00:55:59,830 --> 00:56:01,449 because, you know, we will have 1366 00:56:01,450 --> 00:56:03,579 discussions and, you know, we 1367 00:56:03,580 --> 00:56:06,099 will have the possibility to to answer 1368 00:56:06,100 --> 00:56:08,049 to questions at the theaters and can 1369 00:56:08,050 --> 00:56:09,130 interact. So thank you. 1370 00:56:16,470 --> 00:56:17,470 Oh, 1371 00:56:18,950 --> 00:56:21,649 first perspective on it all and for your, 1372 00:56:21,650 --> 00:56:23,709 um, I think you forgot one 1373 00:56:23,710 --> 00:56:25,570 point, um, capitalism, 1374 00:56:26,830 --> 00:56:29,469 um, all of these 1375 00:56:29,470 --> 00:56:31,550 designs and so on have to 1376 00:56:32,740 --> 00:56:35,139 target a mind to kill 1377 00:56:35,140 --> 00:56:36,219 somebody. 1378 00:56:36,220 --> 00:56:38,590 And so, 1379 00:56:39,730 --> 00:56:40,719 um, fine. 1380 00:56:40,720 --> 00:56:42,969 And, uh, Mitzel is basically 1381 00:56:42,970 --> 00:56:44,709 the success state of 1382 00:56:45,830 --> 00:56:48,309 the goit, so it's a lot 1383 00:56:48,310 --> 00:56:49,360 easier to do it. 1384 00:56:50,830 --> 00:56:52,989 It's a basic design business here for 1385 00:56:52,990 --> 00:56:53,919 good. 1386 00:56:53,920 --> 00:56:55,989 And also, um, as a 1387 00:56:55,990 --> 00:56:58,609 weapon also, you want 1388 00:56:58,610 --> 00:57:01,179 the people using your 1389 00:57:01,180 --> 00:57:03,299 platform to fire you, Mrs. 1390 00:57:03,300 --> 00:57:05,679 Customizes, putting your money. 1391 00:57:05,680 --> 00:57:08,089 I think this point is also, 1392 00:57:08,090 --> 00:57:10,899 um, to to 1393 00:57:10,900 --> 00:57:12,039 think about in the future 1394 00:57:14,440 --> 00:57:16,599 are very 1395 00:57:16,600 --> 00:57:17,379 good question. 1396 00:57:17,380 --> 00:57:19,300 But next question number four. 1397 00:57:21,800 --> 00:57:24,019 OK, OK, OK, I 1398 00:57:24,020 --> 00:57:25,029 also want to thank you. 1399 00:57:25,030 --> 00:57:27,079 I have no idea how it must be like to 1400 00:57:27,080 --> 00:57:28,769 actually sit and then think about it. 1401 00:57:28,770 --> 00:57:30,859 So thank you very much for coming 1402 00:57:30,860 --> 00:57:32,269 forward and talking about it. 1403 00:57:32,270 --> 00:57:33,979 I think it's very important. 1404 00:57:33,980 --> 00:57:35,449 But I also have a question about the 1405 00:57:35,450 --> 00:57:37,639 future because, well, 1406 00:57:37,640 --> 00:57:39,289 the drone killings are happening right 1407 00:57:39,290 --> 00:57:41,389 now. And I believe the people that 1408 00:57:41,390 --> 00:57:43,249 are not too happy about it and I wonder 1409 00:57:43,250 --> 00:57:45,349 how can you actually mediate that? 1410 00:57:45,350 --> 00:57:47,389 How can you say I killed your family? 1411 00:57:47,390 --> 00:57:49,279 But, well, we can have a future where we 1412 00:57:49,280 --> 00:57:51,199 live together. How how how would that 1413 00:57:51,200 --> 00:57:52,309 even work in the future? 1414 00:57:53,980 --> 00:57:54,980 Uh, well, 1415 00:57:56,690 --> 00:57:58,799 right now, I 1416 00:57:58,800 --> 00:58:01,189 I'm I'm trying to involve 1417 00:58:01,190 --> 00:58:02,989 myself in in a first approach. 