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If you are capable, please help us to create good quality subtitles: https://c3subtitles.de/talk/580 Thanks! 1 00:00:09,210 --> 00:00:11,789 Hi, everybody, my name is Dockley, 2 00:00:11,790 --> 00:00:14,429 and my pronouns, are they them, 3 00:00:14,430 --> 00:00:15,869 so I just want to let you know a little 4 00:00:15,870 --> 00:00:17,999 bit about who I am and why I care about 5 00:00:18,000 --> 00:00:19,199 this. 6 00:00:19,200 --> 00:00:21,959 So I do a lot of street level work, 7 00:00:21,960 --> 00:00:23,279 what I call street level work in the 8 00:00:23,280 --> 00:00:24,509 States. 9 00:00:24,510 --> 00:00:26,639 So I have been very involved in doing 10 00:00:26,640 --> 00:00:28,799 legal support for things like 11 00:00:28,800 --> 00:00:31,559 Black Lives Matter and Occupy. 12 00:00:31,560 --> 00:00:33,389 In fact, I was arrested in a big 13 00:00:33,390 --> 00:00:35,399 demonstration many years ago. 14 00:00:35,400 --> 00:00:37,949 That's a lot of what led me to this work. 15 00:00:37,950 --> 00:00:39,839 I've also done a lot of community 16 00:00:39,840 --> 00:00:41,909 organizing with the Arab Muslim, Middle 17 00:00:41,910 --> 00:00:44,039 Eastern and South Asian community, as 18 00:00:44,040 --> 00:00:46,229 I'm sure you're aware, aware, they 19 00:00:46,230 --> 00:00:48,419 are targeted by surveillance 20 00:00:48,420 --> 00:00:49,590 to an incredible degree. 21 00:00:50,640 --> 00:00:52,079 And I am Syrian American. 22 00:00:52,080 --> 00:00:54,209 So all of this is very personal 23 00:00:54,210 --> 00:00:55,210 to me. 24 00:00:55,800 --> 00:00:58,829 So before I start, I just want to 25 00:00:58,830 --> 00:01:00,839 talk a little bit about a project, which 26 00:01:00,840 --> 00:01:02,429 was the last thing I worked on at 27 00:01:02,430 --> 00:01:04,589 Electronic Frontier Foundation and give 28 00:01:04,590 --> 00:01:06,209 thanks to the people I worked with. 29 00:01:06,210 --> 00:01:08,009 So this is the street level surveillance 30 00:01:08,010 --> 00:01:08,969 project. 31 00:01:08,970 --> 00:01:11,099 And I especially want to give 32 00:01:11,100 --> 00:01:13,259 thanks to Hani Fakhoury, Jennifer 33 00:01:13,260 --> 00:01:15,689 Lynch, Dave Moss, Jeremy Gillooly, 34 00:01:15,690 --> 00:01:17,939 Galula and Cooper Quenton. 35 00:01:17,940 --> 00:01:19,469 These are the folks who helped compile 36 00:01:19,470 --> 00:01:22,109 information for this project 37 00:01:22,110 --> 00:01:23,249 and the street level surveillance 38 00:01:23,250 --> 00:01:25,469 project. Unite's efforts past and 39 00:01:25,470 --> 00:01:27,749 future work on these sorts of 40 00:01:27,750 --> 00:01:29,519 law enforcement surveillance technologies 41 00:01:29,520 --> 00:01:31,499 into an easily accessible portal. 42 00:01:31,500 --> 00:01:34,119 And it is incredibly important right now. 43 00:01:34,120 --> 00:01:36,749 I'm going to talk about why. 44 00:01:36,750 --> 00:01:38,819 So for those who are not familiar with 45 00:01:38,820 --> 00:01:40,769 the concept of the panopticon, this comes 46 00:01:40,770 --> 00:01:43,169 from the 18th century philosopher 47 00:01:43,170 --> 00:01:45,539 Jeremy Bentham. And it is the perfect 48 00:01:45,540 --> 00:01:46,289 prison. 49 00:01:46,290 --> 00:01:48,659 So the panopticon is a central 50 00:01:48,660 --> 00:01:50,819 tower with the cells placed 51 00:01:50,820 --> 00:01:52,979 around the central tower and 52 00:01:52,980 --> 00:01:54,449 the person in the middle can see 53 00:01:54,450 --> 00:01:56,219 everybody and they know that they're 54 00:01:56,220 --> 00:01:57,359 always being watched. 55 00:01:57,360 --> 00:01:59,049 They cannot see the observer. 56 00:01:59,050 --> 00:02:01,079 And so the idea of the panopticon is that 57 00:02:01,080 --> 00:02:04,139 it will control people's behavior without 58 00:02:04,140 --> 00:02:05,939 the guards ever having to actually do 59 00:02:05,940 --> 00:02:07,859 anything simply by knowing that you are 60 00:02:07,860 --> 00:02:09,659 constantly being observed, you will 61 00:02:09,660 --> 00:02:11,069 change your behavior. 62 00:02:11,070 --> 00:02:14,039 And so are we there yet? 63 00:02:14,040 --> 00:02:15,929 My argument is that today you certainly 64 00:02:15,930 --> 00:02:17,639 don't need to be in a prison to be in a 65 00:02:17,640 --> 00:02:19,769 panopticon, nor do you need to 66 00:02:19,770 --> 00:02:20,939 be online. And I'm going to talk a little 67 00:02:20,940 --> 00:02:22,919 bit more about what I mean by that. 68 00:02:22,920 --> 00:02:24,689 I would say that the Panopticon is all 69 00:02:24,690 --> 00:02:25,740 around us right now. 70 00:02:27,990 --> 00:02:30,239 So takeaways that I hope 71 00:02:30,240 --> 00:02:32,399 you'll get from this talk, street level 72 00:02:32,400 --> 00:02:34,409 surveillance is mass surveillance 73 00:02:35,580 --> 00:02:37,919 and it doesn't affect 74 00:02:37,920 --> 00:02:39,809 everybody the same, but we all need to 75 00:02:39,810 --> 00:02:42,029 fight it. And what I mean 76 00:02:42,030 --> 00:02:44,549 by that is that different communities 77 00:02:44,550 --> 00:02:46,709 are affected by surveillance differently. 78 00:02:46,710 --> 00:02:48,899 It's not as though a camera has the same 79 00:02:48,900 --> 00:02:50,999 impact for a 80 00:02:51,000 --> 00:02:52,589 person with light colored skin or person 81 00:02:52,590 --> 00:02:53,609 with dark colored skin. 82 00:02:53,610 --> 00:02:54,719 And I'm going to talk a lot more about 83 00:02:54,720 --> 00:02:56,849 that in this talk. 84 00:02:56,850 --> 00:02:58,739 And then finally, what are you going to 85 00:02:58,740 --> 00:02:59,999 do about it? We're going to talk a lot 86 00:03:00,000 --> 00:03:02,069 about why this is so bad, but what can 87 00:03:02,070 --> 00:03:03,149 we do? 88 00:03:03,150 --> 00:03:05,489 And I'm going to talk about three points, 89 00:03:05,490 --> 00:03:07,649 how we can prevent this technology, how 90 00:03:07,650 --> 00:03:09,719 we can expose both what 91 00:03:09,720 --> 00:03:11,879 it does and its vulnerabilities and where 92 00:03:11,880 --> 00:03:14,489 it's being used and how we can empower 93 00:03:14,490 --> 00:03:16,639 the most affected, but also all all 94 00:03:16,640 --> 00:03:17,640 of ourselves. 95 00:03:20,120 --> 00:03:22,429 So who you are matters 96 00:03:22,430 --> 00:03:24,259 when it comes to surveillance and 97 00:03:24,260 --> 00:03:25,639 particularly, you know, when it comes to 98 00:03:25,640 --> 00:03:27,469 street level surveillance technologies 99 00:03:27,470 --> 00:03:29,809 and imagine everybody 100 00:03:29,810 --> 00:03:31,939 here is familiar with 101 00:03:31,940 --> 00:03:32,929 the people in the lower right corner. 102 00:03:32,930 --> 00:03:34,579 But if you aren't, that is Martin Luther 103 00:03:34,580 --> 00:03:36,619 King Jr. and Malcolm X. 104 00:03:36,620 --> 00:03:38,539 And that's a reference, of course, to the 105 00:03:38,540 --> 00:03:40,849 incredible degree of surveillance done 106 00:03:40,850 --> 00:03:43,069 on these civil rights leaders by 107 00:03:43,070 --> 00:03:46,459 the United States, which actually led to 108 00:03:46,460 --> 00:03:48,319 the church committee hearings, which 109 00:03:48,320 --> 00:03:50,239 created FISA, which is the law that 110 00:03:50,240 --> 00:03:51,349 governs surveillance now. 111 00:03:52,460 --> 00:03:54,469 So they were subject to an incredible, 112 00:03:54,470 --> 00:03:56,059 disturbing degree of surveillance. 113 00:03:57,410 --> 00:03:59,389 So that Syrian refugee and I talk a 114 00:03:59,390 --> 00:04:00,859 little bit about the sort of surveillance 115 00:04:00,860 --> 00:04:02,509 that they're experiencing right now. 116 00:04:02,510 --> 00:04:05,089 And in the top right corner, 117 00:04:05,090 --> 00:04:07,189 those are worker 118 00:04:07,190 --> 00:04:09,229 workers rights activists. 119 00:04:09,230 --> 00:04:11,689 They are Latino and Chicano people 120 00:04:11,690 --> 00:04:14,059 in Los Angeles who are demonstrating. 121 00:04:14,060 --> 00:04:16,129 They are also, again, as 122 00:04:16,130 --> 00:04:18,319 people who are activists who are out 123 00:04:18,320 --> 00:04:19,729 in the streets and who are coming into 124 00:04:19,730 --> 00:04:21,739 contact with law enforcement. 125 00:04:21,740 --> 00:04:23,989 And as people who are 126 00:04:23,990 --> 00:04:26,239 not necessarily citizens in the United 127 00:04:26,240 --> 00:04:28,729 States, they are subject 128 00:04:28,730 --> 00:04:30,559 to an incredible degree of surveillance. 129 00:04:30,560 --> 00:04:32,689 So throughout my talk, I'm going 130 00:04:32,690 --> 00:04:35,449 to point out places where technology 131 00:04:35,450 --> 00:04:37,279 may be experienced differently by 132 00:04:37,280 --> 00:04:38,280 different communities. 133 00:04:39,930 --> 00:04:41,999 So why street level surveillance? 134 00:04:42,000 --> 00:04:44,579 Why am I talking about this 135 00:04:44,580 --> 00:04:45,580 this topic? 136 00:04:46,770 --> 00:04:49,169 So just to to preface 137 00:04:49,170 --> 00:04:50,369 this a little bit, you know, 138 00:04:51,570 --> 00:04:53,459 particularly after working at ATF for a 139 00:04:53,460 --> 00:04:55,619 year, I really I stopped using the phrase 140 00:04:55,620 --> 00:04:58,409 I'll stop saying in real life, 141 00:04:58,410 --> 00:05:00,149 because, you know, the distinction 142 00:05:00,150 --> 00:05:02,549 between and I'm sure I'm 143 00:05:02,550 --> 00:05:04,319 talking to people who probably already 144 00:05:04,320 --> 00:05:06,809 feel this, but the distinction between 145 00:05:06,810 --> 00:05:08,969 what we do in our everyday lives when 146 00:05:08,970 --> 00:05:10,169 we're walking around and what we're doing 147 00:05:10,170 --> 00:05:12,239 online is rapidly 148 00:05:12,240 --> 00:05:13,439 disappearing. 149 00:05:13,440 --> 00:05:15,839 For instance, you know, I have 150 00:05:15,840 --> 00:05:18,149 family from Syria who 151 00:05:18,150 --> 00:05:19,859 are not on the same continent as me. 152 00:05:19,860 --> 00:05:21,269 And this is the only connection that I 153 00:05:21,270 --> 00:05:23,579 have to many of them is being on Facebook 154 00:05:23,580 --> 00:05:24,580 with them. 155 00:05:25,290 --> 00:05:27,179 So we know that what we're doing online 156 00:05:27,180 --> 00:05:29,009 is absolutely revealing the most intimate 157 00:05:29,010 --> 00:05:30,209 details of our life. 158 00:05:30,210 --> 00:05:33,029 And we need to keep fighting for 159 00:05:33,030 --> 00:05:34,679 for freedom online. 160 00:05:36,840 --> 00:05:38,909 But the fact is that 161 00:05:38,910 --> 00:05:40,799 when it comes to what we're doing in our 162 00:05:40,800 --> 00:05:43,259 everyday lives offline, 163 00:05:43,260 --> 00:05:45,089 the richness of the data that can be 164 00:05:45,090 --> 00:05:46,769 captured by street level surveillance 165 00:05:46,770 --> 00:05:48,929 technologies in the physical world 166 00:05:48,930 --> 00:05:50,879 is moving ever closer to the richness of 167 00:05:50,880 --> 00:05:51,959 the online world. 168 00:05:51,960 --> 00:05:53,489 You know, in many ways, the online world 169 00:05:53,490 --> 00:05:55,349 is already the perfect panopticon, 170 00:05:55,350 --> 00:05:57,509 particularly if you are like 171 00:05:57,510 --> 00:05:58,919 many people who are not using encryption. 172 00:05:58,920 --> 00:06:00,029 Right. 173 00:06:00,030 --> 00:06:02,639 But the physical world is also 174 00:06:02,640 --> 00:06:05,099 becoming a panopticon in that same way. 175 00:06:05,100 --> 00:06:07,259 So the online world and the offline 176 00:06:07,260 --> 00:06:09,359 world are both moving towards 177 00:06:09,360 --> 00:06:11,549 each other and in 178 00:06:11,550 --> 00:06:13,499 particular with street level surveillance 179 00:06:13,500 --> 00:06:14,429 technology. 180 00:06:14,430 --> 00:06:16,749 The data is often easily analyzable 181 00:06:16,750 --> 00:06:18,749 and it often comes with metadata 182 00:06:18,750 --> 00:06:21,089 attached. And so these technologies 183 00:06:21,090 --> 00:06:23,399 are helping us be turned into data 184 00:06:23,400 --> 00:06:26,099 more than ever before and more that only 185 00:06:26,100 --> 00:06:27,300 what we do online 186 00:06:28,380 --> 00:06:30,449 could achieve. So it's everywhere 187 00:06:30,450 --> 00:06:32,009 we are now numbers and we are now 188 00:06:32,010 --> 00:06:33,129 analyzable everywhere. 189 00:06:34,470 --> 00:06:35,819 So, you know, when we're talking about 190 00:06:35,820 --> 00:06:37,919 these things, Isarel 191 00:06:37,920 --> 00:06:39,869 doesn't really work meatspace. 192 00:06:39,870 --> 00:06:41,309 That's a good one. But maybe not what I 193 00:06:41,310 --> 00:06:43,049 would want to use when I'm talking to 194 00:06:43,050 --> 00:06:45,509 lawmakers and policymakers. 195 00:06:45,510 --> 00:06:47,100 So street level surveillance. 196 00:06:50,260 --> 00:06:51,939 So, as I mentioned, I just want to touch 197 00:06:51,940 --> 00:06:53,469 on the fact that street level 198 00:06:53,470 --> 00:06:55,929 surveillance really is mass surveillance, 199 00:06:55,930 --> 00:06:57,579 and the reason this matters is that, of 200 00:06:57,580 --> 00:06:59,079 course, I'm going to be talking very 201 00:06:59,080 --> 00:07:00,969 particularly about how street level 202 00:07:00,970 --> 00:07:02,949 surveillance technologies affect some 203 00:07:02,950 --> 00:07:05,059 specific communities 204 00:07:05,060 --> 00:07:06,939 and how it will affect you if you're 205 00:07:06,940 --> 00:07:09,519 targeted. But if you're not targeted, 206 00:07:09,520 --> 00:07:11,379 this is still going to capture your data. 207 00:07:11,380 --> 00:07:12,399 These technologies are still going to 208 00:07:12,400 --> 00:07:15,399 capture your data and mass surveillance 209 00:07:15,400 --> 00:07:17,769 without ever having any sort of results 210 00:07:17,770 --> 00:07:19,539 from the data that's captured. 211 00:07:19,540 --> 00:07:21,399 We all know that mass surveillance kills 212 00:07:21,400 --> 00:07:22,749 freedom of expression. 213 00:07:22,750 --> 00:07:24,909 And that's what you know, that 214 00:07:24,910 --> 00:07:26,379 is what we want to build our society on. 215 00:07:26,380 --> 00:07:27,380 Is that right? 216 00:07:28,120 --> 00:07:30,219 And so it matters that that this kind 217 00:07:30,220 --> 00:07:33,209 of technology is also mass surveillance. 