1418 00:58:02,990 --> 00:58:04,549 I'm working with an organization called 1419 00:58:04,550 --> 00:58:06,679 Repreve and 1420 00:58:08,540 --> 00:58:10,039 we're trying to. 1421 00:58:14,290 --> 00:58:16,509 I guess create platforms where 1422 00:58:16,510 --> 00:58:19,179 we can have reconciliation 1423 00:58:19,180 --> 00:58:21,609 with the victims as 1424 00:58:21,610 --> 00:58:23,559 individuals, not as state 1425 00:58:23,560 --> 00:58:25,749 representatives. So 1426 00:58:25,750 --> 00:58:27,549 I myself, I was somebody who was involved 1427 00:58:27,550 --> 00:58:28,869 in that program. 1428 00:58:28,870 --> 00:58:30,459 There's other whistleblowers who are 1429 00:58:30,460 --> 00:58:32,979 working with me, Lisa 1430 00:58:32,980 --> 00:58:36,009 and Brandon Bryant. 1431 00:58:36,010 --> 00:58:37,690 We we've all, 1432 00:58:39,100 --> 00:58:42,039 you know, sat down with drone victims 1433 00:58:42,040 --> 00:58:43,749 and we've tried to 1434 00:58:44,800 --> 00:58:46,059 have a conversation with them. 1435 00:58:47,460 --> 00:58:48,640 Of course, that's not enough. 1436 00:58:50,730 --> 00:58:53,049 The the next stages 1437 00:58:53,050 --> 00:58:55,269 are it's 1438 00:58:55,270 --> 00:58:56,270 going to be 1439 00:58:57,550 --> 00:59:00,159 a time consuming process. 1440 00:59:00,160 --> 00:59:01,479 It's not something that can happen 1441 00:59:01,480 --> 00:59:02,480 overnight. 1442 00:59:03,430 --> 00:59:05,529 But there are people that are 1443 00:59:05,530 --> 00:59:07,359 working on it. And this organization, 1444 00:59:07,360 --> 00:59:09,579 Veterans for Peace, they 1445 00:59:09,580 --> 00:59:12,829 they had organized reconciliation 1446 00:59:12,830 --> 00:59:15,159 in Vietnam. 1447 00:59:15,160 --> 00:59:17,259 And they're 1448 00:59:17,260 --> 00:59:19,000 going to help us with 1449 00:59:20,320 --> 00:59:22,479 organizing reconciliation 1450 00:59:22,480 --> 00:59:24,549 with Afghanistan, Yemen and all 1451 00:59:24,550 --> 00:59:25,559 of these countries as well. 1452 00:59:26,620 --> 00:59:28,539 So thank you. 1453 00:59:28,540 --> 00:59:29,739 Would be good one. 1454 00:59:29,740 --> 00:59:31,749 Cut it short, please. 1455 00:59:31,750 --> 00:59:32,979 First of all, thank you very much for 1456 00:59:32,980 --> 00:59:34,089 your talk. 1457 00:59:34,090 --> 00:59:36,459 And I have a specific question. 1458 00:59:36,460 --> 00:59:38,889 I want to say my my position 1459 00:59:38,890 --> 00:59:41,559 on a matter that was not really addressed 1460 00:59:41,560 --> 00:59:43,329 and I want to hear your opinion on that. 1461 00:59:46,150 --> 00:59:48,249 There is a situation that is 1462 00:59:48,250 --> 00:59:51,039 escalating right now with 1463 00:59:51,040 --> 00:59:52,719 the drone killings on the one side and 1464 00:59:52,720 --> 00:59:54,609 that there is terrorist attacks on the 1465 00:59:54,610 --> 00:59:56,229 other side of the world. 1466 00:59:56,230 --> 00:59:58,689 There is there's a very strong word and 1467 00:59:58,690 --> 01:00:01,539 it is a very easy way for countries to 1468 01:00:01,540 --> 01:00:03,939 legitimize using drones 1469 01:00:03,940 --> 01:00:06,699 and the fact that 1470 01:00:06,700 --> 01:00:08,529 people right now are thinking that it's 1471 01:00:08,530 --> 01:00:10,689 okay to kill civilians, but it's 1472 01:00:10,690 --> 01:00:12,399 not okay to kill soldiers from their 1473 01:00:12,400 --> 01:00:14,139 country stems from the fact that they 1474 01:00:14,140 --> 01:00:17,319 think that the civilians are terrorists. 