218 00:07:33,210 --> 00:07:35,709 So if you define mass surveillance 219 00:07:35,710 --> 00:07:37,959 as surveillance of big groups 220 00:07:37,960 --> 00:07:40,059 of people, usually without 221 00:07:40,060 --> 00:07:41,739 suspicion that they've committed a 222 00:07:41,740 --> 00:07:44,019 specific crime, STREET-LEVEL 223 00:07:44,020 --> 00:07:46,299 surveillance technologies do that. 224 00:07:46,300 --> 00:07:48,189 And if you define mass surveillance as 225 00:07:48,190 --> 00:07:49,989 surveillance, that captures data that can 226 00:07:49,990 --> 00:07:51,789 be analyzed in the aggregate, in 227 00:07:51,790 --> 00:07:53,979 particular to that to determine social 228 00:07:53,980 --> 00:07:56,019 networks, street level surveillance data 229 00:07:56,020 --> 00:07:57,369 also does that. 230 00:07:57,370 --> 00:07:59,589 So, again, this this 231 00:07:59,590 --> 00:08:01,179 technology is turning the lives of 232 00:08:01,180 --> 00:08:02,709 everyone it comes into contact with, 233 00:08:02,710 --> 00:08:04,179 regardless of whether or not you are a 234 00:08:04,180 --> 00:08:06,759 target into easily quantifiable 235 00:08:06,760 --> 00:08:07,760 data. 236 00:08:09,160 --> 00:08:11,439 So this is probably a review 237 00:08:11,440 --> 00:08:13,599 for some folks, but I'm going to just go 238 00:08:13,600 --> 00:08:15,819 through what sort of a typical 239 00:08:15,820 --> 00:08:18,279 day in an average city under 240 00:08:18,280 --> 00:08:19,779 a street level surveillance regime is 241 00:08:19,780 --> 00:08:21,039 like. 242 00:08:21,040 --> 00:08:22,719 So I saw some smiles. 243 00:08:22,720 --> 00:08:24,639 I imagine people recognize the image in 244 00:08:24,640 --> 00:08:26,379 the middle and we've all seen it many 245 00:08:26,380 --> 00:08:27,579 times. 246 00:08:27,580 --> 00:08:29,889 This is a notice from 247 00:08:29,890 --> 00:08:32,168 Berlin that you are being recorded 248 00:08:32,169 --> 00:08:34,658 on the right. We have cameras from 249 00:08:34,659 --> 00:08:37,089 the New York Police Department. 250 00:08:37,090 --> 00:08:38,678 The upper left corner is a cleverly 251 00:08:38,679 --> 00:08:40,480 disguised camera from Helsinki. 252 00:08:41,500 --> 00:08:43,538 And then in the lower left corner, that 253 00:08:43,539 --> 00:08:46,059 is mobile CCTV 254 00:08:46,060 --> 00:08:47,119 from Glasgow. 255 00:08:47,120 --> 00:08:48,309 And so 256 00:08:49,420 --> 00:08:51,999 really like just to walk through it, 257 00:08:52,000 --> 00:08:53,619 the second that you leave your house, 258 00:08:53,620 --> 00:08:55,299 you're going to start getting captured by 259 00:08:55,300 --> 00:08:58,449 cameras and 260 00:08:58,450 --> 00:09:00,699 now your face is getting captured, 261 00:09:00,700 --> 00:09:02,169 your movements are getting captured. 262 00:09:02,170 --> 00:09:04,239 And it's not 263 00:09:04,240 --> 00:09:06,639 just law enforcement cameras, of course. 264 00:09:06,640 --> 00:09:08,439 So really interesting example of this is 265 00:09:08,440 --> 00:09:10,569 in San Francisco, the San 266 00:09:10,570 --> 00:09:12,219 Francisco district attorney. 267 00:09:12,220 --> 00:09:13,809 This is the prosecuting attorney for all 268 00:09:13,810 --> 00:09:15,909 the crimes that happen in the county, 269 00:09:15,910 --> 00:09:18,069 has a program where they 270 00:09:18,070 --> 00:09:20,259 actually ask private camera owners. 271 00:09:20,260 --> 00:09:22,419 So businesses and individuals 272 00:09:22,420 --> 00:09:24,189 that might have cameras in their 273 00:09:24,190 --> 00:09:26,259 driveways, things like that, they 274 00:09:26,260 --> 00:09:28,449 ask people to register these cameras. 275 00:09:28,450 --> 00:09:30,729 And once the cameras are registered, 276 00:09:30,730 --> 00:09:32,709 that gives them a map of where every 277 00:09:32,710 --> 00:09:34,269 single one of these cameras is in the 278 00:09:34,270 --> 00:09:36,489 city. So it's not just their network 279 00:09:36,490 --> 00:09:38,019 and it's not just their money, it's 280 00:09:38,020 --> 00:09:39,819 everybody else's as well. 281 00:09:39,820 --> 00:09:41,559 So they have this map and they also have 282 00:09:41,560 --> 00:09:42,549 the owners information. 283 00:09:42,550 --> 00:09:44,439 It makes it incredibly easy for them to 284 00:09:44,440 --> 00:09:46,539 request information any time that they 285 00:09:46,540 --> 00:09:48,729 might want about what's been recorded 286 00:09:48,730 --> 00:09:49,730 on those cameras. 287 00:09:51,070 --> 00:09:53,019 Oh, here is the first place we're going 288 00:09:53,020 --> 00:09:55,059 to talk a little bit about how this is 289 00:09:55,060 --> 00:09:56,409 going to affect you differently, 290 00:09:56,410 --> 00:09:58,000 depending on who you are, who you are. 291 00:09:59,110 --> 00:10:01,089 So another example of non-government 292 00:10:01,090 --> 00:10:03,159 owned cameras is comes from 293 00:10:03,160 --> 00:10:05,049 Oakland, California. 294 00:10:05,050 --> 00:10:07,719 There is a specific part of the 295 00:10:07,720 --> 00:10:09,549 of the Oakland Police Department that 296 00:10:09,550 --> 00:10:11,949 deals with alcohol beverage control. 297 00:10:11,950 --> 00:10:14,049 And in some of 298 00:10:14,050 --> 00:10:16,239 the work that I did working with the Arab 299 00:10:16,240 --> 00:10:17,679 and Muslim community, one of the things 300 00:10:17,680 --> 00:10:19,779 that we heard is that these 301 00:10:19,780 --> 00:10:21,609 teams that were supposed to go in and 302 00:10:21,610 --> 00:10:23,109 check and make sure nobody's selling 303 00:10:23,110 --> 00:10:25,509 alcohol to minors and 304 00:10:25,510 --> 00:10:26,889 that they are that they have their 305 00:10:26,890 --> 00:10:28,389 license displayed, what they would 306 00:10:28,390 --> 00:10:30,909 actually do is go into stores 307 00:10:30,910 --> 00:10:33,279 owned by Yemeni people or 308 00:10:33,280 --> 00:10:34,749 other Arabs. 309 00:10:34,750 --> 00:10:36,459 And these are stores that are primarily 310 00:10:36,460 --> 00:10:38,529 in black neighborhoods in Oakland. 311 00:10:38,530 --> 00:10:39,849 And they would go into the stores, they 312 00:10:39,850 --> 00:10:41,649 would walk around and they would find 313 00:10:41,650 --> 00:10:44,049 maybe a can of expired soup. 314 00:10:44,050 --> 00:10:46,599 You know, maybe they had their 315 00:10:46,600 --> 00:10:48,759 license in the wrong kind of frame or 316 00:10:48,760 --> 00:10:50,679 something ridiculous like this. 317 00:10:50,680 --> 00:10:52,869 And they would go to the store 318 00:10:52,870 --> 00:10:55,119 owner and say, you know, it doesn't 319 00:10:55,120 --> 00:10:56,229 look like you're complying with the law 320 00:10:56,230 --> 00:10:58,599 here, but, 321 00:10:58,600 --> 00:11:00,729 you know, we could work with you. 322 00:11:00,730 --> 00:11:01,989 We can work something out. 323 00:11:01,990 --> 00:11:03,459 If you just give us access to your 324 00:11:03,460 --> 00:11:05,529 cameras, you know, you'll be you'll 325 00:11:05,530 --> 00:11:06,759 be fine. 326 00:11:06,760 --> 00:11:09,219 The other thing that they did is 327 00:11:09,220 --> 00:11:11,619 in in the states, pretty much every 328 00:11:11,620 --> 00:11:14,169 local police department in a big city 329 00:11:14,170 --> 00:11:16,629 also has at least one or two 330 00:11:16,630 --> 00:11:18,459 FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation 331 00:11:18,460 --> 00:11:20,649 officers that are 332 00:11:20,650 --> 00:11:22,959 sorry, one or two police officers 333 00:11:22,960 --> 00:11:24,519 that work directly with the FBI. 334 00:11:24,520 --> 00:11:25,719 And so they have this very strong 335 00:11:25,720 --> 00:11:27,069 collaboration. 336 00:11:27,070 --> 00:11:28,869 And so they would threaten people with, 337 00:11:28,870 --> 00:11:30,399 you know, I heard that your aunt has a 338 00:11:30,400 --> 00:11:32,049 visa application. 339 00:11:32,050 --> 00:11:34,149 You know, maybe maybe you could work with 340 00:11:34,150 --> 00:11:35,829 us and we could we could see that she's a 341 00:11:35,830 --> 00:11:36,830 good citizen. 342 00:11:37,510 --> 00:11:39,819 So not only is this bias against 343 00:11:39,820 --> 00:11:41,619 the people in the neighborhood, it's the 344 00:11:41,620 --> 00:11:43,719 people who are running the stores. 345 00:11:43,720 --> 00:11:44,979 And it's been very effective. 346 00:11:44,980 --> 00:11:46,929 They've gotten a lot of video that way. 347 00:11:46,930 --> 00:11:49,089 Another example here, and I think 348 00:11:49,090 --> 00:11:51,099 this is a very important example to touch 349 00:11:51,100 --> 00:11:53,199 on, is that, 350 00:11:53,200 --> 00:11:55,509 you know, we are used to seeing cameras 351 00:11:55,510 --> 00:11:57,639 in most places, but 352 00:11:57,640 --> 00:11:59,229 maybe you're not used to seeing a camera 353 00:11:59,230 --> 00:12:01,479 on your front porch facing 354 00:12:01,480 --> 00:12:03,729 your door or something like that. 355 00:12:03,730 --> 00:12:05,379 You know, people who live in housing 356 00:12:05,380 --> 00:12:07,629 projects in the United States, 357 00:12:07,630 --> 00:12:10,629 people who live in states, in the UK, 358 00:12:10,630 --> 00:12:12,849 people who live in favelas, they 359 00:12:12,850 --> 00:12:14,499 are all completely used to having 360 00:12:14,500 --> 00:12:16,479 incredibly pervasive surveillance all the 361 00:12:16,480 --> 00:12:18,759 time, even beyond the degree 362 00:12:18,760 --> 00:12:19,899 that we're used to. And we're seeing 363 00:12:19,900 --> 00:12:21,789 these notifications everywhere on the on 364 00:12:21,790 --> 00:12:23,919 the subway or or, you know, 365 00:12:23,920 --> 00:12:26,379 on the street. This is really invasive, 366 00:12:26,380 --> 00:12:27,429 right. In their homes. 367 00:12:27,430 --> 00:12:29,499 And so I think this is very 368 00:12:29,500 --> 00:12:31,839 important because often 369 00:12:31,840 --> 00:12:34,029 as an activist or as a technologist, 370 00:12:34,030 --> 00:12:35,829 we talk about privacy. 371 00:12:35,830 --> 00:12:38,109 We use it as a theoretical concept. 372 00:12:38,110 --> 00:12:40,299 But the fact is that for many people 373 00:12:40,300 --> 00:12:42,369 in the world in particular, the most the 374 00:12:42,370 --> 00:12:44,229 most marginalized people, the idea of 375 00:12:44,230 --> 00:12:46,239 privacy doesn't make any sense. 376 00:12:46,240 --> 00:12:48,099 And so this is actually this can actually 377 00:12:48,100 --> 00:12:49,929 be very destructive to movement building, 378 00:12:49,930 --> 00:12:51,729 you know, to not take into account the 379 00:12:51,730 --> 00:12:53,469 different circumstances of the people 380 00:12:53,470 --> 00:12:55,029 whom you're talking to. 381 00:12:55,030 --> 00:12:57,219 So just something to keep in mind 382 00:12:57,220 --> 00:12:59,349 if you're an activist and also maybe 383 00:12:59,350 --> 00:13:01,389 something to try to do more activism 384 00:13:01,390 --> 00:13:02,390 around. 385 00:13:03,190 --> 00:13:05,349 You know, I the idea of 386 00:13:05,350 --> 00:13:07,539 talking about privacy to a Syrian refugee 387 00:13:07,540 --> 00:13:09,589 who just. Cross the border or a young 388 00:13:09,590 --> 00:13:11,329 black man in New York who has been 389 00:13:11,330 --> 00:13:13,639 stopped and frisked maybe 390 00:13:13,640 --> 00:13:16,009 every other day for months, for years, 391 00:13:16,010 --> 00:13:18,079 for his whole life, doesn't always 392 00:13:18,080 --> 00:13:19,080 make sense. 393 00:13:19,640 --> 00:13:22,009 So once your image 394 00:13:22,010 --> 00:13:24,199 has been captured, it is subject 395 00:13:24,200 --> 00:13:25,849 to biometrics. 396 00:13:25,850 --> 00:13:27,889 So biometrics work in conjunction with 397 00:13:27,890 --> 00:13:29,449 these cameras. 398 00:13:29,450 --> 00:13:30,799 There are some biometrics that have to be 399 00:13:30,800 --> 00:13:31,699 actively collected. 400 00:13:31,700 --> 00:13:34,189 Of course, this is a 401 00:13:34,190 --> 00:13:36,289 fingerprint scanner being used 402 00:13:36,290 --> 00:13:37,279 in the West Midlands. 403 00:13:37,280 --> 00:13:40,009 And this is I actually got this picture. 404 00:13:40,010 --> 00:13:42,079 They put it on Flickr and it 405 00:13:42,080 --> 00:13:43,369 was Creative Commons and they were very 406 00:13:43,370 --> 00:13:45,649 excited about their mobile fingerprinting 407 00:13:45,650 --> 00:13:46,789 program. 408 00:13:46,790 --> 00:13:48,079 This is mobile fingerprinting. 409 00:13:48,080 --> 00:13:50,059 It goes directly to a database and they 410 00:13:50,060 --> 00:13:51,799 can check it instantly as they really 411 00:13:51,800 --> 00:13:53,689 wanted people to know what good work 412 00:13:53,690 --> 00:13:55,429 they're doing for public safety. 413 00:13:56,720 --> 00:13:58,909 The photo on the left is an Indian 414 00:13:58,910 --> 00:14:01,190 woman who's getting registered 415 00:14:02,660 --> 00:14:04,699 with using iris recognition. 416 00:14:04,700 --> 00:14:07,279 So those are a couple of types of 417 00:14:07,280 --> 00:14:09,199 biometrics. Of course, there's also gait 418 00:14:09,200 --> 00:14:12,889 recognition, there is hand telemetry, 419 00:14:12,890 --> 00:14:15,349 there is scar recognition, 420 00:14:15,350 --> 00:14:17,779 tattoo recognition, iris 421 00:14:17,780 --> 00:14:19,999 and retina scans up there 422 00:14:20,000 --> 00:14:22,069 and voice recognition. 423 00:14:22,070 --> 00:14:24,349 So, again, this is another place 424 00:14:24,350 --> 00:14:26,569 where you're going to have a very 425 00:14:26,570 --> 00:14:27,829 different experience, depending on who 426 00:14:27,830 --> 00:14:30,079 you are. Anybody who has ever 427 00:14:30,080 --> 00:14:32,269 contact with law enforcement is 428 00:14:32,270 --> 00:14:33,739 much more likely to already have their 429 00:14:33,740 --> 00:14:34,969 information in a database. 430 00:14:34,970 --> 00:14:36,259 Right. 431 00:14:36,260 --> 00:14:38,599 And just go back to the previous example. 432 00:14:38,600 --> 00:14:40,969 If you are a young 433 00:14:40,970 --> 00:14:43,129 black man or a man of color 434 00:14:43,130 --> 00:14:45,319 in the United States, the likelihood 435 00:14:45,320 --> 00:14:46,819 that you've ever been stopped and hassled 436 00:14:46,820 --> 00:14:48,169 by the police, the likelihood that 437 00:14:48,170 --> 00:14:49,549 they've taken your picture, the 438 00:14:49,550 --> 00:14:50,959 likelihood that they've taken a cheek 439 00:14:50,960 --> 00:14:53,119 swab to get your DNA or that 440 00:14:53,120 --> 00:14:55,099 you've been fingerprinted is going to be 441 00:14:55,100 --> 00:14:56,839 much higher. And the fact that all of 442 00:14:56,840 --> 00:14:58,459 these things happen to you doesn't 443 00:14:58,460 --> 00:15:00,229 necessarily mean that there was ever any 444 00:15:00,230 --> 00:15:01,669 charges filed against you. 445 00:15:01,670 --> 00:15:03,379 And I think we all now know that it 446 00:15:03,380 --> 00:15:04,609 doesn't necessarily mean that you were 447 00:15:04,610 --> 00:15:05,539 doing anything. 448 00:15:05,540 --> 00:15:07,579 It means that you're in an area that's 449 00:15:07,580 --> 00:15:09,679 crawling with police and they're more 450 00:15:09,680 --> 00:15:12,019 likely to to arrest you, stop 451 00:15:12,020 --> 00:15:14,089 you, hassle you based on the 452 00:15:14,090 --> 00:15:15,090 way that you look. 453 00:15:16,610 --> 00:15:18,769 And so another example here, and 454 00:15:18,770 --> 00:15:20,899 this is one that I would love to get 455 00:15:20,900 --> 00:15:23,449 more information on, is refugees. 456 00:15:23,450 --> 00:15:25,759 So I rischard 457 00:15:25,760 --> 00:15:28,039 recognition technology as of June 458 00:15:28,040 --> 00:15:29,989 and I wasn't able to find any more recent 459 00:15:29,990 --> 00:15:32,059 numbers, has enrolled over 460 00:15:32,060 --> 00:15:34,759 one point six million Syrian refugees 461 00:15:34,760 --> 00:15:35,760 at this point 462 00:15:36,980 --> 00:15:38,839 where now the EU is now also 463 00:15:38,840 --> 00:15:40,339 fingerprinting refugees. 464 00:15:40,340 --> 00:15:42,679 So in Germany, they're using fingerprint 465 00:15:42,680 --> 00:15:44,749 scanners to create a database of 466 00:15:44,750 --> 00:15:46,429 every refugee and their and their 467 00:15:46,430 --> 00:15:47,430 fingerprint. 468 00:15:48,170 --> 00:15:50,479 Another example of how 469 00:15:50,480 --> 00:15:51,769 this may affect you. 470 00:15:51,770 --> 00:15:53,329 This is less about a characteristic, more 471 00:15:53,330 --> 00:15:55,529 about your activities is 472 00:15:55,530 --> 00:15:57,919 if you are an activist who's 473 00:15:57,920 --> 00:16:00,289 out there in the street demonstrating. 474 00:16:00,290 --> 00:16:01,909 So very disturbing example of this comes 475 00:16:01,910 --> 00:16:03,709 from New York. During the Occupy 476 00:16:03,710 --> 00:16:05,959 demonstrations, protesters 477 00:16:05,960 --> 00:16:06,889 were arrested. 478 00:16:06,890 --> 00:16:09,829 And there's sort of a 479 00:16:09,830 --> 00:16:11,149 dance that you do when you're a 480 00:16:11,150 --> 00:16:13,309 protester. You get arrested, you 481 00:16:13,310 --> 00:16:15,229 know, they process you. 482 00:16:15,230 --> 00:16:16,939 They usually release you without bail if 483 00:16:16,940 --> 00:16:18,469 it was for something minimal. 484 00:16:18,470 --> 00:16:19,999 Instead, what the New York Police 485 00:16:20,000 --> 00:16:22,369 Department did is they refused to release 486 00:16:22,370 --> 00:16:25,459 Occupy demonstrators without an IRA scan. 487 00:16:25,460 --> 00:16:27,199 So this is, again, before anybody has 488 00:16:27,200 --> 00:16:29,329 been charged specifically. 489 00:16:29,330 --> 00:16:30,829 You know, they're not necessarily 490 00:16:30,830 --> 00:16:32,089 specific charges. There's a police 491 00:16:32,090 --> 00:16:34,339 report, but they 492 00:16:34,340 --> 00:16:36,109 are simply because of the fact that they 493 00:16:36,110 --> 00:16:37,879 were arrested and they're getting their 494 00:16:37,880 --> 00:16:38,880 iris scanned. 495 00:16:41,870 --> 00:16:42,870 So 496 00:16:44,570 --> 00:16:46,009 you're walking around, you're dealing 497 00:16:46,010 --> 00:16:47,959 with all these cameras, you're dealing 498 00:16:47,960 --> 00:16:49,789 with biometrics, if you want to go 499 00:16:49,790 --> 00:16:52,009 anywhere, either driving or 500 00:16:52,010 --> 00:16:54,139 public transit, you're going 501 00:16:54,140 --> 00:16:55,489 to increase the amount of surveillance 502 00:16:55,490 --> 00:16:56,599 that you're experiencing. 503 00:16:56,600 --> 00:16:59,209 And automated license plate readers 504 00:16:59,210 --> 00:17:01,339 are something that if you're 505 00:17:01,340 --> 00:17:02,749 in a vehicle, you should be concerned 506 00:17:02,750 --> 00:17:04,939 about. So automated license 507 00:17:04,940 --> 00:17:07,039 plate readers, they have a couple of 508 00:17:07,040 --> 00:17:08,598 different names. Also automated number 509 00:17:08,599 --> 00:17:09,739 recognition. 510 00:17:09,740 --> 00:17:11,179 They're called different things, but 511 00:17:11,180 --> 00:17:13,249 these are cameras and they 512 00:17:13,250 --> 00:17:15,469 can be mobile or mounted 513 00:17:15,470 --> 00:17:16,999 that can detect when a license plate 514 00:17:17,000 --> 00:17:18,289 enters the camera's field, 515 00:17:19,369 --> 00:17:21,078 capture an image of the car and the 516 00:17:21,079 --> 00:17:22,759 surroundings, including the plates, and 517 00:17:22,760 --> 00:17:24,588 then convert the image of the license 518 00:17:24,589 --> 00:17:26,719 plate into alphanumeric data. 519 00:17:27,859 --> 00:17:30,049 This also will 520 00:17:30,050 --> 00:17:32,809 get some sort of basic data metadata 521 00:17:32,810 --> 00:17:35,179 like the time that it was captured 522 00:17:35,180 --> 00:17:37,339 as well. So to give you an example 523 00:17:37,340 --> 00:17:40,159 of how powerful this technology is, 524 00:17:40,160 --> 00:17:41,989 Los Angeles Police Department, which 525 00:17:41,990 --> 00:17:44,089 Jennifer Lynch at the ATF has been 526 00:17:44,090 --> 00:17:46,369 suing to try to get some basic data 527 00:17:46,370 --> 00:17:48,829 about how they use this technology. 528 00:17:50,090 --> 00:17:52,999 They do extensive Alpro collection. 529 00:17:53,000 --> 00:17:55,879 They collect combined and on average 530 00:17:55,880 --> 00:17:57,859 data on nearly three million cars per 531 00:17:57,860 --> 00:17:58,789 week. 532 00:17:58,790 --> 00:18:00,439 So that is half of all the registered 533 00:18:00,440 --> 00:18:01,820 vehicles in Los Angeles. 534 00:18:03,350 --> 00:18:05,089 So they're collecting an incredibly huge 535 00:18:05,090 --> 00:18:07,309 amount of data and then they store 536 00:18:07,310 --> 00:18:09,739 that data for two to five years, 537 00:18:09,740 --> 00:18:11,509 whether or not the plates are ever linked 538 00:18:11,510 --> 00:18:13,219 to any sort of criminal activity. 539 00:18:13,220 --> 00:18:14,869 And they share it with nearly 30 other 540 00:18:14,870 --> 00:18:16,759 law enforcement agencies around the 541 00:18:16,760 --> 00:18:17,760 region. 542 00:18:18,320 --> 00:18:21,409 And just a side note there that 543 00:18:21,410 --> 00:18:23,629 this kind of information sharing and 544 00:18:23,630 --> 00:18:24,529 it's very U.S. centric. 545 00:18:24,530 --> 00:18:25,549 So I didn't want to focus on it. 546 00:18:25,550 --> 00:18:27,259 But just to say that in the United 547 00:18:27,260 --> 00:18:29,059 States, the idea that there's sort of 548 00:18:29,060 --> 00:18:30,529 barriers between different law 549 00:18:30,530 --> 00:18:32,449 enforcement agencies, if you move from 550 00:18:32,450 --> 00:18:35,029 one jurisdiction to another 551 00:18:35,030 --> 00:18:37,219 or, you know that that that you might not 552 00:18:37,220 --> 00:18:39,319 be affected, that they might not know 553 00:18:39,320 --> 00:18:41,899 what happened a couple of states over 554 00:18:41,900 --> 00:18:43,639 that, that's just not the case anymore. 555 00:18:43,640 --> 00:18:45,769 All of this data is shared 556 00:18:45,770 --> 00:18:47,839 in the Bay Area, for instance, all 557 00:18:47,840 --> 00:18:49,909 of the license plate reader information 558 00:18:49,910 --> 00:18:52,939 that is captured in the nine Bay Area, 559 00:18:52,940 --> 00:18:55,219 nine counties that make up the Bay Area 560 00:18:55,220 --> 00:18:58,339 all goes to a centralized location 561 00:18:58,340 --> 00:18:59,719 so that Northern California Regional 562 00:18:59,720 --> 00:19:01,430 Intelligence Center, it's a fusion center 563 00:19:02,630 --> 00:19:04,129 that combines all of these different 564 00:19:04,130 --> 00:19:05,839 levels of information. 565 00:19:05,840 --> 00:19:08,119 So when we're talking about this 566 00:19:08,120 --> 00:19:10,159 data as mass surveillance and we're 567 00:19:10,160 --> 00:19:11,599 talking about how it can be analyzed in 568 00:19:11,600 --> 00:19:13,669 the aggregate, you don't just want 569 00:19:13,670 --> 00:19:15,379 to think about the the local agency 570 00:19:15,380 --> 00:19:16,939 that's collecting it. If it is a local 571 00:19:16,940 --> 00:19:18,589 agency and not the Border Patrol or 572 00:19:18,590 --> 00:19:20,059 something like that. 573 00:19:20,060 --> 00:19:21,799 It's also about how the information is 574 00:19:21,800 --> 00:19:23,749 getting shared and combined. 575 00:19:23,750 --> 00:19:25,909 And automated license 576 00:19:25,910 --> 00:19:28,399 plate readers are particularly concerning 577 00:19:28,400 --> 00:19:30,679 because it very rapidly becomes 578 00:19:30,680 --> 00:19:32,390 clear what they can reveal about you, 579 00:19:33,830 --> 00:19:36,589 even without aggregating the data, 580 00:19:36,590 --> 00:19:38,689 you know, having your car parked outside 581 00:19:38,690 --> 00:19:40,819 of a psychiatrist's office or an 582 00:19:40,820 --> 00:19:43,399 abortion clinic or a 583 00:19:43,400 --> 00:19:46,009 demonstration, a church. 584 00:19:46,010 --> 00:19:47,269 This reveals a lot. 585 00:19:47,270 --> 00:19:49,459 But then think about taking all 586 00:19:49,460 --> 00:19:51,709 of that data and taking it for a city 587 00:19:51,710 --> 00:19:53,779 like Los Angeles, a huge city, and the 588 00:19:53,780 --> 00:19:54,829 amount of information that they're 589 00:19:54,830 --> 00:19:56,899 capturing and aggregating that 590 00:19:56,900 --> 00:19:59,029 and being able to see movements and 591 00:19:59,030 --> 00:20:00,829 being able to see associations between 592 00:20:00,830 --> 00:20:02,339 different vehicles. 593 00:20:02,340 --> 00:20:05,029 This is revealing in the same way that 594 00:20:05,030 --> 00:20:07,369 phone call metadata is revealing. 595 00:20:07,370 --> 00:20:09,559 The law enforcement is able to collect 596 00:20:09,560 --> 00:20:10,880 an incredible amount of information. 597 00:20:12,020 --> 00:20:14,269 So a couple of examples of how 598 00:20:14,270 --> 00:20:16,459 this is used in a discriminatory way. 599 00:20:18,530 --> 00:20:20,719 So this is a heat 600 00:20:20,720 --> 00:20:22,819 map from Jimmy Gluey, 601 00:20:22,820 --> 00:20:25,219 Galula and Dave Moscati, if they did some 602 00:20:25,220 --> 00:20:27,289 great work with a week's 603 00:20:27,290 --> 00:20:29,389 worth of automated license plate reader 604 00:20:29,390 --> 00:20:31,789 data that they got from Oakland 605 00:20:31,790 --> 00:20:33,679 Local Police Department. 606 00:20:33,680 --> 00:20:35,839 So the neighborhoods shown here 607 00:20:35,840 --> 00:20:38,179 are the places where automated license 608 00:20:38,180 --> 00:20:40,339 plate reader use is the 609 00:20:40,340 --> 00:20:43,279 heaviest. So North Oakland. 610 00:20:43,280 --> 00:20:44,689 And for those who are familiar with 611 00:20:44,690 --> 00:20:46,879 Oakland, this says North 612 00:20:46,880 --> 00:20:49,039 Oakland, but it's the area 613 00:20:49,040 --> 00:20:50,659 a little bit south. 614 00:20:50,660 --> 00:20:53,149 So this is sort of northwest 615 00:20:53,150 --> 00:20:54,739 Oakland and East Oakland. 616 00:20:54,740 --> 00:20:55,819 These are two of the biggest 617 00:20:55,820 --> 00:20:57,919 concentrations of people of color in 618 00:20:57,920 --> 00:20:59,239 Oakland. 619 00:20:59,240 --> 00:21:01,309 Not only that, they're neighborhoods that 620 00:21:01,310 --> 00:21:03,109 currently have a lot of housing fights 621 00:21:03,110 --> 00:21:05,269 going on because they sort of have like 622 00:21:05,270 --> 00:21:06,349 people are getting pushed out. 623 00:21:10,140 --> 00:21:11,219 So as you can see, 624 00:21:12,240 --> 00:21:14,699 the heat maps overlaid onto 625 00:21:14,700 --> 00:21:16,829 the heat map or the heat map 626 00:21:16,830 --> 00:21:19,019 overlay onto the census data 627 00:21:19,020 --> 00:21:21,119 shows that the use is heaviest 628 00:21:21,120 --> 00:21:23,069 in communities that are already 629 00:21:23,070 --> 00:21:24,629 incarcerated and incredibly 630 00:21:24,630 --> 00:21:26,489 disproportionate rates. 631 00:21:26,490 --> 00:21:27,959 And this sort of street level 632 00:21:27,960 --> 00:21:29,759 surveillance is going to help put them 633 00:21:29,760 --> 00:21:31,439 into prison, helped her their families 634 00:21:31,440 --> 00:21:33,719 apart and is 635 00:21:33,720 --> 00:21:34,889 hardly going to make the communities 636 00:21:34,890 --> 00:21:35,890 safer. 637 00:21:36,690 --> 00:21:38,219 So that's Oakland. 638 00:21:38,220 --> 00:21:40,229 Another example is New York Police 639 00:21:40,230 --> 00:21:41,699 Department. 640 00:21:41,700 --> 00:21:43,079 So New York Police Department. 641 00:21:43,080 --> 00:21:45,689 In 2011, the Associated Press revealed 642 00:21:45,690 --> 00:21:48,029 this wholesale surveillance 643 00:21:48,030 --> 00:21:50,279 of Muslims and people who were 644 00:21:50,280 --> 00:21:51,719 from countries perceived to be 645 00:21:51,720 --> 00:21:53,369 predominantly Muslim. 646 00:21:53,370 --> 00:21:54,749 This was the New York Police Department's 647 00:21:54,750 --> 00:21:56,099 demographics unit. 648 00:21:56,100 --> 00:21:58,379 And it literally mapped out 649 00:21:58,380 --> 00:22:01,169 where all of these populations were 650 00:22:01,170 --> 00:22:03,329 no suspicion, but it mapped out 651 00:22:03,330 --> 00:22:04,469 the populations. 652 00:22:04,470 --> 00:22:06,929 So street by street, you know, there's 653 00:22:06,930 --> 00:22:08,999 mapped out the locations people spent 654 00:22:09,000 --> 00:22:11,369 time in. So looking at 655 00:22:11,370 --> 00:22:13,109 street by street, here's a cafe. 656 00:22:13,110 --> 00:22:14,039 Here's a mosque. 657 00:22:14,040 --> 00:22:16,139 Here's a block that has, you 658 00:22:16,140 --> 00:22:19,019 know, this many Moroccans living on it. 659 00:22:19,020 --> 00:22:21,329 So very detailed mapping out. 660 00:22:21,330 --> 00:22:23,579 They also used informants in churches 661 00:22:23,580 --> 00:22:25,049 and mosques. 662 00:22:25,050 --> 00:22:26,729 And of course, they also used automated 663 00:22:26,730 --> 00:22:27,749 license plate readers. 664 00:22:27,750 --> 00:22:30,089 And this is and I should say for 665 00:22:30,090 --> 00:22:31,529 for the New York Police Department's 666 00:22:31,530 --> 00:22:33,449 surveillance, that I would be curious 667 00:22:33,450 --> 00:22:35,639 what it would look like now, because 668 00:22:35,640 --> 00:22:37,019 it happened several years ago, 669 00:22:38,040 --> 00:22:39,239 but they took these automated license 670 00:22:39,240 --> 00:22:40,649 plate readers and they literally put them 671 00:22:40,650 --> 00:22:42,779 on police cars and drove up and down 672 00:22:42,780 --> 00:22:44,939 the street in front of mosques and 673 00:22:44,940 --> 00:22:47,279 captured the plate data for everybody 674 00:22:47,280 --> 00:22:49,529 who was attending their 675 00:22:49,530 --> 00:22:50,530 religious services. 