1475 01:00:17,320 --> 01:00:19,779 And there's all this propaganda 1476 01:00:19,780 --> 01:00:22,059 about terrorism that goes on. 1477 01:00:22,060 --> 01:00:24,129 And this this is 1478 01:00:24,130 --> 01:00:25,629 the most important thing for me, that it 1479 01:00:25,630 --> 01:00:27,759 legitimizes killing more and more. 1480 01:00:27,760 --> 01:00:29,859 And on the other side, the 1481 01:00:29,860 --> 01:00:32,049 existence of drones and attacks so 1482 01:00:32,050 --> 01:00:34,179 stronger, so much stronger than the 1483 01:00:34,180 --> 01:00:36,009 attacks that Afghanistan are countries 1484 01:00:36,010 --> 01:00:38,739 like that could ever possibly make 1485 01:00:38,740 --> 01:00:40,689 and radicalize them. 1486 01:00:40,690 --> 01:00:43,269 And the terrorists, 1487 01:00:43,270 --> 01:00:44,620 as they are called, 1488 01:00:45,760 --> 01:00:47,889 employ means like the attack on in 1489 01:00:47,890 --> 01:00:50,019 Berlin. And it means that they're really, 1490 01:00:53,470 --> 01:00:55,539 really radical because it's the 1491 01:00:55,540 --> 01:00:57,669 only way they can respond to threats like 1492 01:00:57,670 --> 01:00:58,629 drones. 1493 01:00:58,630 --> 01:00:59,860 And so 1494 01:01:01,030 --> 01:01:03,699 my point is that I would like 1495 01:01:03,700 --> 01:01:06,009 you to tell me your opinion 1496 01:01:06,010 --> 01:01:07,059 on how to 1497 01:01:08,200 --> 01:01:10,659 change the views 1498 01:01:10,660 --> 01:01:12,909 on terrorism and how 1499 01:01:12,910 --> 01:01:15,969 to to 1500 01:01:15,970 --> 01:01:18,099 stop maybe this propaganda that was 1501 01:01:18,100 --> 01:01:20,199 used repeatedly throughout the history 1502 01:01:20,200 --> 01:01:21,200 to legitimize 1503 01:01:23,470 --> 01:01:25,539 states and governments 1504 01:01:25,540 --> 01:01:28,179 that have no other legitimization. 1505 01:01:30,470 --> 01:01:33,259 Yeah, but 1506 01:01:33,260 --> 01:01:35,539 we need to create counter 1507 01:01:35,540 --> 01:01:38,869 narratives, we need to 1508 01:01:38,870 --> 01:01:40,639 create more comprehensive narratives, 1509 01:01:40,640 --> 01:01:42,949 ones that explain 1510 01:01:42,950 --> 01:01:44,899 how people become radicalized in the 1511 01:01:44,900 --> 01:01:47,239 first place and what 1512 01:01:47,240 --> 01:01:49,429 the country has done, our our 1513 01:01:49,430 --> 01:01:51,499 countries have done historically, because 1514 01:01:51,500 --> 01:01:53,329 you're not only dealing with religious 1515 01:01:53,330 --> 01:01:55,249 issues, you're dealing with post-colonial 1516 01:01:55,250 --> 01:01:56,250 issues. 1517 01:01:57,560 --> 01:01:59,539 You know, the structures of colonialism 1518 01:01:59,540 --> 01:02:00,949 never really went away. 1519 01:02:02,300 --> 01:02:04,309 They're still there. I mean, the borders 1520 01:02:04,310 --> 01:02:05,809 that are drawn all over the Middle East 1521 01:02:05,810 --> 01:02:08,329 are borders that the British 1522 01:02:08,330 --> 01:02:10,369 and the French established. 1523 01:02:10,370 --> 01:02:11,370 So 1524 01:02:12,440 --> 01:02:13,759 we need to we need to create a 1525 01:02:13,760 --> 01:02:15,110 civilizational narrative, 1526 01:02:16,160 --> 01:02:18,889 one that is more encompassing 1527 01:02:18,890 --> 01:02:20,959 just of terrorism or, you 1528 01:02:20,960 --> 01:02:23,239 know, the war 1529 01:02:23,240 --> 01:02:25,340 in the Middle East, let's say. 1530 01:02:27,280 --> 01:02:28,690 I'm sorry, I have to cut it off, 1531 01:02:31,000 --> 01:02:32,000 didn't have to. 1532 01:02:34,060 --> 01:02:35,199 So thanks. 1533 01:02:35,200 --> 01:02:36,200 All right.