676 00:22:52,020 --> 00:22:53,519 And so they did this without any 677 00:22:53,520 --> 00:22:55,379 particular suspicion about any of the 678 00:22:55,380 --> 00:22:57,089 people or places surveilled. 679 00:22:57,090 --> 00:22:58,919 And I should say, again, coming from my 680 00:22:58,920 --> 00:23:02,009 work in in the community, that 681 00:23:02,010 --> 00:23:03,839 Muslims in America have made it very 682 00:23:03,840 --> 00:23:06,029 clear that they 683 00:23:06,030 --> 00:23:08,999 feel intimidated from going to church. 684 00:23:09,000 --> 00:23:10,559 They're scared to practice their 685 00:23:10,560 --> 00:23:12,749 religion. And, of course, it's even worse 686 00:23:12,750 --> 00:23:13,750 now. 687 00:23:14,460 --> 00:23:16,559 But that is the kind of impact that this 688 00:23:16,560 --> 00:23:17,729 type of surveillance is having on that 689 00:23:17,730 --> 00:23:18,730 community. 690 00:23:19,750 --> 00:23:21,879 So even if you are 691 00:23:21,880 --> 00:23:23,679 OK and actually one other point about 692 00:23:23,680 --> 00:23:25,899 Oakland, Oakland 693 00:23:25,900 --> 00:23:28,029 has a tiny, rich 694 00:23:28,030 --> 00:23:30,969 town in the middle of it called Piedmont. 695 00:23:30,970 --> 00:23:32,469 I wish I should have included a map of 696 00:23:32,470 --> 00:23:34,629 this. It is literally a town 697 00:23:34,630 --> 00:23:36,489 that is surrounded on all sides by 698 00:23:36,490 --> 00:23:37,659 Oakland, California. 699 00:23:37,660 --> 00:23:39,849 And this town essentially seceded from 700 00:23:39,850 --> 00:23:41,379 Oakland because they were rich and they 701 00:23:41,380 --> 00:23:42,879 wanted to have a rich town. 702 00:23:42,880 --> 00:23:44,889 And so they created their own borders. 703 00:23:44,890 --> 00:23:46,989 And at the only entrances into this 704 00:23:46,990 --> 00:23:49,029 town, it's called Piedmont, there are 705 00:23:49,030 --> 00:23:50,319 automated license plate readers. 706 00:23:51,340 --> 00:23:52,359 So what does that mean? 707 00:23:52,360 --> 00:23:53,709 That means that everybody who's coming 708 00:23:53,710 --> 00:23:55,659 from Oakland into Piedmont, Oakland, 709 00:23:55,660 --> 00:23:58,239 which is less and less so 710 00:23:58,240 --> 00:24:00,429 predominantly black, but 711 00:24:00,430 --> 00:24:02,379 still a large community of color, 712 00:24:02,380 --> 00:24:03,939 everybody who's coming from a community 713 00:24:03,940 --> 00:24:06,519 which Piedmont considers undesirable 714 00:24:06,520 --> 00:24:08,649 is getting their their license 715 00:24:08,650 --> 00:24:09,759 plate captured. 716 00:24:09,760 --> 00:24:12,879 So not only can it be used by 717 00:24:12,880 --> 00:24:15,999 by law enforcement in a way to 718 00:24:16,000 --> 00:24:17,529 attract people and into criminal 719 00:24:17,530 --> 00:24:19,629 investigations, it also because 720 00:24:19,630 --> 00:24:20,979 people know that this is happening. 721 00:24:20,980 --> 00:24:23,259 It also can be used as a way to 722 00:24:24,330 --> 00:24:26,409 to sort of repeat the theme here, keep 723 00:24:26,410 --> 00:24:27,410 communities gated. 724 00:24:30,540 --> 00:24:32,279 So I also just wanted to mention 725 00:24:32,280 --> 00:24:34,489 automatic ticketing and tolls, 726 00:24:34,490 --> 00:24:36,689 and just because they are 727 00:24:36,690 --> 00:24:39,449 even if they're not law enforcement, 728 00:24:39,450 --> 00:24:41,009 sometimes going through an automated toll 729 00:24:41,010 --> 00:24:43,529 system is the only way to get somewhere 730 00:24:44,760 --> 00:24:46,619 in on the Golden Gate Bridge in San 731 00:24:46,620 --> 00:24:47,909 Francisco. 732 00:24:47,910 --> 00:24:49,289 You're either going to go through an 733 00:24:49,290 --> 00:24:51,509 automated toll system or you're going 734 00:24:51,510 --> 00:24:53,129 to have a picture. And actually all of 735 00:24:53,130 --> 00:24:54,269 these they're taking they're also 736 00:24:54,270 --> 00:24:55,469 capturing your license plate 737 00:24:57,030 --> 00:24:59,069 and of course, electronic ticketing 738 00:24:59,070 --> 00:25:01,019 systems again. 739 00:25:01,020 --> 00:25:02,549 Well, they may not be operated by law 740 00:25:02,550 --> 00:25:04,679 enforcement. They are completely 741 00:25:04,680 --> 00:25:06,809 willing, at least in the 742 00:25:06,810 --> 00:25:09,029 United States and Canada and South Africa 743 00:25:09,030 --> 00:25:11,249 and I imagine elsewhere they 744 00:25:11,250 --> 00:25:14,009 are completely willing to hand over 745 00:25:14,010 --> 00:25:15,539 that information to law enforcement 746 00:25:15,540 --> 00:25:17,729 agencies on a voluntary basis, 747 00:25:17,730 --> 00:25:19,529 meaning without even any sort of court 748 00:25:19,530 --> 00:25:20,530 order. 749 00:25:23,280 --> 00:25:26,159 Flight simulators, so 750 00:25:26,160 --> 00:25:28,079 cell site simulators, also known as emcee 751 00:25:28,080 --> 00:25:30,000 catchers, also known as stingrays. 752 00:25:31,380 --> 00:25:33,629 These are for those who don't know, these 753 00:25:33,630 --> 00:25:35,789 are devices that masquerade as cell phone 754 00:25:35,790 --> 00:25:38,099 towers and they trick your phone into 755 00:25:38,100 --> 00:25:40,379 connecting with them in order to capture 756 00:25:40,380 --> 00:25:42,059 the location of your phone. 757 00:25:42,060 --> 00:25:44,399 Now, in the United States, 758 00:25:44,400 --> 00:25:46,679 law enforcement insists that they only do 759 00:25:46,680 --> 00:25:48,389 this to collect location. 760 00:25:48,390 --> 00:25:50,069 But, of course, cell site simulators can 761 00:25:50,070 --> 00:25:52,439 also intercept content. 762 00:25:52,440 --> 00:25:54,659 They can jam communications. 763 00:25:54,660 --> 00:25:56,849 There's been some research into the use 764 00:25:56,850 --> 00:25:59,669 of cell site simulators to 765 00:25:59,670 --> 00:26:01,769 remotely inject malware so they 766 00:26:01,770 --> 00:26:03,119 can do a lot. 767 00:26:03,120 --> 00:26:05,699 And the location information 768 00:26:05,700 --> 00:26:08,009 that they are capturing can very easily 769 00:26:08,010 --> 00:26:10,559 susceptible to aggregate analysis. 770 00:26:10,560 --> 00:26:12,659 And if you are, 771 00:26:12,660 --> 00:26:14,129 these are a perfect example of mass 772 00:26:14,130 --> 00:26:16,259 surveillance in that one of the ways 773 00:26:16,260 --> 00:26:18,599 that law enforcement uses them is to 774 00:26:18,600 --> 00:26:20,669 figure out if they know if they have 775 00:26:20,670 --> 00:26:22,409 a suspect and they're trying to determine 776 00:26:22,410 --> 00:26:24,209 what phone they are using. 777 00:26:24,210 --> 00:26:26,219 So they know the suspect, they don't know 778 00:26:26,220 --> 00:26:28,369 the phone or the 779 00:26:28,370 --> 00:26:30,959 the IMF or the phone. 780 00:26:30,960 --> 00:26:33,119 So they will turn on this cell 781 00:26:33,120 --> 00:26:35,279 site simulator in the in areas where they 782 00:26:35,280 --> 00:26:37,289 know that the suspect will be. 783 00:26:37,290 --> 00:26:39,209 And they do this several times and they 784 00:26:39,210 --> 00:26:41,759 capture the data of everybody there. 785 00:26:41,760 --> 00:26:43,769 And then they sift through it to find the 786 00:26:43,770 --> 00:26:45,839 number that comes up repeatedly. 787 00:26:45,840 --> 00:26:48,149 So by by necessity, 788 00:26:48,150 --> 00:26:49,799 they cannot use this technology without 789 00:26:49,800 --> 00:26:51,719 capturing everybody's information. 790 00:26:51,720 --> 00:26:54,239 And cell site simulators 791 00:26:54,240 --> 00:26:56,729 in particular are a concern for 792 00:26:56,730 --> 00:26:57,929 activists. 793 00:26:57,930 --> 00:26:59,939 Black Lives Matter activists have 794 00:26:59,940 --> 00:27:01,589 reported all sorts of suspicious things 795 00:27:01,590 --> 00:27:03,779 happening with their phones that 796 00:27:03,780 --> 00:27:05,459 they can't explain. 797 00:27:05,460 --> 00:27:07,619 They feel very certain that cell 798 00:27:07,620 --> 00:27:09,149 flight simulators are being used at 799 00:27:09,150 --> 00:27:10,150 demonstrations, 800 00:27:11,250 --> 00:27:12,809 but they can't get the information. 801 00:27:12,810 --> 00:27:14,999 And in the United States, the 802 00:27:15,000 --> 00:27:16,889 image that I have up here is of a 803 00:27:16,890 --> 00:27:18,089 stingray. 804 00:27:18,090 --> 00:27:20,249 This is the device manufactured by Harris 805 00:27:20,250 --> 00:27:21,569 Corporation. 806 00:27:21,570 --> 00:27:23,459 This is the company that manufactures 807 00:27:23,460 --> 00:27:25,709 most of the devices, at least the devices 808 00:27:25,710 --> 00:27:27,059 that are getting attention in the United 809 00:27:27,060 --> 00:27:29,369 States. And the Harris Corporation 810 00:27:29,370 --> 00:27:31,769 has been totally complicit in 811 00:27:31,770 --> 00:27:33,839 forcing local, state and 812 00:27:33,840 --> 00:27:35,849 federal government to not reveal any 813 00:27:35,850 --> 00:27:37,649 information. And their argument is that 814 00:27:37,650 --> 00:27:39,479 it's its trade secrets. 815 00:27:39,480 --> 00:27:41,609 Can't know how the device works, but 816 00:27:41,610 --> 00:27:43,289 in effect, what it has done is made it 817 00:27:43,290 --> 00:27:45,509 impossible to get information about 818 00:27:45,510 --> 00:27:46,799 these devices. 819 00:27:46,800 --> 00:27:47,969 And some of that has changed. 820 00:27:47,970 --> 00:27:49,799 And we know some, but we don't know 821 00:27:49,800 --> 00:27:51,089 everywhere they're being used. 822 00:27:52,620 --> 00:27:54,839 And another thing another thing to point 823 00:27:54,840 --> 00:27:56,429 out here about cell site simulator's is 824 00:27:56,430 --> 00:27:58,589 that, again, in the States, they 825 00:27:58,590 --> 00:28:00,839 are often used for fraud 826 00:28:00,840 --> 00:28:02,909 cases, but they are also often used for 827 00:28:02,910 --> 00:28:04,139 drug cases. 828 00:28:04,140 --> 00:28:07,109 And drug cases disproportionately 829 00:28:07,110 --> 00:28:09,689 are targeting people of color, even when 830 00:28:09,690 --> 00:28:12,149 we know that use of drugs 831 00:28:12,150 --> 00:28:14,309 among white people hire. 832 00:28:14,310 --> 00:28:16,109 But it is people of color who are often 833 00:28:16,110 --> 00:28:17,110 being affected by this. 834 00:28:18,750 --> 00:28:21,089 And also, this is, of course, 835 00:28:21,090 --> 00:28:23,279 in addition to the incredible ease 836 00:28:23,280 --> 00:28:25,439 by which the government can obtain 837 00:28:25,440 --> 00:28:27,599 locational data directly from your cell 838 00:28:27,600 --> 00:28:29,939 phone provider, I don't know 839 00:28:29,940 --> 00:28:32,009 if people have seen the article that 840 00:28:32,010 --> 00:28:34,139 just came out earlier this week about 841 00:28:34,140 --> 00:28:36,329 our last week about Hyde Park 842 00:28:36,330 --> 00:28:38,399 tracking visitors via Bluetooth. 843 00:28:38,400 --> 00:28:39,929 That Bluetooth is another way that people 844 00:28:39,930 --> 00:28:40,930 can be tracked. 845 00:28:41,850 --> 00:28:44,489 But there are myriad ways to obtain, 846 00:28:44,490 --> 00:28:46,259 at the very least, your location data 847 00:28:46,260 --> 00:28:47,939 cell site simulator's can do more. 848 00:28:49,490 --> 00:28:51,559 So this is, 849 00:28:52,640 --> 00:28:54,859 you know, sort of at a baseline what 850 00:28:54,860 --> 00:28:57,019 you would see on any given 851 00:28:57,020 --> 00:28:58,020 day in the city. 852 00:28:58,820 --> 00:29:00,259 So what do we do about it? 853 00:29:00,260 --> 00:29:01,460 Can you encrypt the streets? 854 00:29:03,480 --> 00:29:04,480 Well. 855 00:29:06,100 --> 00:29:08,159 Got we've got some answers 856 00:29:08,160 --> 00:29:10,410 here, not really very practical, 857 00:29:11,800 --> 00:29:13,769 and one of the things that is that is 858 00:29:13,770 --> 00:29:15,089 helpful that I like to tell people about, 859 00:29:15,090 --> 00:29:16,229 of course, when it comes to cell flight 860 00:29:16,230 --> 00:29:17,879 simulators, if you're using end to end 861 00:29:17,880 --> 00:29:20,429 encryption, that's helpful. 862 00:29:20,430 --> 00:29:21,599 There's also, of course, been some 863 00:29:21,600 --> 00:29:23,699 fantastic research 864 00:29:23,700 --> 00:29:24,959 on detecting them. 865 00:29:24,960 --> 00:29:27,299 So security research labs, 866 00:29:27,300 --> 00:29:29,789 Snoop Snitch, that's a fantastic app. 867 00:29:29,790 --> 00:29:31,979 And protecting and knowing 868 00:29:31,980 --> 00:29:33,749 that it's there is part of protecting 869 00:29:33,750 --> 00:29:35,009 yourself. 870 00:29:35,010 --> 00:29:36,689 But typically the advice that activists 871 00:29:36,690 --> 00:29:38,879 get is just don't bring your phone. 872 00:29:38,880 --> 00:29:40,559 That's that's really completely 873 00:29:40,560 --> 00:29:43,049 impractical. Particular, particularly 874 00:29:43,050 --> 00:29:44,489 for people like Black Lives Matter 875 00:29:44,490 --> 00:29:46,349 activists who, you know, the only reason 876 00:29:46,350 --> 00:29:47,669 people started paying attention is 877 00:29:47,670 --> 00:29:49,919 because people were there on the street 878 00:29:49,920 --> 00:29:52,679 with their cell phones, tweeting, 879 00:29:52,680 --> 00:29:55,469 sending videos and communicating 880 00:29:55,470 --> 00:29:58,409 really instantly with the outside world. 881 00:29:58,410 --> 00:30:00,059 So the idea that somebody can't bring 882 00:30:00,060 --> 00:30:01,919 their cell phone doesn't really make 883 00:30:01,920 --> 00:30:03,179 sense. 884 00:30:03,180 --> 00:30:05,789 There are anti drone hoodies, 885 00:30:05,790 --> 00:30:07,199 probably not something that you would 886 00:30:07,200 --> 00:30:08,220 wear every day. 887 00:30:09,390 --> 00:30:11,579 They're like, I couldn't put up pictures 888 00:30:11,580 --> 00:30:12,839 of them because they're copyrighted. 889 00:30:12,840 --> 00:30:15,329 But these are like 890 00:30:15,330 --> 00:30:17,069 reflective hoodies that sort of cover 891 00:30:17,070 --> 00:30:19,019 your shoulders. There's also anti facial 892 00:30:19,020 --> 00:30:20,309 recognition makeup and. 893 00:30:20,310 --> 00:30:22,049 Well, I would totally wear that every day 894 00:30:22,050 --> 00:30:23,249 because I think it looks awesome. 895 00:30:24,540 --> 00:30:25,930 Probably not the case for everybody. 896 00:30:27,420 --> 00:30:29,819 There's also reflective coating on 897 00:30:29,820 --> 00:30:31,259 your license plate in order to avoid a 898 00:30:31,260 --> 00:30:32,459 license plate reader. 899 00:30:32,460 --> 00:30:33,869 Doesn't work. It's been tested. 900 00:30:33,870 --> 00:30:35,909 It doesn't work. And it's also even 901 00:30:35,910 --> 00:30:37,469 though it doesn't work, it's actually 902 00:30:37,470 --> 00:30:39,539 illegal in some states to do, which is 903 00:30:39,540 --> 00:30:40,540 kind of funny. 904 00:30:44,690 --> 00:30:45,690 So what do we do? 905 00:30:47,570 --> 00:30:48,649 That's why I'm here. 906 00:30:48,650 --> 00:30:49,819 I'm hoping that you're all going to help 907 00:30:49,820 --> 00:30:51,439 me out or at least a couple of you. 908 00:30:51,440 --> 00:30:52,699 You don't have to if you're here. 909 00:30:52,700 --> 00:30:54,919 But but what we want to do 910 00:30:54,920 --> 00:30:56,359 is prevent the adoption of these 911 00:30:56,360 --> 00:30:58,309 technologies, expose their 912 00:30:58,310 --> 00:31:00,799 vulnerabilities and expose 913 00:31:00,800 --> 00:31:02,089 where they are. 914 00:31:02,090 --> 00:31:04,489 And we want to empower ourselves 915 00:31:04,490 --> 00:31:06,679 and particularly the most affected 916 00:31:06,680 --> 00:31:08,419 communities to to fight these 917 00:31:08,420 --> 00:31:09,420 technologies. 918 00:31:13,100 --> 00:31:15,259 So prevention, what I'm talking 919 00:31:15,260 --> 00:31:17,119 about, prevention, I mean, actually 920 00:31:17,120 --> 00:31:19,399 convincing lawmakers not 921 00:31:19,400 --> 00:31:21,349 to adopt this technology and this 922 00:31:21,350 --> 00:31:23,389 absolutely goes hand in hand with 923 00:31:23,390 --> 00:31:25,049 exposing it. 924 00:31:25,050 --> 00:31:26,639 So it's kind of a hard decision. 925 00:31:26,640 --> 00:31:28,549 What do I put first? 926 00:31:28,550 --> 00:31:31,159 But this is just my examples, 927 00:31:31,160 --> 00:31:33,439 all coming from the U.S., from very local 928 00:31:33,440 --> 00:31:34,429 grassroots movements. 929 00:31:34,430 --> 00:31:37,009 And I would be really curious to hear 930 00:31:37,010 --> 00:31:39,079 at the at the sort of city 931 00:31:39,080 --> 00:31:40,879 level or things like that what other 932 00:31:40,880 --> 00:31:42,739 people are doing. 933 00:31:42,740 --> 00:31:44,809 But there are a lot of activists in the 934 00:31:44,810 --> 00:31:46,819 Bay Area, in Chicago, in New York and 935 00:31:46,820 --> 00:31:48,049 L.A. 936 00:31:48,050 --> 00:31:50,009 that are doing work on this. 937 00:31:50,010 --> 00:31:52,189 So preventing the adoption 938 00:31:52,190 --> 00:31:53,539 of this technology. This is an example 939 00:31:53,540 --> 00:31:55,579 from San Mateo County, California. 940 00:31:55,580 --> 00:31:57,739 This is part of the Bay Area. 941 00:31:57,740 --> 00:31:59,959 They were considering getting a cell site 942 00:31:59,960 --> 00:32:02,239 simulator and they immediately 943 00:32:02,240 --> 00:32:04,399 had activists who sent them letters and 944 00:32:04,400 --> 00:32:06,469 who showed up at their meetings. 945 00:32:06,470 --> 00:32:08,659 And there was one person 946 00:32:08,660 --> 00:32:10,039 on the board of supervisors, just one 947 00:32:10,040 --> 00:32:12,379 lawmaker, who really became a thorn 948 00:32:12,380 --> 00:32:14,479 in the side of the process to getting 949 00:32:14,480 --> 00:32:16,819 this. And I should say, 950 00:32:16,820 --> 00:32:18,469 in the U.S., a lot of the money for 951 00:32:18,470 --> 00:32:20,629 purchasing this technology comes from 952 00:32:20,630 --> 00:32:22,369 the federal level. So it comes directly 953 00:32:22,370 --> 00:32:24,079 from the Department of Homeland Security 954 00:32:24,080 --> 00:32:25,879 and it's funneled down to local law 955 00:32:25,880 --> 00:32:27,949 enforcement. And they get huge chunks of 956 00:32:27,950 --> 00:32:30,229 money and they have almost no conditions 957 00:32:30,230 --> 00:32:31,159 on the money. 958 00:32:31,160 --> 00:32:32,509 The really the conditions are this is the 959 00:32:32,510 --> 00:32:34,189 kind of technology that you can purchase. 960 00:32:34,190 --> 00:32:35,270 The conditions aren't 961 00:32:36,350 --> 00:32:38,389 you know, you can't invade people's 962 00:32:38,390 --> 00:32:39,469 rights with this. 963 00:32:39,470 --> 00:32:41,029 If we get a certain number of complaints, 964 00:32:41,030 --> 00:32:42,709 we'll take the technology back. 965 00:32:42,710 --> 00:32:43,999 It's nothing like that. 966 00:32:44,000 --> 00:32:45,559 It's really just you can buy these 967 00:32:45,560 --> 00:32:47,059 things. There you go. 968 00:32:47,060 --> 00:32:48,229 Have fun. 969 00:32:48,230 --> 00:32:49,759 Like Big Brother, just giving pocket 970 00:32:49,760 --> 00:32:51,109 money to Little Brother. 971 00:32:51,110 --> 00:32:53,419 So so it's very easy 972 00:32:53,420 --> 00:32:55,069 for law enforcement agencies to get this. 973 00:32:55,070 --> 00:32:57,349 And, you know, I think talking 974 00:32:57,350 --> 00:32:58,969 about the monetary issues with this 975 00:32:58,970 --> 00:33:01,189 technology, it's a whole other talk. 976 00:33:01,190 --> 00:33:03,199 But this was a case where the county 977 00:33:03,200 --> 00:33:04,969 already had the money, you know, so to 978 00:33:04,970 --> 00:33:06,379 lawmakers, it's like free money. 979 00:33:06,380 --> 00:33:08,689 You're going to turn down free money. 980 00:33:08,690 --> 00:33:10,789 But they they were convinced 981 00:33:10,790 --> 00:33:13,189 after hearing from activists who said, 982 00:33:13,190 --> 00:33:15,349 once you get this technology, 983 00:33:15,350 --> 00:33:17,029 Harris Corporation is not going to let 984 00:33:17,030 --> 00:33:18,799 you respond to Public Records Act 985 00:33:18,800 --> 00:33:20,869 requests and it's going to be used to 986 00:33:20,870 --> 00:33:21,889 violate our rights. 987 00:33:21,890 --> 00:33:23,119 We don't support it. 988 00:33:23,120 --> 00:33:24,829 And then with the help of that of that 989 00:33:24,830 --> 00:33:26,959 one lawmaker, they were actually able 990 00:33:26,960 --> 00:33:29,549 to prevent the purchase of the system, 991 00:33:29,550 --> 00:33:31,669 of course. Another example 992 00:33:31,670 --> 00:33:33,709 is the Domain Awareness Center in 993 00:33:33,710 --> 00:33:34,639 Oakland. 994 00:33:34,640 --> 00:33:36,709 This is a project that was 995 00:33:36,710 --> 00:33:38,479 going to take all of the different 996 00:33:38,480 --> 00:33:40,549 cameras in Oakland and 997 00:33:40,550 --> 00:33:42,319 all of the information at the port. 998 00:33:42,320 --> 00:33:44,629 And I'm going to combine 999 00:33:44,630 --> 00:33:46,999 that with just like the system 1000 00:33:47,000 --> 00:33:49,429 that law enforcement uses to get updates 1001 00:33:49,430 --> 00:33:51,829 with weather updates with 1002 00:33:51,830 --> 00:33:53,899 ShotSpotter, which is little microphones 1003 00:33:53,900 --> 00:33:55,339 placed in the street that are supposed to 1004 00:33:55,340 --> 00:33:56,900 turn on when they hear gunshot. 1005 00:33:57,920 --> 00:33:59,269 I was going to combine an incredible 1006 00:33:59,270 --> 00:34:00,409 amount of information. 1007 00:34:00,410 --> 00:34:02,779 And of course, as I just showed this NPR 1008 00:34:02,780 --> 00:34:05,479 map in Oakland and the experience 1009 00:34:05,480 --> 00:34:07,459 of store owners in Oakland, it's clearly 1010 00:34:07,460 --> 00:34:08,959 a city that has lots of problems of 1011 00:34:08,960 --> 00:34:10,099 biased policing. 1012 00:34:10,100 --> 00:34:12,169 And the community was pissed off. 1013 00:34:12,170 --> 00:34:13,399 They were so angry. 1014 00:34:13,400 --> 00:34:15,709 And this was really incredible. 1015 00:34:15,710 --> 00:34:17,988 I mean, people showed up at city council 1016 00:34:17,989 --> 00:34:20,119 meetings and they would stay for these 1017 00:34:20,120 --> 00:34:21,738 city council meetings would last for like 1018 00:34:21,739 --> 00:34:23,509 eight or nine hours. 1019 00:34:23,510 --> 00:34:24,948 And people would just be sitting there 1020 00:34:24,949 --> 00:34:26,959 waiting for their chance to talk. 1021 00:34:26,960 --> 00:34:28,609 And they would they would just wait it 1022 00:34:28,610 --> 00:34:30,559 out and they would argue with the 1023 00:34:30,560 --> 00:34:32,419 lawmakers. So what ultimately happened 1024 00:34:32,420 --> 00:34:33,468 with the Domain Awareness Center is that 1025 00:34:33,469 --> 00:34:35,569 it was supposed to be Oakland wide and it 1026 00:34:35,570 --> 00:34:37,759 got pushed to only the Port of Oakland. 1027 00:34:37,760 --> 00:34:39,589 So it was made smaller. 1028 00:34:39,590 --> 00:34:41,658 This actually cost the city money because 1029 00:34:41,659 --> 00:34:43,849 they had to take out the traffic cameras 1030 00:34:43,850 --> 00:34:45,619 that had been integrated into the system. 1031 00:34:45,620 --> 00:34:46,939 And the number of times when you can 1032 00:34:46,940 --> 00:34:49,459 actually convince a government agency 1033 00:34:49,460 --> 00:34:52,738 to spend money to fix rights, 1034 00:34:52,739 --> 00:34:53,869 it doesn't happen very often. 1035 00:34:53,870 --> 00:34:56,359 So this was really a huge success 1036 00:34:56,360 --> 00:34:58,399 in the shrinking of the system. 1037 00:34:58,400 --> 00:35:00,469 Now, most community members who came 1038 00:35:00,470 --> 00:35:02,209 to these demonstrations made it clear 1039 00:35:02,210 --> 00:35:04,429 they didn't want the technology at all. 1040 00:35:04,430 --> 00:35:06,529 They just didn't want to have it. 1041 00:35:06,530 --> 00:35:08,659 But what ended up happening is that 1042 00:35:08,660 --> 00:35:10,339 it was still there for the port and there 1043 00:35:10,340 --> 00:35:12,409 was a very extensive and specific 1044 00:35:12,410 --> 00:35:14,359 privacy policy put into place. 1045 00:35:14,360 --> 00:35:16,579 I was on the committee that helped create 1046 00:35:16,580 --> 00:35:18,859 that privacy policy, another member 1047 00:35:18,860 --> 00:35:19,969 of the committee in the audience. 1048 00:35:19,970 --> 00:35:22,339 And it was a very difficult process. 1049 00:35:22,340 --> 00:35:24,469 But it is the first sort of privacy 1050 00:35:24,470 --> 00:35:26,539 ordinance like that that has existed, 1051 00:35:26,540 --> 00:35:28,189 really a very comprehensive. 1052 00:35:38,130 --> 00:35:40,289 So knowing 1053 00:35:40,290 --> 00:35:42,569 how the technologies are vulnerable, 1054 00:35:42,570 --> 00:35:44,759 this is one of the things that 1055 00:35:44,760 --> 00:35:47,099 activists really need to be talking 1056 00:35:47,100 --> 00:35:49,109 to technologists more on. 1057 00:35:49,110 --> 00:35:51,179 There has been great research and 1058 00:35:51,180 --> 00:35:52,920 there definitely needs to be more 1059 00:35:53,970 --> 00:35:55,679 on some of the really great 1060 00:35:57,390 --> 00:36:00,029 examples that we see are. 1061 00:36:00,030 --> 00:36:02,639 For instance, in 2012 1062 00:36:02,640 --> 00:36:04,709 at Black Hat, there was a demonstration 1063 00:36:04,710 --> 00:36:06,869 of how you can fake an iris scan 1064 00:36:06,870 --> 00:36:08,309 quite easily. 1065 00:36:08,310 --> 00:36:10,379 Also in 2012, a researcher at the 1066 00:36:10,380 --> 00:36:12,509 University of Texas showed how you can 1067 00:36:12,510 --> 00:36:14,909 spoof GPS signals 1068 00:36:14,910 --> 00:36:16,979 that for satellite controlled drones and 1069 00:36:16,980 --> 00:36:18,989 was able to take over a drone. 1070 00:36:18,990 --> 00:36:21,149 He actually did it well while people 1071 00:36:21,150 --> 00:36:22,229 from the Department of Homeland Security 1072 00:36:22,230 --> 00:36:23,489 were watching because he was trying to 1073 00:36:23,490 --> 00:36:25,529 demonstrate to them why the technology 1074 00:36:25,530 --> 00:36:27,989 was vulnerable, that really didn't 1075 00:36:27,990 --> 00:36:29,519 stop them from wanting to use it and 1076 00:36:29,520 --> 00:36:31,259 spread the technology everywhere and pay 1077 00:36:31,260 --> 00:36:32,789 cities to use it. 1078 00:36:33,930 --> 00:36:35,879 And then, of course, a wonderful example. 1079 00:36:35,880 --> 00:36:38,159 In 2013, Chaos Computer Club 1080 00:36:38,160 --> 00:36:40,619 hacked an iPhone five US. 1081 00:36:40,620 --> 00:36:41,879 And for those who don't know about this 1082 00:36:41,880 --> 00:36:43,589 hack, incredibly simple. 1083 00:36:43,590 --> 00:36:45,479 You know, to somebody like me, I'm not a 1084 00:36:45,480 --> 00:36:47,629 technologist. And FBI, when we get into 1085 00:36:47,630 --> 00:36:49,799 the Q&A session, if you ask me really 1086 00:36:49,800 --> 00:36:51,989 specific technological questions all day, 1087 00:36:51,990 --> 00:36:53,219 I'll bet somebody else in the audience 1088 00:36:53,220 --> 00:36:54,220 can answer that. 1089 00:36:55,050 --> 00:36:57,119 But they so they hacked an 1090 00:36:57,120 --> 00:36:59,249 iPhone five is taking a page simply 1091 00:36:59,250 --> 00:37:01,259 by taking a photograph of a user's 1092 00:37:01,260 --> 00:37:03,419 fingerprint, converting that to a mold 1093 00:37:03,420 --> 00:37:05,609 by printing it out and 1094 00:37:05,610 --> 00:37:07,379 then using pre coded photosensitive 1095 00:37:07,380 --> 00:37:09,629 boards and a little bit of wood glue. 1096 00:37:09,630 --> 00:37:10,769 And that was it. 1097 00:37:10,770 --> 00:37:12,419 Incredibly simple. 1098 00:37:12,420 --> 00:37:14,429 And and this is technology that people 1099 00:37:14,430 --> 00:37:16,319 are still using. People are still locking 1100 00:37:16,320 --> 00:37:17,339 things with their fingerprint. 1101 00:37:17,340 --> 00:37:19,679 Companies are still using fingerprint 1102 00:37:19,680 --> 00:37:20,789 access. 1103 00:37:20,790 --> 00:37:22,440 But we know that it is vulnerable. 1104 00:37:24,090 --> 00:37:26,309 So that's exposing 1105 00:37:26,310 --> 00:37:28,859 the technical vulnerabilities. 1106 00:37:28,860 --> 00:37:31,919 But we also need to be 1107 00:37:31,920 --> 00:37:34,109 waging public information warfare. 1108 00:37:34,110 --> 00:37:36,329 So this is an example from Los 1109 00:37:36,330 --> 00:37:38,549 Angeles, fantastic 1110 00:37:38,550 --> 00:37:40,229 work from a community group called Stop 1111 00:37:40,230 --> 00:37:41,609 LAPD Spying. 1112 00:37:41,610 --> 00:37:44,009 And so what they did is there is 1113 00:37:44,010 --> 00:37:45,899 an inspector general for the Los Angeles 1114 00:37:45,900 --> 00:37:46,949 Police Department. 1115 00:37:46,950 --> 00:37:48,449 They're supposed to investigate. 1116 00:37:49,770 --> 00:37:51,329 They're supposed to investigate special 1117 00:37:51,330 --> 00:37:52,590 order one, which is 1118 00:37:53,820 --> 00:37:55,139 we'll get into it. But it's a specific 1119 00:37:55,140 --> 00:37:57,389 type of surveillance that the LAPD 1120 00:37:57,390 --> 00:37:59,459 does that they report directly 1121 00:37:59,460 --> 00:38:00,689 to the fusion center there. 1122 00:38:00,690 --> 00:38:02,939 So this state, local, 1123 00:38:02,940 --> 00:38:05,159 federal information clearinghouse. 1124 00:38:05,160 --> 00:38:07,889 So the stop LAPD spying group, 1125 00:38:07,890 --> 00:38:10,049 they saw the inspector general's 1126 00:38:10,050 --> 00:38:12,149 report and they said, you 1127 00:38:12,150 --> 00:38:13,679 know, this doesn't really seem right to 1128 00:38:13,680 --> 00:38:15,689 us. We're going to go ahead and file our 1129 00:38:15,690 --> 00:38:18,509 own Public Records Act requests and 1130 00:38:18,510 --> 00:38:20,249 we're going to analyze that data. 1131 00:38:20,250 --> 00:38:21,989 And we're also and this is what's really 1132 00:38:21,990 --> 00:38:23,309 important. We're going to include the 1133 00:38:23,310 --> 00:38:24,809 stories of the community. 1134 00:38:24,810 --> 00:38:26,699 We're going to include stories from 1135 00:38:26,700 --> 00:38:28,199 people who have been stopped for no 1136 00:38:28,200 --> 00:38:30,269 apparent reason, who have had these 1137 00:38:30,270 --> 00:38:32,189 experiences that seem, you know, if you 1138 00:38:32,190 --> 00:38:34,019 don't know what sort of surveillance is 1139 00:38:34,020 --> 00:38:35,339 happening, it just seems like a very 1140 00:38:35,340 --> 00:38:37,529 scary experience to somebody who's 1141 00:38:37,530 --> 00:38:39,569 getting stopped in Skid Row in L.A., 1142 00:38:39,570 --> 00:38:41,309 getting asked these questions and they 1143 00:38:41,310 --> 00:38:42,959 don't understand why. 1144 00:38:42,960 --> 00:38:45,059 So they put together a people's 1145 00:38:45,060 --> 00:38:47,029 audit and they have used they've used 1146 00:38:47,030 --> 00:38:48,419 this people's audit. I've used this 1147 00:38:48,420 --> 00:38:49,679 people's audit. 1148 00:38:49,680 --> 00:38:51,869 It's an incredibly detailed report about 1149 00:38:51,870 --> 00:38:53,969 the surveillance that LAPD is doing. 1150 00:38:53,970 --> 00:38:56,639 And it actually they compare the report 1151 00:38:56,640 --> 00:38:58,889 to the report from the inspector 1152 00:38:58,890 --> 00:39:00,629 general, from the the police agency 1153 00:39:00,630 --> 00:39:03,029 themselves. So that's also exposing 1154 00:39:03,030 --> 00:39:05,549 sort of how these internal bureaucracies 1155 00:39:05,550 --> 00:39:08,070 do or more likely don't actually 1156 00:39:09,210 --> 00:39:10,979 look into technologies very extensively. 1157 00:39:15,660 --> 00:39:17,819 So this is another 1158 00:39:17,820 --> 00:39:19,919 example of research and how these 1159 00:39:19,920 --> 00:39:22,919 technologies work, and this is from if 1160 00:39:22,920 --> 00:39:24,869 this is an automated license, this is a 1161 00:39:24,870 --> 00:39:27,149 publicly accessible feed from an 1162 00:39:27,150 --> 00:39:29,159 automated license plate reader. 1163 00:39:29,160 --> 00:39:31,349 So Jeremy Galula and Dave 1164 00:39:31,350 --> 00:39:33,749 Moss and Cooper Quenton all looked 1165 00:39:33,750 --> 00:39:35,999 at how 1166 00:39:36,000 --> 00:39:37,379 they looked at vulnerabilities that have 1167 00:39:37,380 --> 00:39:39,029 previously been found by researchers. 1168 00:39:39,030 --> 00:39:40,439 And when I say vulnerabilities, 1169 00:39:41,760 --> 00:39:43,859 maybe not even the right word, 1170 00:39:43,860 --> 00:39:45,689 I mean, maybe just stupidity is the right 1171 00:39:45,690 --> 00:39:47,969 word because these are publicly 1172 00:39:47,970 --> 00:39:49,109 accessible feeds. 1173 00:39:49,110 --> 00:39:50,369 Like literally, if you can find the right 1174 00:39:50,370 --> 00:39:53,789 Web page, you can view an Alpro. 1175 00:39:53,790 --> 00:39:55,679 These are publicly viewable configuration 1176 00:39:55,680 --> 00:39:58,439 Web pages and this is easily, 1177 00:39:58,440 --> 00:40:00,989 easily accessible telnet access. 1178 00:40:00,990 --> 00:40:03,089 So why does this matter? 1179 00:40:03,090 --> 00:40:05,549 This is a perfect example of how expose 1180 00:40:05,550 --> 00:40:07,919 and prevent work together. 1181 00:40:07,920 --> 00:40:10,409 They responsibly disclosed 1182 00:40:10,410 --> 00:40:12,539 their findings to the police departments 1183 00:40:12,540 --> 00:40:14,849 involved and they actually got 1184 00:40:14,850 --> 00:40:16,469 some police departments to improve their 1185 00:40:16,470 --> 00:40:17,879 systems. 1186 00:40:17,880 --> 00:40:20,219 And I want to make a note here about 1187 00:40:20,220 --> 00:40:22,289 exposing vulnerabilities and about doing 1188 00:40:22,290 --> 00:40:23,290 this research. 1189 00:40:24,090 --> 00:40:26,519 What I am really encouraging you to do 1190 00:40:26,520 --> 00:40:27,520 is, 1191 00:40:29,220 --> 00:40:31,829 is not to just 1192 00:40:31,830 --> 00:40:33,029 it's not to just find the 1193 00:40:33,030 --> 00:40:35,519 vulnerabilities, but politicize them. 1194 00:40:35,520 --> 00:40:36,989 You know, if you're just finding the 1195 00:40:36,990 --> 00:40:38,849 vulnerabilities, you're giving them a 1196 00:40:38,850 --> 00:40:41,309 chance to fix the vulnerabilities and, 1197 00:40:41,310 --> 00:40:42,749 you know, maybe giving them free help, 1198 00:40:43,890 --> 00:40:46,049 but instead politicize them. 1199 00:40:46,050 --> 00:40:48,149 Talk about why it matters so. 1200 00:40:57,380 --> 00:40:59,569 So this is another example 1201 00:40:59,570 --> 00:41:00,529 of exposure. 1202 00:41:00,530 --> 00:41:03,019 This is a camera map from 1203 00:41:03,020 --> 00:41:04,359 and I'm going to have to speed through 1204 00:41:04,360 --> 00:41:06,439 because I'm almost done and want to 1205 00:41:06,440 --> 00:41:07,909 get to questions. 1206 00:41:07,910 --> 00:41:10,879 So this is a map from Tampa, Florida. 1207 00:41:10,880 --> 00:41:13,189 This is a project that was done for the 1208 00:41:13,190 --> 00:41:14,629 Republican National Convention. 1209 00:41:14,630 --> 00:41:15,829 The Republican National Convention at the 1210 00:41:15,830 --> 00:41:17,359 Democratic National Convention are always 1211 00:41:17,360 --> 00:41:18,889 huge demonstrations in the U.S. 1212 00:41:18,890 --> 00:41:20,359 Lots of people getting arrested, usually 1213 00:41:20,360 --> 00:41:22,159 tear gas, rubber bullets, all all of that 1214 00:41:22,160 --> 00:41:23,160 fun stuff. 1215 00:41:24,050 --> 00:41:26,329 And so somebody actually just 1216 00:41:26,330 --> 00:41:27,679 created a project to map where all the 1217 00:41:27,680 --> 00:41:30,079 cameras were prior to the demonstrations. 1218 00:41:30,080 --> 00:41:31,459 Some of these cameras were installed 1219 00:41:31,460 --> 00:41:33,169 specifically as security for the 1220 00:41:33,170 --> 00:41:34,099 demonstrations. 1221 00:41:34,100 --> 00:41:36,079 They were left in place, which is always 1222 00:41:36,080 --> 00:41:38,119 what happens. It's you know, it's what 1223 00:41:38,120 --> 00:41:39,049 happens at the Olympics. 1224 00:41:39,050 --> 00:41:40,399 It's what happens whenever we have any 1225 00:41:40,400 --> 00:41:41,299 big events. 1226 00:41:41,300 --> 00:41:42,469 So this page is still up. 1227 00:41:43,510 --> 00:41:45,589 There is also a similar page for the 1228 00:41:45,590 --> 00:41:46,849 New York Police Department surveillance 1229 00:41:46,850 --> 00:41:49,159 cameras, which has not always 1230 00:41:49,160 --> 00:41:50,119 being maintained. 1231 00:41:50,120 --> 00:41:52,939 So something you're interested in, 1232 00:41:52,940 --> 00:41:53,940 something to think about. 1233 00:41:56,670 --> 00:41:58,679 So we need to let people know what's 1234 00:41:58,680 --> 00:42:00,509 happening, we need to expose these 1235 00:42:00,510 --> 00:42:02,639 technologies, but if 1236 00:42:02,640 --> 00:42:05,249 we just do that, it's very frustrating. 1237 00:42:05,250 --> 00:42:07,349 So finally, we 1238 00:42:07,350 --> 00:42:08,609 want to empower. 1239 00:42:08,610 --> 00:42:10,379 We can't just talk among ourselves. 1240 00:42:10,380 --> 00:42:11,519 Those of us who understand this 1241 00:42:11,520 --> 00:42:14,039 technology can't just have a conversation 1242 00:42:14,040 --> 00:42:16,289 and say, well, you know, I'm 1243 00:42:16,290 --> 00:42:18,189 not too worried about cell site simulator 1244 00:42:18,190 --> 00:42:20,399 because, like, I always use signal and, 1245 00:42:20,400 --> 00:42:21,419 you know, I don't care if they know my 1246 00:42:21,420 --> 00:42:24,179 location, that's that's not helpful. 1247 00:42:24,180 --> 00:42:26,819 What we need to do is educate people 1248 00:42:26,820 --> 00:42:29,069 and work with them, especially the most 1249 00:42:29,070 --> 00:42:31,589 marginalized. This can be technol 1250 00:42:31,590 --> 00:42:33,149 technological. 1251 00:42:33,150 --> 00:42:34,679 It could be, you know, your rights if 1252 00:42:34,680 --> 00:42:35,909 you're an activist or attorney who has 1253 00:42:35,910 --> 00:42:36,809 that information. 1254 00:42:36,810 --> 00:42:39,179 But we need to be working with people. 1255 00:42:39,180 --> 00:42:40,589 And a great example of this. 1256 00:42:40,590 --> 00:42:42,689 So this is a picture from the 1257 00:42:42,690 --> 00:42:44,399 the NATO protests that happened in 1258 00:42:44,400 --> 00:42:46,049 Chicago a few years ago. 1259 00:42:46,050 --> 00:42:48,719 I was there doing legal support. 1260 00:42:48,720 --> 00:42:50,999 It's very disturbing, some 1261 00:42:51,000 --> 00:42:52,379 very disturbing violence that happened 1262 00:42:52,380 --> 00:42:53,489 with law enforcement. 1263 00:42:53,490 --> 00:42:56,039 And in Chicago, 1264 00:42:56,040 --> 00:42:57,719 there is a technologist, Freddy Martinez, 1265 00:42:57,720 --> 00:43:00,269 who has been working with activists 1266 00:43:00,270 --> 00:43:02,669 to deploy catcher catchers. 1267 00:43:02,670 --> 00:43:05,699 So he actually gave activists 1268 00:43:05,700 --> 00:43:07,109 phones that already had Snoop Snitch 1269 00:43:07,110 --> 00:43:08,309 installed. 1270 00:43:08,310 --> 00:43:10,199 He did all of the work of installing it 1271 00:43:10,200 --> 00:43:12,209 and explaining to them how to use it. 1272 00:43:12,210 --> 00:43:14,369 And they went around Chicago and they 1273 00:43:14,370 --> 00:43:16,619 they figured out where in 1274 00:43:16,620 --> 00:43:18,299 Sketchers our flight simulators were 1275 00:43:18,300 --> 00:43:19,679 being used. 1276 00:43:19,680 --> 00:43:20,669 But he didn't just do that. 1277 00:43:20,670 --> 00:43:23,369 He also gave them security trainings. 1278 00:43:23,370 --> 00:43:25,529 He also taught them sort of what to be 1279 00:43:25,530 --> 00:43:26,549 on the lookout for. 1280 00:43:26,550 --> 00:43:29,339 And as a result, activists who previously 1281 00:43:29,340 --> 00:43:31,169 never knew about cell flight simulators 1282 00:43:31,170 --> 00:43:33,359 are now doing things like listening to 1283 00:43:33,360 --> 00:43:35,309 police scanners and saying, wow, we just 1284 00:43:35,310 --> 00:43:36,539 heard something really weird. 1285 00:43:36,540 --> 00:43:37,799 And it sounds like they're using a cell 1286 00:43:37,800 --> 00:43:39,959 site simulator and this is 1287 00:43:39,960 --> 00:43:41,219 knowledge that they wouldn't have had. 1288 00:43:41,220 --> 00:43:43,679 This is knowledge that we want to have. 1289 00:43:43,680 --> 00:43:45,509 But it it doesn't happen unless we're 1290 00:43:45,510 --> 00:43:47,280 working together, so. 1291 00:43:51,800 --> 00:43:53,179 How can we defend the from the 1292 00:43:53,180 --> 00:43:55,369 technologies we already know about, how 1293 00:43:55,370 --> 00:43:57,109 can we make things better? 1294 00:43:57,110 --> 00:43:58,489 That's for me to work on, but it's also 1295 00:43:58,490 --> 00:43:59,729 for you to answer. 1296 00:43:59,730 --> 00:44:01,880 And with that, I am open for questions. 1297 00:44:14,690 --> 00:44:16,189 Thank you very much. 1298 00:44:16,190 --> 00:44:17,899 Are slightly over 50 minutes for 1299 00:44:17,900 --> 00:44:19,909 questions and the first two questions, go 1300 00:44:19,910 --> 00:44:20,910 to the Internet. 1301 00:44:21,980 --> 00:44:22,980 Yes. 1302 00:44:23,750 --> 00:44:26,089 Have you actually run into 1303 00:44:26,090 --> 00:44:27,559 many companies that do it? 1304 00:44:27,560 --> 00:44:29,659 Like, uh, do you know that 1305 00:44:29,660 --> 00:44:32,149 Mall of America or something 1306 00:44:32,150 --> 00:44:33,919 is actually giving the surveillance 1307 00:44:33,920 --> 00:44:35,719 cameras access to the police? 1308 00:44:36,790 --> 00:44:37,929 Can you repeat the question, 1309 00:44:39,040 --> 00:44:41,199 do you know of many companies 1310 00:44:41,200 --> 00:44:43,389 that actually do give their 1311 00:44:43,390 --> 00:44:45,939 surveillance camera data to 1312 00:44:45,940 --> 00:44:46,940 the authorities? 1313 00:44:49,120 --> 00:44:50,469 Well, if you're talking about 1314 00:44:51,580 --> 00:44:52,839 it depends on what level you're talking 1315 00:44:52,840 --> 00:44:54,339 about. But absolutely. 1316 00:44:54,340 --> 00:44:56,649 I mean, at the at the level of the cities 1317 00:44:56,650 --> 00:44:58,719 that I've worked in, the sort of program 1318 00:44:58,720 --> 00:45:00,039 that I mentioned with the district 1319 00:45:00,040 --> 00:45:01,899 attorney in San Francisco, there are 1320 00:45:01,900 --> 00:45:04,269 programs like that all over the U.S. 1321 00:45:04,270 --> 00:45:06,009 and I can't imagine that that's not 1322 00:45:06,010 --> 00:45:08,779 happening in Europe either that. 1323 00:45:08,780 --> 00:45:10,839 So I don't know if you're if 1324 00:45:10,840 --> 00:45:12,579 you're referring to sort of people who 1325 00:45:12,580 --> 00:45:13,749 have actually have 1326 00:45:15,220 --> 00:45:17,049 these cameras right now. 1327 00:45:17,050 --> 00:45:19,239 But but, yes, certainly there 1328 00:45:19,240 --> 00:45:20,240 are specific examples. 1329 00:45:22,760 --> 00:45:25,069 And can you get information about 1330 00:45:25,070 --> 00:45:27,259 that, using something like the Freedom of 1331 00:45:27,260 --> 00:45:29,329 Information Act or whatever is 1332 00:45:29,330 --> 00:45:31,259 applicable in your country? 1333 00:45:31,260 --> 00:45:33,589 Yes, so the people's 1334 00:45:33,590 --> 00:45:35,569 audit that I was mentioning that the Stop 1335 00:45:35,570 --> 00:45:37,669 LAPD spying group did 1336 00:45:37,670 --> 00:45:39,979 that was through stories 1337 00:45:39,980 --> 00:45:41,419 and interviews, but it was also through 1338 00:45:41,420 --> 00:45:42,649 Public Records Act requests. 1339 00:45:42,650 --> 00:45:44,869 And actually, if street 1340 00:45:44,870 --> 00:45:46,729 level surveillance project, one of the 1341 00:45:46,730 --> 00:45:48,889 really exciting pieces of it was 1342 00:45:48,890 --> 00:45:51,409 that it had a there was a partnership 1343 00:45:51,410 --> 00:45:54,589 with Muckrake in order to do 1344 00:45:54,590 --> 00:45:56,419 Parra's about biometrics. 1345 00:45:56,420 --> 00:45:57,949 So they just had to then actually it's 1346 00:45:57,950 --> 00:45:59,269 still up there. Just a little form you 1347 00:45:59,270 --> 00:46:00,529 can fill out. 1348 00:46:00,530 --> 00:46:02,699 They'll do the pray for you. 1349 00:46:02,700 --> 00:46:04,459 Of course, what we see is that 1350 00:46:04,460 --> 00:46:06,709 unsurprisingly, you get denials 1351 00:46:06,710 --> 00:46:07,699 all the time. 1352 00:46:07,700 --> 00:46:09,889 You deal with companies who are actually 1353 00:46:09,890 --> 00:46:11,689 colluding with the government to try to 1354 00:46:11,690 --> 00:46:13,429 keep things private by arguing that they 1355 00:46:13,430 --> 00:46:14,430 have trade secrets. 1356 00:46:15,380 --> 00:46:17,329 But, you know, most of what we know is 1357 00:46:17,330 --> 00:46:18,770 through Public Records Act requests. 1358 00:46:21,300 --> 00:46:23,309 Before we move out of the room itself, 1359 00:46:23,310 --> 00:46:25,469 may I remind you that questions are short 1360 00:46:25,470 --> 00:46:26,489 sentences? 1361 00:46:26,490 --> 00:46:28,679 This question marks and did not include 1362 00:46:28,680 --> 00:46:31,619 extensive expressions of your gratitude. 1363 00:46:31,620 --> 00:46:32,729 First question over there 1364 00:46:33,840 --> 00:46:36,300 in Sweden this year, we actually 1365 00:46:37,770 --> 00:46:39,929 looked at Tels. 1366 00:46:39,930 --> 00:46:42,149 You briefly mentioned telephones, mobile 1367 00:46:42,150 --> 00:46:44,879 phones. So we what we did was 1368 00:46:44,880 --> 00:46:46,709 that there was this company that 1369 00:46:46,710 --> 00:46:47,820 collected Wi-Fi, 1370 00:46:48,990 --> 00:46:51,059 Mac addresses and societies 1371 00:46:51,060 --> 00:46:52,989 to measure the flow of people in the city 1372 00:46:52,990 --> 00:46:55,229 centers. Yeah, it's actually got 1373 00:46:55,230 --> 00:46:57,519 a regulatory agencies to consider 1374 00:46:57,520 --> 00:47:00,089 megadoses as personal identifiers. 1375 00:47:00,090 --> 00:47:02,669 So that was all of a sudden regulated. 1376 00:47:02,670 --> 00:47:04,919 So that is fantastic. 1377 00:47:04,920 --> 00:47:07,379 So it sounds like you you actually worked 1378 00:47:07,380 --> 00:47:09,359 on pointing out to them why this is a 1379 00:47:09,360 --> 00:47:11,909 problem, that sort of surveillance 1380 00:47:11,910 --> 00:47:14,159 of Mac addresses. 1381 00:47:14,160 --> 00:47:16,019 This happens all along the U.S. 1382 00:47:16,020 --> 00:47:18,329 Canada border and over 1383 00:47:18,330 --> 00:47:19,769 and over. Government officials just say, 1384 00:47:19,770 --> 00:47:20,909 well, it's you know, it's just Mac 1385 00:47:20,910 --> 00:47:21,989 addresses. 1386 00:47:21,990 --> 00:47:23,579 So that's exactly the kind of strategic 1387 00:47:23,580 --> 00:47:25,170 intervention that we need everywhere. 1388 00:47:27,840 --> 00:47:30,059 Why do you find it's difficult to get 1389 00:47:30,060 --> 00:47:32,609 information about these products 1390 00:47:32,610 --> 00:47:33,610 and the features? 1391 00:47:34,620 --> 00:47:36,869 Because there are tradeoffs everywhere I 1392 00:47:36,870 --> 00:47:38,999 go there. They talk about whatever they 1393 00:47:39,000 --> 00:47:41,939 can offer is easy. 1394 00:47:41,940 --> 00:47:44,579 So just as I mentioned, 1395 00:47:44,580 --> 00:47:46,379 how these technologies affect people 1396 00:47:46,380 --> 00:47:48,239 differently, depending on the color of 1397 00:47:48,240 --> 00:47:50,879 their skin or what they look like, 1398 00:47:50,880 --> 00:47:52,829 I can tell you that I would never be let 1399 00:47:52,830 --> 00:47:54,809 into at least in the States I've actually 1400 00:47:54,810 --> 00:47:55,829 tried. 1401 00:47:55,830 --> 00:47:57,599 There's something that happens in Alameda 1402 00:47:57,600 --> 00:47:59,699 County called Urban Shield, 1403 00:47:59,700 --> 00:48:01,619 and it is partly really just a 1404 00:48:01,620 --> 00:48:03,239 marketplace for this technology. 1405 00:48:04,410 --> 00:48:06,359 Even if I put on a suit, they're not 1406 00:48:06,360 --> 00:48:07,929 going to let me in. 1407 00:48:07,930 --> 00:48:10,139 So if you have a list of publicly 1408 00:48:10,140 --> 00:48:12,089 accessible trade fairs, please come talk 1409 00:48:12,090 --> 00:48:13,859 to me after, because I would love, I 1410 00:48:13,860 --> 00:48:15,209 would love. And actually, some of the 1411 00:48:15,210 --> 00:48:17,309 best information that we have does come 1412 00:48:17,310 --> 00:48:18,569 from that that source. 1413 00:48:18,570 --> 00:48:20,369 I mean, there was a fantastic there's 1414 00:48:20,370 --> 00:48:21,809 been a couple of fantastic articles from 1415 00:48:21,810 --> 00:48:23,669 journalists who have gone to these trade 1416 00:48:23,670 --> 00:48:24,869 barriers and talked about what they 1417 00:48:24,870 --> 00:48:25,739 found. Yeah. 1418 00:48:25,740 --> 00:48:27,029 And I would like to add that this is a 1419 00:48:27,030 --> 00:48:29,039 project in the Hollonds where we are 1420 00:48:29,040 --> 00:48:31,349 combining the data, the video 1421 00:48:31,350 --> 00:48:33,419 surveillance data of a couple of 1422 00:48:33,420 --> 00:48:35,489 organizations to surveil the 1423 00:48:35,490 --> 00:48:37,889 whole area and one goal except 1424 00:48:37,890 --> 00:48:40,439 instead of setting cameras everywhere. 1425 00:48:40,440 --> 00:48:42,629 So we're doing it excellent 1426 00:48:42,630 --> 00:48:43,229 at anybody. 1427 00:48:43,230 --> 00:48:45,299 If you I would love anybody who 1428 00:48:45,300 --> 00:48:46,709 has any of these projects. Come talk to 1429 00:48:46,710 --> 00:48:48,449 me after so I can write your information 1430 00:48:48,450 --> 00:48:49,590 down because I want to know more. 1431 00:48:51,690 --> 00:48:53,129 First off, thank you very much for doing 1432 00:48:53,130 --> 00:48:54,130 this talk. 1433 00:48:55,170 --> 00:48:57,599 I wanted to ask about your 1434 00:48:57,600 --> 00:48:59,549 techniques for reaching out to the 1435 00:48:59,550 --> 00:49:01,169 communities who are most affected by 1436 00:49:01,170 --> 00:49:03,299 this. How do you what it's 1437 00:49:03,300 --> 00:49:04,529 in your mind when you're trying to find 1438 00:49:04,530 --> 00:49:06,419 allies in this face and what works the 1439 00:49:06,420 --> 00:49:08,069 best for you? And the second is a little 1440 00:49:08,070 --> 00:49:10,439 bit of a confirmation 1441 00:49:10,440 --> 00:49:12,119 question, because I think we all know 1442 00:49:12,120 --> 00:49:14,579 that about gentrification 1443 00:49:14,580 --> 00:49:16,260 in San Francisco and in the Bay Area. 1444 00:49:17,310 --> 00:49:18,929 The second question is, what is the 1445 00:49:18,930 --> 00:49:20,849 reaction of the tech community that it's 1446 00:49:20,850 --> 00:49:22,979 coming into this area? 1447 00:49:22,980 --> 00:49:23,939 And do they know about it? 1448 00:49:23,940 --> 00:49:26,219 And have you seen anybody? 1449 00:49:26,220 --> 00:49:28,289 My my gut instinct is 1450 00:49:28,290 --> 00:49:30,389 no, they're not aware and they're not 1451 00:49:30,390 --> 00:49:31,390 a part of this. 1452 00:49:32,130 --> 00:49:33,250 But what would you say? 1453 00:49:34,500 --> 00:49:36,599 So those are two excellent questions to 1454 00:49:36,600 --> 00:49:39,059 the first. It is it is definitely 1455 00:49:39,060 --> 00:49:41,129 important how you reach out and how 1456 00:49:41,130 --> 00:49:42,179 you try to work with people. 1457 00:49:43,740 --> 00:49:45,539 Again, I know I've mentioned Black Lives 1458 00:49:45,540 --> 00:49:47,129 Matter a lot of times, but I think it's 1459 00:49:47,130 --> 00:49:49,199 an incredible example of activism in the 1460 00:49:49,200 --> 00:49:51,269 United States. And it's also a 1461 00:49:51,270 --> 00:49:53,249 community that is very used to having 1462 00:49:53,250 --> 00:49:55,319 people come in from outside and say, you 1463 00:49:55,320 --> 00:49:56,549 know, you don't know about this and you 1464 00:49:56,550 --> 00:49:57,899 don't know about that. And I think I 1465 00:49:57,900 --> 00:49:59,729 better explain it to you. 1466 00:49:59,730 --> 00:50:01,829 That's definitely not the way to do it. 1467 00:50:01,830 --> 00:50:03,929 I think the way to do it is to seek out 1468 00:50:03,930 --> 00:50:05,939 individuals to reach out through your 1469 00:50:05,940 --> 00:50:08,069 networks, to reach out to somebody 1470 00:50:08,070 --> 00:50:10,019 individually and say, hey, this is the 1471 00:50:10,020 --> 00:50:11,939 knowledge that I have. 1472 00:50:11,940 --> 00:50:13,379 I think it might be helpful, but I'm 1473 00:50:13,380 --> 00:50:14,609 curious what you think. 1474 00:50:14,610 --> 00:50:16,379 So it's about not like presenting to 1475 00:50:16,380 --> 00:50:18,449 somebody a fully formed package of 1476 00:50:18,450 --> 00:50:19,889 this is what you need from me. 1477 00:50:19,890 --> 00:50:22,259 It's about actually finding out. 1478 00:50:22,260 --> 00:50:24,959 So I think that's one important thing. 1479 00:50:24,960 --> 00:50:27,029 I've actually done doorknocking in 1480 00:50:27,030 --> 00:50:29,219 Oakland, like in 1481 00:50:29,220 --> 00:50:30,449 specific areas where things are 1482 00:50:30,450 --> 00:50:31,450 happening. 1483 00:50:32,040 --> 00:50:33,389 There's a lot of pitfalls to that. 1484 00:50:33,390 --> 00:50:34,739 And I'm happy to talk to anybody about it 1485 00:50:34,740 --> 00:50:35,740 afterwards. 1486 00:50:36,510 --> 00:50:38,969 But it is it does require, 1487 00:50:38,970 --> 00:50:40,949 you know, some some humility, some 1488 00:50:40,950 --> 00:50:42,329 sensitivity. 1489 00:50:42,330 --> 00:50:44,549 I'm sure that that here, you know, 1490 00:50:44,550 --> 00:50:46,109 if you want to work with refugees, it's 1491 00:50:46,110 --> 00:50:47,129 not like they're going to they're going 1492 00:50:47,130 --> 00:50:48,419 to say, oh, great, I want to work with 1493 00:50:48,420 --> 00:50:50,549 you. And I don't have any suspicions. 1494 00:50:50,550 --> 00:50:52,379 So so I think that's that's a lot of it. 1495 00:50:52,380 --> 00:50:54,749 And there I mean, there 1496 00:50:54,750 --> 00:50:57,059 is just so much to that 1497 00:50:57,060 --> 00:50:58,739 and to that kind of community organizing 1498 00:50:58,740 --> 00:51:00,359 that that could be a whole series of 1499 00:51:00,360 --> 00:51:03,569 talks when it comes to 1500 00:51:03,570 --> 00:51:06,299 sort of tech workers in the Bay Area. 1501 00:51:06,300 --> 00:51:08,399 So in Oakland, at least, I 1502 00:51:08,400 --> 00:51:10,259 know that with the activism that was 1503 00:51:10,260 --> 00:51:11,769 happening in Oakland, again, also we're 1504 00:51:11,770 --> 00:51:13,829 getting very rapidly gentrified with the 1505 00:51:13,830 --> 00:51:15,029 activism that was happening. 1506 00:51:15,030 --> 00:51:17,009 There were some tech workers that were 1507 00:51:17,010 --> 00:51:19,349 involved, but for the most part not. 1508 00:51:19,350 --> 00:51:20,609 And. 1509 00:51:20,610 --> 00:51:23,609 The impression that I get is that 1510 00:51:23,610 --> 00:51:25,749 there's not I don't know, 1511 00:51:25,750 --> 00:51:28,109 it's not it's not totally my community, 1512 00:51:28,110 --> 00:51:29,549 but they haven't been prominently 1513 00:51:29,550 --> 00:51:31,529 involved in any of this, certainly. 1514 00:51:31,530 --> 00:51:32,519 And they're and they're helping to 1515 00:51:32,520 --> 00:51:33,689 capture data. 1516 00:51:33,690 --> 00:51:35,819 So it's not surprising that 1517 00:51:35,820 --> 00:51:36,820 they wouldn't be. 1518 00:51:38,950 --> 00:51:41,019 Hi, I was wondering 1519 00:51:41,020 --> 00:51:43,179 if in your research, you mentioned 1520 00:51:43,180 --> 00:51:44,829 the interconnectivity between law 1521 00:51:44,830 --> 00:51:47,049 enforcement agencies sharing 1522 00:51:47,050 --> 00:51:49,419 their data, are 1523 00:51:49,420 --> 00:51:51,549 the companies who collect, say, 1524 00:51:51,550 --> 00:51:53,409 pictures from the street working with 1525 00:51:53,410 --> 00:51:55,689 people who do mobile ticketing 1526 00:51:55,690 --> 00:51:57,909 to share their information, to create 1527 00:51:57,910 --> 00:51:59,769 like a picture of someone's day to day 1528 00:51:59,770 --> 00:52:00,770 life? 1529 00:52:01,480 --> 00:52:03,579 So mobile ticketing and 1530 00:52:03,580 --> 00:52:05,649 and what was the first like? 1531 00:52:05,650 --> 00:52:08,139 Just like are they particularly sharing 1532 00:52:08,140 --> 00:52:10,809 data with, say, the people who, 1533 00:52:10,810 --> 00:52:13,059 like, captured camera feeds 1534 00:52:13,060 --> 00:52:14,529 on the street, like it's obviously 1535 00:52:14,530 --> 00:52:16,029 independent companies? 1536 00:52:16,030 --> 00:52:18,099 Are they connected as law 1537 00:52:18,100 --> 00:52:21,249 enforcement agencies are connected to 1538 00:52:21,250 --> 00:52:23,319 like really expose someone's day to 1539 00:52:23,320 --> 00:52:24,639 day life? 1540 00:52:24,640 --> 00:52:26,889 So I haven't done as much research into 1541 00:52:26,890 --> 00:52:29,109 that. I mean, instinctively, 1542 00:52:29,110 --> 00:52:30,579 I would say the answer is yes. 1543 00:52:30,580 --> 00:52:32,649 And one thing to keep in mind is 1544 00:52:32,650 --> 00:52:34,749 that but I can't say it's 1545 00:52:34,750 --> 00:52:36,789 not has not been my focus. 1546 00:52:36,790 --> 00:52:38,259 One thing I can say is that once your 1547 00:52:38,260 --> 00:52:40,449 data is is 1548 00:52:40,450 --> 00:52:42,639 collected, you know, it is it 1549 00:52:42,640 --> 00:52:43,959 can be considered valuable in the same 1550 00:52:43,960 --> 00:52:45,489 way that online data could be considered 1551 00:52:45,490 --> 00:52:46,779 valuable. 1552 00:52:46,780 --> 00:52:48,069 But I'm not certain and I think that 1553 00:52:48,070 --> 00:52:49,239 that's an area that needs to be looked at 1554 00:52:49,240 --> 00:52:50,240 more. 1555 00:52:51,340 --> 00:52:53,379 Next question is for the Internet. 1556 00:52:53,380 --> 00:52:55,439 So how do you find out about 1557 00:52:55,440 --> 00:52:57,279 your local governments adopting these 1558 00:52:57,280 --> 00:52:58,690 technologies beforehand? 1559 00:53:00,040 --> 00:53:02,109 So this very much depends on where 1560 00:53:02,110 --> 00:53:03,129 you are. 1561 00:53:03,130 --> 00:53:05,949 I can mostly only speak to the states, 1562 00:53:05,950 --> 00:53:07,329 and this is one of the sort of pitfalls 1563 00:53:07,330 --> 00:53:08,979 of dealing with these these types of 1564 00:53:08,980 --> 00:53:10,749 technologies and why it's so important to 1565 00:53:10,750 --> 00:53:12,249 be talking about it here, because we get 1566 00:53:12,250 --> 00:53:13,569 a chance to talk to each other. 1567 00:53:14,590 --> 00:53:16,779 But in the States, it's usually 1568 00:53:16,780 --> 00:53:17,919 three things. 1569 00:53:17,920 --> 00:53:20,229 One, people who are 1570 00:53:20,230 --> 00:53:21,819 on the streets will notice something 1571 00:53:21,820 --> 00:53:24,099 weird happening or they'll notice 1572 00:53:24,100 --> 00:53:25,419 that they're getting it. 1573 00:53:25,420 --> 00:53:27,159 They're getting the police are talking to 1574 00:53:27,160 --> 00:53:29,919 them. They're not exactly sure why. 1575 00:53:29,920 --> 00:53:31,809 So they'll notice something and they may 1576 00:53:31,810 --> 00:53:34,269 actually, you know, go to an organization 1577 00:53:34,270 --> 00:53:36,219 like Electronic Frontier Foundation and 1578 00:53:36,220 --> 00:53:37,899 they may go to people who they know are 1579 00:53:37,900 --> 00:53:40,469 already doing this work and 1580 00:53:40,470 --> 00:53:42,999 and they'll actually go analyze. 1581 00:53:43,000 --> 00:53:45,519 So like with cell site simulator's, 1582 00:53:45,520 --> 00:53:46,989 people will actually go analyze and say, 1583 00:53:46,990 --> 00:53:48,009 OK, we're seeing all of these 1584 00:53:48,010 --> 00:53:49,010 discrepancies. 1585 00:53:50,080 --> 00:53:52,809 Looks like this is maybe in use here. 1586 00:53:52,810 --> 00:53:54,639 That's one way, the other way. 1587 00:53:54,640 --> 00:53:56,859 And this is very frustrating. 1588 00:53:56,860 --> 00:53:58,329 But there are people who do it. 1589 00:53:58,330 --> 00:53:59,499 There are people who do it incredibly 1590 00:53:59,500 --> 00:54:01,689 well in Oakland is actually 1591 00:54:01,690 --> 00:54:04,179 if you if if there are requirements 1592 00:54:04,180 --> 00:54:06,909 that before your city council 1593 00:54:06,910 --> 00:54:09,039 or the police 1594 00:54:09,040 --> 00:54:10,089 department or anything, if there are 1595 00:54:10,090 --> 00:54:12,609 requirements that they notify 1596 00:54:12,610 --> 00:54:13,629 you about what they're going to be 1597 00:54:13,630 --> 00:54:15,699 discussing. So this is, you know, in 1598 00:54:15,700 --> 00:54:17,829 the states before any city 1599 00:54:17,830 --> 00:54:19,749 council meeting or before any county 1600 00:54:19,750 --> 00:54:21,909 board of supervisors meeting, there's 1601 00:54:21,910 --> 00:54:23,499 some sort of notice requirement about 1602 00:54:23,500 --> 00:54:24,939 what they'll be discussing. 1603 00:54:24,940 --> 00:54:26,649 And there are people who just continually 1604 00:54:26,650 --> 00:54:28,899 pay attention to these announcements 1605 00:54:28,900 --> 00:54:31,239 because they hide things in there 1606 00:54:31,240 --> 00:54:32,649 and they expect that nobody will ever see 1607 00:54:32,650 --> 00:54:35,919 them. So before it ever gets adopted, 1608 00:54:35,920 --> 00:54:38,259 the lawmakers worst nightmare is having 1609 00:54:38,260 --> 00:54:40,749 like 40 angry people outside 1610 00:54:40,750 --> 00:54:42,579 their door saying, are you kidding? 1611 00:54:42,580 --> 00:54:44,139 You're going to give cops this technology 1612 00:54:44,140 --> 00:54:45,639 when they're already harassing people. 1613 00:54:46,750 --> 00:54:48,339 So paying attention. 1614 00:54:48,340 --> 00:54:50,889 And then, of course, the third is doing 1615 00:54:50,890 --> 00:54:52,089 public information requests. 1616 00:54:52,090 --> 00:54:54,249 So Public Records Act requests, 1617 00:54:54,250 --> 00:54:56,169 paying attention and seeing what you get 1618 00:54:56,170 --> 00:54:58,389 in there and, you know, really reaching 1619 00:54:58,390 --> 00:55:01,239 out to get help because sometimes 1620 00:55:01,240 --> 00:55:03,069 you'll get requests. And if the right 1621 00:55:03,070 --> 00:55:04,419 person is looking at it, they'll notice 1622 00:55:04,420 --> 00:55:05,949 one thing that will then lead them to 1623 00:55:05,950 --> 00:55:07,239 make further requests. 1624 00:55:07,240 --> 00:55:09,039 So you can sort of follow the follow the 1625 00:55:09,040 --> 00:55:10,389 breadcrumbs to the technology. 1626 00:55:12,600 --> 00:55:14,759 OK, so societies have a tendency 1627 00:55:14,760 --> 00:55:17,459 to penalize and criminalize many things 1628 00:55:17,460 --> 00:55:18,869 over time. So first we catch the 1629 00:55:18,870 --> 00:55:20,789 murderers and the thieves and then the 1630 00:55:20,790 --> 00:55:23,549 people who do who speed with their cars. 1631 00:55:23,550 --> 00:55:24,839 It's a tendency we have. 1632 00:55:24,840 --> 00:55:26,429 We create more and more law to require 1633 00:55:26,430 --> 00:55:28,319 more and more crime to go ahead. 1634 00:55:28,320 --> 00:55:29,609 Sorry, what's your question? 1635 00:55:29,610 --> 00:55:33,029 My question is, is our answer to society 1636 00:55:33,030 --> 00:55:35,669 accept a certain level of criminality 1637 00:55:35,670 --> 00:55:37,499 and stop the surveillance? 1638 00:55:37,500 --> 00:55:39,629 Or is our answer hire many, many 1639 00:55:39,630 --> 00:55:41,699 more policemen who do manual work 1640 00:55:41,700 --> 00:55:43,020 and stop the surveillance? 1641 00:55:46,020 --> 00:55:47,909 I mean, I think it depends on who you 1642 00:55:47,910 --> 00:55:50,159 are, you're talking to me. 1643 00:55:50,160 --> 00:55:52,469 So my answer is 1644 00:55:52,470 --> 00:55:54,359 that we have all sorts of structural 1645 00:55:54,360 --> 00:55:55,529 problems. 1646 00:55:55,530 --> 00:55:57,449 Ultimately, I think we should be in a 1647 00:55:57,450 --> 00:55:58,590 society without police. 1648 00:56:06,380 --> 00:56:08,599 Until we get there, until we get there, 1649 00:56:08,600 --> 00:56:10,309 that's my strategy as harm reduction, 1650 00:56:11,390 --> 00:56:13,039 particularly as an anarchist who does 1651 00:56:13,040 --> 00:56:14,149 sort of policy work. 1652 00:56:16,880 --> 00:56:18,529 It's about it's about changing the 1653 00:56:18,530 --> 00:56:20,599 effects of this technology right now for 1654 00:56:20,600 --> 00:56:21,859 people who are being affected by it. 1655 00:56:21,860 --> 00:56:23,929 You know, I will go I will argue 1656 00:56:23,930 --> 00:56:25,639 all day long with lawmakers about the 1657 00:56:25,640 --> 00:56:27,859 crappy technology that they're adopting, 1658 00:56:27,860 --> 00:56:28,969 even though I think they shouldn't have 1659 00:56:28,970 --> 00:56:30,499 the right to adopt it in the first place. 1660 00:56:30,500 --> 00:56:31,579 And that's harm reduction. 1661 00:56:31,580 --> 00:56:33,079 You know, you can have as many ideals as 1662 00:56:33,080 --> 00:56:34,639 you want, but that's not fair to the 1663 00:56:34,640 --> 00:56:36,289 people who right now are getting sent to 1664 00:56:36,290 --> 00:56:38,689 jail. So get rid of the cops. 1665 00:56:38,690 --> 00:56:40,309 In the meantime, reduce the harm that 1666 00:56:40,310 --> 00:56:41,310 they can do. 1667 00:56:47,700 --> 00:56:49,829 I'm curious, in your research 1668 00:56:49,830 --> 00:56:52,289 and in your experience what the reaction 1669 00:56:52,290 --> 00:56:54,149 is from the police when people try to 1670 00:56:54,150 --> 00:56:56,069 protect themselves and each other using 1671 00:56:56,070 --> 00:56:57,929 things like makeup or reflective hoodies, 1672 00:56:57,930 --> 00:56:59,939 like you mentioned, and then maybe I have 1673 00:56:59,940 --> 00:57:01,799 a fantasy about someone rigging up a 1674 00:57:01,800 --> 00:57:04,079 bunch of burner cell phones and making 1675 00:57:04,080 --> 00:57:06,209 some kind of fancy dos attack 1676 00:57:06,210 --> 00:57:08,610 against these cell simulators. 1677 00:57:09,870 --> 00:57:11,579 What where do they draw the line when 1678 00:57:11,580 --> 00:57:13,289 they start to say you're impeding police 1679 00:57:13,290 --> 00:57:14,969 progress and now you're arrested? 1680 00:57:16,230 --> 00:57:18,629 Well, I think with the sort of physical 1681 00:57:18,630 --> 00:57:21,119 barriers they've always 1682 00:57:21,120 --> 00:57:23,189 been, they always get aggressive in 1683 00:57:23,190 --> 00:57:25,109 the face of that, you know, and of 1684 00:57:25,110 --> 00:57:26,909 course, now you want to put a mask on 1685 00:57:26,910 --> 00:57:29,039 your face, at least in the United States, 1686 00:57:29,040 --> 00:57:30,359 automatically going to say you're black 1687 00:57:30,360 --> 00:57:31,589 block and you're about to break some 1688 00:57:31,590 --> 00:57:32,590 windows. 1689 00:57:33,060 --> 00:57:35,459 But, you know, even even regardless 1690 00:57:35,460 --> 00:57:37,500 of that, if you have your face covered, 1691 00:57:38,620 --> 00:57:40,079 the reality is and this comes from my 1692 00:57:40,080 --> 00:57:41,069 work doing legal support. 1693 00:57:41,070 --> 00:57:42,419 The reality is that even if it's not 1694 00:57:42,420 --> 00:57:44,159 legal for police to tell you to take a 1695 00:57:44,160 --> 00:57:46,019 mask off, they'll still do it and they'll 1696 00:57:46,020 --> 00:57:48,239 still a rescue later. 1697 00:57:48,240 --> 00:57:50,129 You can sort out the details of the fact 1698 00:57:50,130 --> 00:57:51,209 that they weren't allowed to do the 1699 00:57:51,210 --> 00:57:53,399 arrest, but they will they 1700 00:57:53,400 --> 00:57:54,479 will be aggressive about it. 1701 00:57:54,480 --> 00:57:56,669 And so those physical barriers now 1702 00:57:56,670 --> 00:57:58,349 the makeup, I haven't actually ever been 1703 00:57:58,350 --> 00:57:59,969 at a demonstration where I saw somebody 1704 00:58:01,170 --> 00:58:02,609 using that. So I don't know. 1705 00:58:02,610 --> 00:58:03,689 I think they would probably just think 1706 00:58:03,690 --> 00:58:04,690 that it's weird makeup. 1707 00:58:05,490 --> 00:58:07,799 But but yeah, I mean, they are certainly 1708 00:58:07,800 --> 00:58:08,939 going to react aggressively. 1709 00:58:08,940 --> 00:58:10,139 And I will tell you, law enforcement 1710 00:58:10,140 --> 00:58:12,329 shows up every single time I go to any 1711 00:58:12,330 --> 00:58:13,319 sort of meeting to talk about. 1712 00:58:13,320 --> 00:58:14,759 That's about this technology. 1713 00:58:14,760 --> 00:58:17,579 And they are very aggressive and they 1714 00:58:17,580 --> 00:58:18,899 lie about the technology. 1715 00:58:18,900 --> 00:58:20,249 They lie about its capabilities. 1716 00:58:20,250 --> 00:58:21,719 And they called me a liar. 1717 00:58:21,720 --> 00:58:22,720 It's pretty ridiculous. 1718 00:58:24,550 --> 00:58:25,860 Next question is for the Internet. 1719 00:58:26,950 --> 00:58:29,519 So what's the range of the stingray 1720 00:58:29,520 --> 00:58:31,199 devices? 1721 00:58:31,200 --> 00:58:33,419 That is a great question, one 1722 00:58:33,420 --> 00:58:35,819 that I wish I knew the answer to 1723 00:58:35,820 --> 00:58:37,079 in my research. 1724 00:58:37,080 --> 00:58:39,569 I the last thing that I did on 1725 00:58:39,570 --> 00:58:40,979 a street level surveillance site was put 1726 00:58:40,980 --> 00:58:42,389 up a frequently asked questions about 1727 00:58:42,390 --> 00:58:43,679 cell site simulators, which if you're 1728 00:58:43,680 --> 00:58:45,869 interested in them, I got to say by 1729 00:58:45,870 --> 00:58:47,399 the end of my research, I wanted to, 1730 00:58:47,400 --> 00:58:48,389 like, throw my phone away. 1731 00:58:48,390 --> 00:58:50,609 I was so disturbed. 1732 00:58:50,610 --> 00:58:53,009 So just from various sources 1733 00:58:53,010 --> 00:58:55,229 and from marketing materials, 1734 00:58:55,230 --> 00:58:56,909 there are stingrays that are so strong 1735 00:58:56,910 --> 00:58:59,129 and so called boxes 1736 00:58:59,130 --> 00:59:01,709 that they can they can read cell phones 1737 00:59:01,710 --> 00:59:03,039 from a plane. 1738 00:59:03,040 --> 00:59:05,409 So that sort of gives you an idea 1739 00:59:05,410 --> 00:59:06,599 of the smaller ones. 1740 00:59:07,800 --> 00:59:09,989 They've said like in hearings 1741 00:59:09,990 --> 00:59:11,819 before the House Judiciary Committee, the 1742 00:59:11,820 --> 00:59:13,229 Department of Homeland Security and the 1743 00:59:13,230 --> 00:59:15,329 DOJ has said, I believe 1744 00:59:15,330 --> 00:59:17,009 that, you know, the range is something 1745 00:59:17,010 --> 00:59:18,839 like a couple of city blocks. 1746 00:59:18,840 --> 00:59:21,029 I wouldn't trust any of these companies 1747 00:59:21,030 --> 00:59:22,349 as to what they say publicly. 1748 00:59:22,350 --> 00:59:23,429 I would love to see their marketing 1749 00:59:23,430 --> 00:59:24,430 materials. 1750 00:59:25,010 --> 00:59:26,639 OK, last question over there. 1751 00:59:27,720 --> 00:59:29,109 Thank you very much for the talk. 1752 00:59:29,110 --> 00:59:31,679 First, I was wondering 1753 00:59:31,680 --> 00:59:34,079 about facial recognition and 1754 00:59:34,080 --> 00:59:36,119 CCTV images. 1755 00:59:36,120 --> 00:59:38,249 Everyone knows that that technology 1756 00:59:38,250 --> 00:59:40,259 exists. But my question would be, if you 1757 00:59:40,260 --> 00:59:42,449 have knowledge about it, how 1758 00:59:42,450 --> 00:59:45,359 far is it used as a default 1759 00:59:45,360 --> 00:59:47,579 and how far images 1760 00:59:47,580 --> 00:59:49,650 are processed automatically to, 1761 00:59:50,850 --> 00:59:53,369 well, to create movement profiles 1762 00:59:53,370 --> 00:59:54,370 and so on. 1763 00:59:55,110 --> 00:59:57,570 So in some places, law enforcement 1764 00:59:58,650 --> 00:59:59,849 is adapting. 1765 00:59:59,850 --> 01:00:02,429 Is adopting facial recognition ready 1766 01:00:02,430 --> 01:00:04,409 cameras? These are cameras that do 1767 01:00:04,410 --> 01:00:05,669 automatically process data. 1768 01:00:07,080 --> 01:00:09,209 And there are also in the states, there 1769 01:00:09,210 --> 01:00:11,489 are some companies, some actual 1770 01:00:11,490 --> 01:00:13,649 local law enforcement that have 1771 01:00:13,650 --> 01:00:15,719 their own facial recognition databases. 1772 01:00:15,720 --> 01:00:17,279 So it's not just that they're capturing 1773 01:00:17,280 --> 01:00:19,319 the information, they're processing it, 1774 01:00:19,320 --> 01:00:21,539 preparing it for the analysis 1775 01:00:21,540 --> 01:00:23,399 of the points of what they're looking at 1776 01:00:23,400 --> 01:00:24,839 on everybody's face. 1777 01:00:24,840 --> 01:00:26,399 And it's easily accessible to them. 1778 01:00:26,400 --> 01:00:27,629 And this is at the local level. 1779 01:00:27,630 --> 01:00:29,489 I mean, this is like a city police 1780 01:00:29,490 --> 01:00:31,439 department that has this database. 1781 01:00:31,440 --> 01:00:33,269 So I think more and more that technology 1782 01:00:33,270 --> 01:00:34,270 is getting integrated. 1783 01:00:35,220 --> 01:00:36,780 So you should everybody should be scared. 1784 01:00:38,580 --> 01:00:39,659 Almost happy. No, thank. 1785 01:00:39,660 --> 01:00:41,759 Think you're want 1786 01:00:41,760 --> 01:00:42,989 to leave the room. 1787 01:00:42,990 --> 01:00:44,259 Please do take your trash. 1788 01:00:44,260 --> 01:00:46,349 But trust, but also the trust that 1789 01:00:46,350 --> 01:00:48,119 other people have left behind. 1790 01:00:48,120 --> 01:00:49,120 Thank you.